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Improving the Effectiveness of Labor Courts Through Information and Conciliation

Institutions & Governance Mexico

Credit: Kam_

Courts in many lower-middle and low-income countries are rendered dysfunctional by long delays in resolving cases, corruption, low settlement rates, poor enforcement, and limited access to justice. In Mexico, researchers have observed these traits compounded by indications of significant misinformation among suing workers, overconfidence in outcomes, and lawsuit inflation, particularly for plaintiffs represented by private layers. In this project, researchers seek to understand the extent to which the divergence of incentives between private lawyers and the clients they represent contribute to the dysfunctionality of the courts and sub-optimal outcomes for plaintiffs.

The experiment tests two treatments:

  1. incentives to consult with (free) public lawyers; and
  2. the provision of a personalized statistical prediction about expected case outcomes as well as the plaintiff’s legally-mandated entitlements.

Both treatments occur before the plaintiffs file a suit. By influencing the choice of lawyer, this can identify the effect of lawyers on case delays and the amount awarded to the plaintiff, as well as measuring proxies of effort such as lawsuit quality and expectations for case outcomes. Welfare effects will be measured through surveys on satisfaction, measures of consumption and perceptions of corruption. Initial pilot projects provide evidence that the provision of statistical predictions reduces delays and increases conciliation in ongoing cases.

All PIS on Project
  • Joyce Sadka
  • Enrique Seira
  • Christopher Woodruff
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