Reconceptualizing the State: West Africa Workshop on Multi-actor Security Networks & Global Order

On May 13-14, 2025, CEGA and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) hosted the “Workshop on Multi-actor Security Networks and Global Order: West Africa” at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana. The workshop was part of CEGA’s Security Networks and Contested Orders Initiative, a multi-site effort to investigate security dynamics in world politics, funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. In this post, principal investigators and workshop organizers Naazneen Barma, Lina Benabdallah, Emma Birikorang, Susanna Campbell, Jonathan Chang, Aila Matanock, and Naila Salihu provide key takeaways from the meeting. As the final installment in a global workshop series, this session follows earlier workshops in the Pacific and Southeast Asia regions.

This workshop focused on West Africa and the Sahel Region, with regional participants presenting on Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Cameroon, Benin, Togo, Niger, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria. The workshop analyzed the security landscape of the region, which is undergoing significant transformation characterized by shifting partnerships and non-traditional security challenges, highlighting the evolving conceptions of statehood and sovereignty in West Africa and the Sahel. 

A fragmented regional security regime 

The post-Cold War global order has given way to an increasingly fragmented and multipolar landscape in which traditional multilateral frameworks are weakening, and non-Western powers (e.g., Russia, China, Turkey) are playing more assertive roles. This has led to competing norms, overlapping security partnerships, and a lack of coordinated responses to regional threats. West African states now navigate a world where security is contested, transactional, and resources to provide it are dispersed across multiple actors.

The web of external and regional actors operating in West Africa and the Sahel is complex and dynamic. Major and middle powers, such as China, Russia, the United States, France, Turkey, Iran, and Israel, and their proxies and partners (e.g., Africa Corps, Cameroon Rapid Intervention Battalion, G5 Sahel) are competing for influence across the region, each offering different models of security provision. The role of regional organizations, particularly the longstanding but now shrinking ECOWAS and the nascent Alliance of Sahel States (AES), remains unclear. This multiplicity of shifting actors creates both opportunities and challenges for West African states seeking to maintain sovereignty while addressing increasing security concerns.

The limitations of frameworks such as the G5 Sahel have driven coastal countries to pursue stronger bilateral and multilateral ties. Ghana and Burkina Faso are enhancing intelligence-sharing mechanisms. Benin and Niger signed a cooperation agreement in 2022, which was later suspended following the July 2023 coup in Niger. The Accra Initiative, led by Ghana, aims to facilitate intelligence sharing and military coordination. Although Nigeria is an observer, its preference remains with ECOWAS, signaling divergence among regional powers on central coordination mechanisms. Recent political upheaval in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and the subsequent creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), have disrupted previously existing cross-border security collaboration, as these countries have withdrawn from ECOWAS but continue limited engagement in intelligence sharing.

Given this fragmented and changing security regime, academic focus must shift from emphasizing what these states lack towards understanding how they are evolving during this period of conflict and transformation. These critical questions emerged: what model of the state is taking shape? What role are different security networks playing in this evolution? What is the role of regional organizations, in particular, in an increasingly overlapping multilateral space? 

Strategic Sovereignty: states as selective actors

Rather than viewing African states as passive recipients of international influence, workshop participants emphasized their agency and strategic rationality. States in the region are increasingly making intentional choices about whom to partner with—whether regional bodies (ECOWAS, AU), international powers (France, Russia, the US), or non-state actors (local militias, civil society). These decisions reflect political calculations about legitimacy, autonomy, and survival on the behalf of elites. This act of sharing sovereignty alters many aspects including potentially the structure of institutions, support and resources for leaders, and  perceptions of the state. The lines between domestic and external authority become blurred, raising new questions about state accountability, ownership, and the limits of state control.

Moving beyond simple models of the state as a unitary actor and instead emphasizing the hybrid nature of West African governance—a blend of bureaucratic institutions, traditional authority systems, and informal networks—workshop participants discussed who exercises power and how that power is legitimized, which depend on the interplay between internal actors (e.g., local leaders, civil society, or traditional institutions) and external agents (e.g., donors, foreign militaries, or international NGOs). The lines between state and non-state actors are increasingly blurred. Citizens often hold overlapping identities—such as being both tribal members and state employees—while armed groups and community leaders sometimes fulfill roles the state cannot.

As such, state legitimacy is not only institutional but also performative and negotiated. Non-state actors in some contexts, such as vigilante groups, religious authorities, or diaspora influencers, wield more day-to-day legitimacy than central government structures. From neighborhood watch groups in Ghana’s Nima community to underrecognized women-led negotiation efforts with insurgents in Mali, these actors often bridge formal and informal systems of authority while maintaining local legitimacy. These examples reflect the crucial role of traditional institutions in enabling the state to deliver security and public services. This interdependence requires us to rethink what constitutes “the state” and who counts as a security provider.

A regional conflict environment

These complex dynamics occur in an increasingly unstable regional security environment. Security challenges in West Africa transcend national boundaries, creating a truly regional conflict environment. Cross-border insecurity is facilitated by the growth of non-state armed groups (including Boko Haram, Islamic State, and Al Qaeda), criminal networks, and trafficking systems that exploit vulnerabilities, particularly among the younger populations. The Lake Chad Basin and border regions between coastal states and Sahel countries represent critical zones where these dynamics are most visible. 

Non-state actors are taking advantage of porous borders, weak state presence, and limited coordination among security forces to move freely across border frontiers in the region. The spillover of insecurity across states has led to increasing violence beyond traditional conflict zones, drawing coastal countries like Benin, Togo, and Ghana towards conflict in the Sahel. The interconnectivity of these threats means that instability in one country quickly reverberates across its neighbors, complicating regional-level responses and security.

Climate change and environmental degradation are other exacerbating factors that cross national boundaries. Despite the region’s minimal contribution to global emissions and limited capacity to influence global climate governance, West African countries are disproportionately affected by climate change as a threat multiplier. The effects on livelihoods and natural resources compound existing governance and security challenges, making affected communities more vulnerable to displacement and recruitment by extremist groups.

Increasingly “sovereign,” militarized states, supported by external actors

Frustration with past and current external interference and unmet development promises has fueled states to reclaim control over security and governance, exercising a form of “sovereignism.” To sustain their hold on power in an increasingly unstable region, many states are developing increasingly militarized responses to security challenges. To do so, they are creating security-based arrangements with the support of states that are now deeply invested in the region (i.e., Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and China). 

For example, Benin and Togo responded with militarization to the expanding threat of terrorism emanating from the Sahel. Benin has pursued diversified partnerships, engaging with both traditional Western actors and new African partners. Talks with Rwanda aim at military cooperation, including joint troop deployment, while France has provided reconnaissance drones and intelligence aircraft through the European Peace Facility (EPF). This support package includes training and equipment maintenance valued at €11.7 million. Togo has turned to multiple global actors, including Russia, Turkey, the United States, and France, to bolster its security apparatus. Russia has deployed experts and upgraded military infrastructure, complementing Turkish-supplied Bayraktar TB2 drones. Meanwhile, Lomé is also exploring deeper defense cooperation with the United States through the AFRICOM Excess Defense Articles program and preliminary arrangements for unarmed US drone access across the sub-region.

This approach reinforces a “strong state” model that seeks to share the monopoly over the use of force with states and other actors, including community defense groups, private security companies, and even traditional hunters (e.g., the Dozo of Mali and Côte d’Ivoire). The expansion of Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) in Burkina Faso and community groups elsewhere demonstrates this trend of militarization. This type of response has taken precedence over improved public service provision to build cooperation or negotiations.

However, once force is shared without proper command and control mechanisms, the state may be threatened by those with whom it shares that force. This creates a paradoxical situation where efforts to strengthen state security may ultimately undermine it. Despite this risk, governments across the region are increasingly focused on defending and asserting their sovereign authority over their territories, including against regional institutions. Many leaders are determined to maintain control over the provision of security in their territory even while depending on support from external actors, deepening their dependence on multi-actor security networks for their own survival.