Pro-Sociality and Political Voice

Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Uganda

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NOVA SBE & WZB

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Female participation is important

- There is evidence that **political engagement of women** affects policy

- When women gained voting rights in USA:
  - There was a decline of 8 to 15% in child mortality *(Miller, 2008)*
  - More liberal voting patterns and increase government expenditures *(Kenny and Lott, 1999)*

- Furthermore, there is evidence that female participation in a village development program, increases involvement of women in village governance, community life and economic activities in Afghanistan *(Beath, Christia and Enikolopov, 2013)*
Participation of women at local level remains low

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Attend comm meeting</th>
<th>Join others raise issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: % who say ”once or twice”, ”several times”, or ”often”
Note 2: Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 131. Pauline M. Wambua. Weak support and limited participation hinder women’s political leadership in North Africa. Jan 2017. Data from 2016 wave
Particularly in Uganda

- Women are marginalized from the male dominated community politics and local councils (Tripp, 1997).
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Research Questions

- What are the effects of an increase in political voice of women in the context of informal institutions on policy outcomes?
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- What is the relationship between political voice and contributions to a community level public good game in the context of rural Uganda?
This paper

- Increasing political voice of women may help development by
  1. Shifting resources (different preferences)
  2. Increasing contributions to community (agency/reciprocity toward community)

- I develop a model explaining the relationship between political voice and pro-sociality

- I use a modified Public Good Game with contributions of public account used to buy a good for the community’s school or health center

- It allows me to control for selection/reverse causality by exogenously assigning political voice
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- Results:
  1. No overall effect of political voice on contributions to community
  2. Women overall contribute less than men, but those given political voice contribute the same as men
  3. Effect is driven by women who had higher levels of empowerment at baseline (survey)
I propose...

Novel version of a modified *public goods game* that examines the effect of an exogenous increase of political voice on the contributions to public goods.
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Hypotheses:
1. More political voice increases the level of contributions.
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Novel version of a modified **public goods game** that examines the effect of an exogenous increase of political voice on the contributions to public goods.

**Hypotheses:**

1. More political voice increases the level of contributions.
2. Political voice increases contributions more in women than in men - women start off with a lower level of political voice in the community
Context

- Lira District, North Uganda
- **Sample size:** 290 individuals, 10 per game. 29 PGG in 20 communities

- Ten participants per game - selected by random walk previous day
- 94% attendance of mobilized people
- One or two games played per village. In case of two games, they were played simultaneously
Modified Public Good Game

- Two rounds

- Initial Endowment, $E$: 10,000 UGX (2.5€) in fake bills of 1,000 UGX

- Private account:
  \[ T_i = E_i - C_i \]

- Group account:
  \[ T_j = 2 \sum C_i \]

$T_j$ is used to buy a good for the Primary School or for the Health Center in the community.
Political Voice

- Participants decide to which sector they want to allocate the money; education or health

- They vote for one of the sectors before the first round of the game

- Political Voice = Voting power

- At the beginning of each round, participants receive a card.
  - Red: invalid vote, no voting power
  - Green: valid vote, voting power

- Randomly allocated in the first round. In the second round the color is reversed.

- Participants know there are 5 green cards and 5 red cards but the don’t know who has them
Strategy Method

- In each round the participant receives two different endowments (Education and Health) and the decision between public and private account is made *conditional* on that sector receiving more votes.

- To isolate the effect of political voice from preferences selection
The Game

1. Vote for education or health
The Game

1. Vote for education or health
2. Round 1
   2.1 The participants receive the card - *Political Voice*
   2.2 Participants make their contributions to education and to health
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3. Same in round 2
4. One round is randomly chosen
5. Votes are counted and payments made out for the category with more votes
Results
H1: Effect of political voice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Contributions round 1</th>
<th>(2) Contributions round 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Voice</td>
<td>-0.226</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.195)</td>
<td>(0.203)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions round 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.623***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.876***</td>
<td>1.175***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.227)</td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
H2: Effect political voice by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>t-statistic</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Voice</td>
<td>-0.262</td>
<td>(0.257)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.744***</td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Voice X Female</td>
<td>0.605*</td>
<td>(0.330)</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions Round 1</td>
<td>0.618***</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>11.15</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.598***</td>
<td>(0.256)</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 288
Exploratory analysis

Table: Contributions Preferred sector

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<thead>
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<th>(1) Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Political Voice</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.284)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Voice X Female</td>
<td>-0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.429)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment</td>
<td>0.347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment X Political Voice</td>
<td>-0.619*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.356)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment X Female</td>
<td>-0.461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.443)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment X Political Voice X Female</td>
<td>1.173*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.617)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions round 1</td>
<td>0.617***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.384***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
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Conclusions

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- There is suggestive evidence that men and women respond very differently to the treatment of political voice according to previous level of empowerment in the community, probably driven by the fact that their point of reference is different; their own group.

- Policy implication: be cautious when designing programs that aim to improve political voice for marginalized groups since it may not be effective for the most marginalized.
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- Data suggests that women that have experienced some empowerment in the community, contribute more when given political voice in the game. Men seem to have the opposite behavior.
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