

THE ECONOMICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EVIDENCE FROM BANGLADESH

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OUTLINE

- 1 INTRODUCTION
- 2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
- 3 BEHAVIOR EXPERIMENT
- 4 SURVEY EXPERIMENT

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- Lifetime exposure to domestic violence is correlated with
 - Adverse economic and health outcomes in victims (Erten and Keskin 2018; Ellsberg et al. 2008; Campbell et al. 2002).
 - Poor developmental outcomes in children (Aizer 2011; Carrell and Hoekstra 2010; Koenen et al. 2003; Huth-Bocks et al. 2001).

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IS NEGATIVELY CORRELATED WITH GDP




FIGURE 1: Source: World Bank

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- Did not consider social image concerns. ► Correlates

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→ First step towards identifying interventions that can reduce violence.

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- ② **Income gradient**: Low-income men are up to twice as violent. ▶ $I \leftrightarrow V$
- ③ **Disobedience dependence**: Violence increases in “disobedience”. ▶ $D \leftrightarrow V$
 - Low-income wives do not disobey more. ▶ $D \leftrightarrow I$

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- ② Survey experiment: Elicit beliefs and norms using vignettes.

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- $\text{Utility}_H(\overset{-}{\text{disobedience}}, \overset{-/+}{\text{violence}}, \overset{+}{\text{consumption}}, \overset{+}{\text{social image}})$

► Wife's problem

► Husband's problem


1. MOTIVES FOR VIOLENCE: IV-DV-RV

Idiosyncratic Violence	Deterrence Violence	Reaction Violence
<i>V increases utility:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Taste for V • V increases social image 	<i>V deters D:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distaste for D • D decreases consumption • D decreases social image 	<i>V decreases utility cost of D:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Taste for punishment • V restores social image

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Disobedience independent	Disobedience dependent	

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 - *Social image*: Low-income men have higher MU from social image.

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- Woman chooses between small and large plate of rice for herself.

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- **Disobedience:** Woman gives herself the large plate.

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
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- Do men understand that disobedience is the efficient outcome? - Men play against themselves.
- Does hot-state violence matter? - One-shot ex-post punishment.

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- ① **Differences in taste:** Low-income men punish more even for no disobedience.
- ② **Differences in marginal utility:** Low-income men have higher consumption or social image concerns.

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 - ① Beliefs: How will the husband (re-)act?
 - ② Social norms: What is the socially desirable (re-)action?

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- Show vignettes portraying **visibly low- or visibly high-income** couple.
- **Vary situation portrayed**: Husband instructs wife to avoid disobedience that is costly to i) consumption, ii) social image.

	High	Low
High		
Low		

THE END

CROSS-COUNTRY RELATIONSHIP - TOP 50%




FIGURE 2: Source: World Bank

CROSS-COUNTRY RELATIONSHIP - BOTTOM 50%




FIGURE 3: Source: World Bank

GLOBAL ESTIMATES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE





FIGURE 4: Source: WHO, 2013

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME AND VIOLENCE REMAINS POORLY UNDERSTOOD



LOW-INCOME HUSBANDS USE MORE VIOLENCE

TABLE 1: Types of violence that husbands use against their wives, by income

	Low income (%)		High income (%)		Difference
He destroys her belongings	13.149	867	9.147	973	4.002***
He forces her to have sex	27.912	867	21.172	973	6.741***
He kicks her	18.339	867	10.175	973	8.164***
He limits her contact with others	17.497	863	11.614	973	5.884***
He forces her to perform sexual acts	16.148	867	8.941	973	7.206***
He punches her	13.610	867	8.941	973	4.669***
He pushes her	17.532	867	11.716	973	5.815***
He slaps her	38.870	867	30.113	973	8.757***
He spites her	21.915	867	18.088	973	3.826**
He stomps her	20.761	867	11.922	973	8.839***
He twists her wrist	11.188	867	6.578	973	4.610***

DISOBEDIENCE, VIOLENCE AND INCOME

TABLE 2: Disobedience, violence and income

	Outcome: Violence Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Disobedience Index	-0.010 (0.039)	-0.035 (0.039)	-0.120 (0.136)
Low Income	0.182*** (0.031)	0.116*** (0.032)	0.115*** (0.032)
Disobedience*Low Income	0.232*** (0.074)	0.216*** (0.074)	0.206*** (0.075)
Age		0.010 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)
Disobedience*Age			0.005 (0.006)
Secondary Edu		-0.188*** (0.036)	-0.188*** (0.036)
Husband Age		0.006* (0.004)	0.006* (0.004)
Husband Secondary Edu		-0.162*** (0.036)	-0.162*** (0.036)
Observations	1840	1840	1840

OLS regressions with modified Huber-White SEs.

DISOBEDIENCE BY INCOME

FIGURE 5: Without permission she...





FIGURE 6: It is justified to beat if...



CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK - WIFE'S PROBLEM

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \max_D \underbrace{u(C_W)}_{\text{Consumption utility}} + \underbrace{g(D, I)}_{\text{Disobedience utility}} - \underbrace{\overbrace{h(V(D), I)}^{\bar{u}(I)}}_{\text{Violence cost}} \end{array} \right. \begin{array}{l} M = 0 \\ M = 1 \end{array}$$

$$C_W = \alpha I$$

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK - HUSBAND'S PROBLEM

$$\max_{V, \alpha} \underbrace{u(C_H)}_{\text{Consumption utility}} + \underbrace{\tilde{\theta}(D, V(D), I)}_{\text{Image utility}} + \underbrace{e(V(D), I)}_{\text{Violence utility}} - \underbrace{f(D, V(D), I, \epsilon)}_{\text{Disbodience cost}}$$

$$C_H = (1 - \alpha)I - \underbrace{\lambda(D, I)}_{\text{Material cost}}$$

$$C_W = \alpha I$$


DIVORCE IS FINANCIALLY COSTLY

TABLE 3: Costs of divorce to husbands and wives, by income

	Low income		High income		
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Difference
Costs to husbands:					
Denmeher (USD)	2074.822	554	1827.005	693	247.818***
Divorced	0.059	809	0.034	917	0.026**
Costs to wives:					
Currently working	0.331	1182	0.261	973	0.070***
Total income	1059.604	1182	1687.091	973	-627.487**
She received money from parents	0.112	886	0.143	774	-0.032*
Money she sent parents last month (USD)	1.699	866	0.854	831	0.844*

Two-sided t-tests.

BEST-RESPONSES



IV-DV-HS PREDICTIONS

