

# National Identification and Interpersonal Trust in Diverse Societies

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## **Abstract**

Previous work has suggested that low levels of trust in ethnically diverse societies may be one mechanism explaining the negative relationship between diversity and economic growth. Building on theories developed in social psychology, I argue that increased national identification in such societies may reduce the negative effects of ethnic diversity on interpersonal trust by extending trust across ethnic lines. Based on analyses of original survey data collected in a border region of Malawi and Zambia, results suggest that degree of national identification is positively related to trust in conationals, even across ethnic lines. However, non-coethnics are trusted at rates similar to coethnics only among individuals that identify strongly with the nation *and* weakly with their ethnic group. Thus, the evidence suggests that increased national identification alone is not enough to reduce the coethnic trust premium.

It is taken as common wisdom among scholars and laymen alike that many of the political and economic problems of post-colonial states can be attributed to the lack of a unifying national identity. In Africa, the arbitrary division of the continent by colonial powers produced ethnically diverse countries, making the emergence of a unifying national identity difficult. As a consequence of this ethnic diversity, scholars have argued that low levels of trust and cooperation have hampered economic growth (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Englebert, 2002) and ethnic bloc-voting and ethnic favoritism have perverted democratic institutions (Horowitz, 1985; Neuberger, 2000; Chandra, 2004).

The presumption is that a common national identity shared by individuals within these countries could ameliorate the negative consequences of ethnic diversity. However, this presumption has yet to be rigorously tested. The work presented in this paper addresses the effects of national identification on one important micro-foundation of economic development – interpersonal trust. Previous work has identified the low levels of generalized trust within ethnically diverse societies as a mechanism explaining the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and economic growth. Building on the Common In-group Identity Model developed in social psychology (Gairtner and Dovidio, 2000), I argue that increased identification with the overarching national identity within ethnically diverse African societies may reduce the negative effects of ethnic diversity on interpersonal trust.

The empirical results presented come from two sources. The first are public opinion data collected by Afrobarometer in sixteen African countries. I analyze the effect of national identification on interpersonal trust at the individual level and find that national identification relative to ethnic identification is positively related to both generalized interpersonal trust and to trust in non-coethnics *vis-a-vis* coethnics. The second source of data comes from original survey data I collected in an ethnically diverse border region of Malawi and Zambia in the fall of 2010, which measures national and ethnic identification separately. I find evidence that the degree of identification with the national (ethnic) group is positively related to amount of additional trust held in strangers based on shared nationality (ethnicity). However, I do not find statistically significant effects of the strength of national identification on the degree to which non-coethnics within the same national group are trusted relative to coethnics, once strength of ethnic identification is controlled for. Building on results from these two data sources, and the lessons learned during preliminary fieldwork, the last section of the paper outlines

my plans for collecting additional data in Malawi.

## **Ethnic Diversity and Interpersonal Trust**

A growing literature in economics, beginning with a seminal paper by Easterly and Levine (1997), has identified a robustly negative relationship between ethnic diversity and economic growth around the world (see Alesina and Ferrara (2005) for a review). One of the mechanisms suggested to account for this relationship works through generalized trust. First suggested by Zak and Knack (2001), the argument is that low levels of generalized interpersonal trust inhibit economic growth, and that low trust is typically found in ethnically diverse societies. This argument implies two separate relationships: first, between trust and growth and, second, between ethnic diversity and trust.

### **Trust and Economic Growth**

Early work on the role of social capital on economic development focused on social capital as an umbrella category. For example, in the famous book explaining differential development between northern and southern Italy, Putnam (1993) defines social capital as encompassing trust in other members of society, cooperative social norms, and active civic engagement. However, the cross-national empirical analyses that followed Putnam have focused almost exclusively on generalized trust. The two most prominent papers that connect trust to economic performance are Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001). Both papers use World Values Survey data to measure trust, using the standard question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?” At the country level, these authors find that the percentage of respondents that say “most people can be trusted” is positively related to economic growth, controlling for the standard factors that predict economic performance. The identified effects are quite large – a one standard deviation increase in trust (15 percentage points) increases growth in GDP per capita by one percentage point (Zak and Knack, 2001). Other studies using a similar framework find comparable effect sizes (Whiteley, 2000; Beugelsdijk et al., 2004). The mechanism generally suggested to account for this effect is that societies with high levels of generalized trust are able to achieve higher eco-

conomic growth due to lower transaction costs (Zak and Knack, 2001; Whiteley, 2000). As Arrow (1972) has noted, “virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust.” Where such trust is lacking, individuals must invest in additional information or contracting, diverting resources away from production. Thus, Zak and Knack (2001) argue that when trust is sufficiently low there is too little investment to make economic growth possible.

## **Ethnic Diversity and Trust**

If generalized interpersonal trust is such an important requisite for economic growth, it is important to identify its determinants. Empirical work using the same survey data on generalized trust discussed above finds evidence that good government, wealth, income inequality, and Protestantism are all positively related to average levels of generalized trust (Zak and Knack, 2001; Delhey and Newton, 2005). But perhaps one of the most robust predictors of generalized trust across countries is the ethnic make-up of the country (Zak and Knack, 2001; Delhey and Newton, 2005; Hooghe et al., 2009). As Whiteley (2000) cogently puts it, “some societies, particularly those deeply divided by ethnic or racial divisions, may have strong ties and high levels of ‘thick’ trust within particular communities, but this does not generalize to society as a whole.”

Why does ethnic diversity reduce trust? Two possibilities have been suggested. First, it may be that individuals in all societies tend to trust coethnics more than non-coethnics, and because there are more non-coethnics in diverse societies, overall levels of generalized trust are depressed. In line with this explanation, Zak and Knack (2001) suggest that trust is lower in diverse societies because individuals possess an innate (biological) desire to protect one’s own extended family, through the mechanism of kin altruism. Thus, in all societies, individuals trust those from a similar ethnic background more than those of different ethnicities. In homogenous societies, there are high levels of generalized trust because everyone is ethnically similar. In contrast, in ethnically diverse societies, individuals may greatly trust their coethnics, but ‘most people’ would include a lot of non-coethnics whom the individual does not trust.

The second possibility is that diversity has more than just a compositional effect – it may make ethnic differences more relevant for who is to be trusted. For example, scholars have long had the intuition that ethnic diversity was

somehow related to the salience of ethnic differences (Horowitz, 1985). In particular, it has been argued that the salience of ethnic group differences should be maximized when there are a few, equally sized ethnic groups than when there is only one large ethnic group or many small ethnic groups, and, thus, measures of ‘ethnic polarization’ have been developed in order to capture this intuition (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a,b; Dincer, 2011). In terms of trust, then, we would expect that inter-group trust would decrease (and that within-group trust would increase) as ethnic salience increased.

This is ultimately an empirical question. The first explanation would predict that trust would have a negative linear relationship with generalized trust. In contrast, the second explanation would predict that generalized trust would have a non-monotonic relationship with ethnic diversity and would have a negative linear relationship with ethnic polarization. Existing evidence seems to support the latter explanation. Zak and Knack (2001) and Dincer (2011) find that ethnic diversity has a negative effect on trust at low levels of ethnic diversity, but that the relationship becomes positive at higher levels of diversity. Similarly, Dincer (2011) also finds a significant negative relationship between ethnic polarization and generalized trust.

These results suggest that ethnic make-up is related to generalized trust because certain ethnic compositions make ethnic differences more salient. The obvious next question is why the salience of ethnic differences are related to trust. Social identity theory (SIT), a guiding theory in social psychology, would suggest that increased salience of ethnic group differences increase the likelihood that individuals classify members of in-groups and out-groups based on ethnic membership (Tajfel et al., 1971). Relevant to the topic at hand, one benefit that in-group members consistently enjoy over out-group members is greater perceptions of trustworthiness by other in-group members (Brewer and Kramer, 1985; Kramer and Brewer, 2006).

Thus, in short, the existing literature suggests that ethnic polarization should be negatively related to generalized trust (and, in turn, economic growth) because individuals in polarized societies tend to define in-groups and out-groups on the bases of ethnicity. As a result, trust does not extend beyond ethnic lines.

## **Extending Trust Through National Identification**

If trust is ethnically-based in diverse societies because relevant in-groups are ethnically defined, is it ever possible to extend trust across ethnic lines? I argue that increased identification with a common, overarching national identity group can lead to increased trust in non-coethnics. This proposition is in line with the general recommendations of Putnam (2007), that diverse societies must “create new forms of social solidarity and dampen the negative effects of diversity by constructing new, more encompassing identities. Thus, the central challenge...is to create a new, broader sense of ‘we’.”

The expectation that national identification can increase trust in non-coethnics is consistent with work on inter-group relations in social psychology. In particular, scholars have found that the benefits enjoyed by in-group members can be extended to out-group members through increased identification with an overarching identity common to both groups, in what has become known as the Common In-group Identity Model (CIIM) (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000). While it is possible to create a common identity, CIIM is most successful when a common in-group identity can be fostered by increasing identification with an existing superordinate identity (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2005).

The CIIM rests on the finding that bias due to categorization of others into in-groups and out-groups generally results from positive in-group bias rather than negative out-group bias (Brewer, 1999). In the context of interpersonal trust in diverse societies, then, we expect that trust differences between coethnics and non-coethnics are due to increased trust in coethnics rather than reduced trust in non-coethnics (relative to a no-group situation). The CIIM argues for creating a new, more inclusive in-group through recategorization, so that positive benefits, such as trust, can be extended to former out-group members. This is in contrast to processes of individualization (decategorization) that reduce intergroup bias by reducing positive in-group biases (Wilder, 1981; Brewer and Miller, 1984).

Theoretically, there are two versions of the CIIM. In the first – the one group model – individuals abandon their sub-group identities for the sake of the common, overarching identity. Thus, former A group members and former B group members become C group members. The second model – the dual-identity model does not require the elimination of intergroup dif-

ferences in order to foster a common identity. The latter is seen to be more normatively appealing, and Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) argue that the dual-identity representation is just as effective at reducing intergroup bias as is the single group outcome. In the context of ethnically diverse states, the one group model would require that ethnic identities diminish at the expense of the national identity, which is similar to the “melting pot” analogy often employed in the United States. In contrast, the dual-identity version of the CIIM suggests that the benefits of common in-group membership can be realized without losing sub-group cultural differences. Which of these configurations of the CIIM leads to greater generalized trust in ethnically diverse states is an empirical question that this research project can address.

Existing evidence for the CIIM comes from both minimal group laboratory experiments and real world contexts, such as an ethnically diverse high-school (Gaertner et al., 1996), executives after a corporate merger (Bachman, 1993), children in ‘blended’ families after remarriage (Banker and Gaertner, 1998), and racially diverse football fans (Nier et al., 2001). A few existing studies have used the CIIM to try to understand the effect of national identification on intergroup relations. One evaluates the effect of increasing the salience of a common American identity on the relations between college-aged Democrats and Republicans (Riek et al., 2010). In this study, the authors find that a single common identity (American) was just as effective at reducing intergroup bias as was a dual identity (Democrats and Republicans, but first Americans). In another study, Transue (2007) finds that increasing the saliency of a shared national (American) identity increases support among whites for policies favoring a minority ethnic group in the US. Finally, while not explicitly working within the CIIM paradigm explicitly, Miguel (2004) finds higher levels of cooperation across ethnic lines in Tanzania than in Kenya, and attributes this difference to stronger national identification in Tanzania.

### **Conceptualizing Group Identification: Strength and Salience**

Thus far, I have laid out the theoretical expectation that national identification will be related to interpersonal trust within diverse societies. But what

does national identification really mean?<sup>1</sup> First, “national” simply refers to the territorially-defined, state-based identity group. Thus, for the purposes of this study, the national in-group is defined along citizenship lines.<sup>2</sup> The more difficult term to define is “identification.” In the social sciences, there is a classic debate between primordialist and circumstantialist approaches to the study of identity. The primordial approach, most often linked to Geertz (1963), argues that ethnic and national identities are fixed, deep-rooted, and naturally given.<sup>3</sup> In contrast, the circumstantialist approach emphasizes group identities as malleable and flexible in response to different circumstances. While this debate has revolved around the degree of stability in group identities themselves, the same logic is easily extended to the study of individual identification with a given group identity. In this case, we can think of the primordialist form of group identification as the *degree* or *strength* of identification with the group, which is fairly stable within an individual across contexts. The circumstantialist form of group identification, on the other hand, is the relative *salience* of a particular identity, which is likely to vary across different contexts.

While these two approaches are typically viewed as mutually exclusive, from a psychological perspective they are not incompatible (Brubaker, 2004). Research in psychology finds that while strength of identification with a social category is generally stable across individuals, it is also sensitive to context. In their study of racial identity among African-Americans, for example, Shelton and Sellers (2000) find that the degree of racial identification across individuals is fairly stable, and is explained by life experiences and socializa-

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<sup>1</sup>Note that “national identification” is distinct from the ideology of “nationalism.” The latter is the belief that national identity groups should be congruent with states (Gellner, 1983) and typically motivates studies of national groups demanding their own states (irredentism). Instead, this study addresses national identification, which can be thought of as an individual’s degree of identification with an existing state.

<sup>2</sup>A growing literature is focusing on the *content* of the national identity as a subject of study, with particular focus on how immigrants are perceived *vis-a-vis* the nation in developed democracies (Wright et al., 2011; Bonikowski, 2010). Thus, these scholars focus on how individuals define the nation, rather than how strongly they identify with it themselves, as the primary explanatory variable.

<sup>3</sup>Brubaker (2004) makes the cogent point that while primordialists only argue that individuals *perceive* their ethnic and national identities to be naturally given, their approach is often portrayed as purporting that the identities *are* naturally given. For this reason, ‘circumstantialist’ is used instead of ‘constructivist’ to refer to the opposing view, as most primordialist would agree that identity is socially constructed.



tion. However, while the meaning and attitudes attached to a given identity are stable across situations, different situations do influence which identity is particularly salient at a given time. Thus, this project seeks to incorporate both approaches.

I conceive of *strength* of identification as comprising three different ways in which individuals identify with social groups: affectively (Piper et al., 1983), cognitively (Tajfel et al., 1971), and behaviorally (Brewer and Gardner, 1996). *Affective* comes from the social cohesion literature on identification, and emphasizes interpersonal attraction and the attractiveness of the group. Affective identification, simply put, means that individuals identify with a given group to the degree that they *like* the group or its other members. *Behavioral* comes from the common fate literature, and focus on the interdependence of members as a source of group identification. Thus, behavioral identification with a group should increase the more that an individual *depends on or interacts with* other members of that group. Finally, *Cognitive* comes from the social identity literature, and theorizes that individuals categorize themselves as a member of a group based on shared attributes and homogeneity of characteristics. The basic argument is that these three forms of group identification are related to the degree to which an individual identifies with a given social category to which he or she belongs, and that this degree of identification is fairly stable within individuals. *Situational* identification with a given social group, on the other hand, is defined simply as the salience of a given social identity relative to other social identities in a particular context. The importance of such salience is made evident by constructivist arguments that individuals possess multiple identities, and that some identities are more salient in a given context than other identities (Laitin and Posner, 2001).

In addition to understanding the impact of the strength of national identification and salience of national identity on interpersonal trust separately, a longer-term goal of the larger project is to understand how these two forms of increased national identification interact. Cognitive psychology would suggest that there is an additive effect of stable and situational identification – the more strongly one identifies with the group, the more accessible that identity is, and thus the more sensitive an individual should be to the contextual salience of that identity (Bargh et al., 1986; Bargh and Pratto, 1986).

## Summary of Expectations

The discussion above suggests a number of observable implications. First, at the individual level, we should expect that:

- Strength (and salience) of national identification will be positively related to degree of generalized trust among citizens of ethnically diverse countries.
- Strength (and salience) of national identification will be negatively related to the ‘ethnic trust premium’ (difference between trust in coethnics and non-coethnics) among citizens of ethnically diverse countries.
- Increased salience of a common national identity will have a stronger negative effect on the size of the ‘ethnic trust premium’ among individuals that strongly identify with the national identity group.

## Empirics I: Cross-National Analyses

As a first test of (some of) these observation implications, I take advantage of existing survey data on national versus ethnic identification and interpersonal trust.

### Data

Individual level data come from the third round of Afrobarometer survey data collected in 2005–2006 (Afrobarometer, 2008). Between 1200 and 2400 individuals were surveyed in each of the following sixteen countries: Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The following individual level variable were used.

### National over Ethnic Identification

Group identification was measured using the following question:

*Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] and being a [Akan/Kikuyu/etc.]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to? Only Ethnic, Ethnic more than National, Ethnic and National Equally, National more than Ethnic, or National Only?*

I recoded the response into a binary indicator of choosing the national group over the ethnic group. Of the 22,155 respondents, 41% chose their national identity group over their ethnic identity group.

### **Generalized Trust**

Afrobarometer used the standard generalized trust question:

*Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people?*

18% of respondents across all countries said that most people can be trusted.

### **Trust in Coethnics**

Respondents were asked:

*How much do you trust people from your own ethnic group? Not at all, just a little, somewhat, or a lot?*

13% of respondents said 'not at all', 31% said 'just a little', 31% said 'somewhat', and 26% said 'a lot'.

### **Trust in Non-Coethnics**

Similarly, respondents were asked:

*How much do you trust [Ghanaians/Kenyans/etc.] from other ethnic groups? Not at all, just a little, somewhat, or a lot?*

21% of respondents said 'not at all', 36% said 'just a little', 27% said 'somewhat', and 16% said 'a lot'.

### **Coethnic Trust Premium**

For each individual, I calculated the difference in expressed trust in coethnics and expressed trust in non-coethnics (*Trust in Coethnic - Trust in Non-Coethnic*). Because each of the original trust variables ranged from 1 to 4, the resulting measure of the *Coethnic Trust Premium* ranged from -3 to 3, though only 5% of respondents had a negative value of the coethnic trust premium (i.e., trusted non-coethnics more than coethnics).

## Controls

Finally, I also include the following individual-level indicators as controls: gender, level of education, employment status, and urban/rural locality. Each of these indicators were found to be significant predictors of national over ethnic identification in previous work (Robinson, 2009).

## Results

In line with previous work, I find that individuals across the sixteen countries trust coethnics significantly more than non-coethnics, and the relationship is strongly significant within each of the sixteen countries, as well. Thus, there is evidence of a ‘coethnic trust premium’. However, this ‘coethnic trust premium’ is negatively related to national (versus ethnic) identification at the individual-level. Table 1 shows the results of standard OLS regression of *Trust Difference* on *National over Ethnic Identification* at the individual level. Both models include country fixed-effects, and the second model includes all control variables. In both specifications, national over ethnic identification is negatively related to the size of the coethnic trust premium. In other words, individuals that say that they identify more strongly with the national group than their ethnic group also trust non-coethnics at a rate more similar to coethnics, compared to individuals that do not identify with the nation above the ethnic group. The ethnic trust premium is reduced 0.15 standard deviations among nationally identifying individuals. However, as is evident from the very low adjusted- $R^2$  of both models, relative group identification is explaining very little of the variation in the size of the ethnic trust premium within countries.

Table 1: National Identification and CoEthnic Trust Premium

Variable	DV=TrustDiff	DV=TrustDiff
National Over Ethnic ID	-0.10*** (0.012)	-0.09*** (0.012)
Intercept	0.35*** (0.007)	0.44*** (0.012)
$N$	21,747	21,565
State FE	Y	Y
Controls Included	N	Y
Adj. $R^2$	0.02	0.02

Next, I analyzed the effect of national identification on expressed generalized trust. Table 2 shows the logistic regression of *Generalized Trust* on *National Over Ethnic Identification* at the individual level. Again, both models include state fixed-effects, and the second model includes individual-level control variables. In line with expectations, national over ethnic identification has a positive and statistically significant effect on an individual saying that ‘most people can be trusted’. After controlling for individual level characteristics, the odds that a nationally identifying individual will say that most people can be trusted are 31% higher than are the odds that an individual that do not choose their national identity over their ethnic identity will say the same.

Table 2: National Identification and Generalized Trust

Variable	DV=GenTrust	DV=GenTrust
National Over Ethnic ID	0.23*** (0.039)	0.27*** (0.039)
Intercept	-2.27*** (0.098)	-1.85*** (0.107)
<i>N</i>	21,688	21,507
State FE	Y	Y
Controls Included	N	Y
Pseudo $R^2$	0.05	0.06

Taken together, these results are consistent with the expectation that increased national identification will be positively related to generalized trust in diverse societies, and that this occurs because of the reduced difference in trust expressed in non-coethnics *vis-a-vis* coethnics.

## Limitations

The appropriateness of using Afrobarometer survey data to evaluate the effect of national identification on interpersonal trust is limited in two important ways: the way in which national identification is measured and the inability to isolate a conational trust premium.

First, the way in which national identification is measured in the Afrobarometer surveys has two main limitations. The first is that the question does not specify what is meant by ‘identify’, and thus the interpretation of the question likely varies quite a bit across individuals, and conflates the strength of identification with the relative salience of those two identities within the

context of the larger survey. Second, and more importantly, national identification is measured *relative* to ethnic identification. As a result, it is difficult to interpret the measure as an indicator of the *degree* of national identification without a clearer understanding of the relationship between national and sub-national forms of identification.

Second, the surveys only ask about trust in coethnics and non-coethnics, while holding conationality constant. Thus, *Trust Difference* is actually measuring the increased trust that national in-group members gain from also being ethnic in-group members relative to ethnic out-group members. In combination with the fact that national identification is measured relative to ethnic identification, this suggests that the results presented above could reflect the effect of ethnic group identification, rather than national group identification, on ethnic-based trust. What we would really like to have in order to evaluate the effect of national identification on trust, are measures of trust for conationals and non-conationals, holding coethnicity constant.

## Empirics II: Preliminary Fieldwork

In order to overcome some of the limitations outlined above, particularly in terms of measuring national identification separately from ethnic identification and in varying both conationality and coethnicity independently, I collected original survey data in an ethnically diverse border region of Malawi and Zambia in October 2010.

### Sample

Data were collected in northwestern Kasungu District and just across the border in Lundazi, Zambia. This region was selected for two principal reasons. First, it lies at the intersection of where two ethnic groups, the Chewa and the Tumbuka, meet (see Figure 1). There is documented evidence of hostility and prejudice between these two groups on the Malawian side of the border, which Posner (2004) argues is the result of political mobilization along ethnic lines, making it an ideal setting to assess




Figure 1: Fieldsite

whether or not such hostile inter-ethnic relations are lessened among nationally-identifying individuals. Second, the region crosses an international border, and members of both ethnic groups are found in both Malawi and Zambia. This simple fact lends great power to the research design by allowing me to vary common ethnic group membership and common national group membership independently. This in turn allows me to measure within-subject differences in of trust based on coethnicity and conationality, which can then be related to strength of identification with each of those identities. For example, if a respondent was a Chewa from Malawi living in this border region, I was able to measure trust in four different types of individuals: a Chewa from Malawi (same nationality, same ethnicity), a Tumbuka from Malawi (same nationality, different ethnicity), a Chewa from Zambia (different nationality, same ethnicity), and a Tumbuka from Malawi (different nationality, different ethnicity). I then evaluate whether strength of identification with the national group predicts the size of any ‘conational trust premium’, and strength of ethnic group identification is related to the measured ‘coethnic trust premium’. This design is part of a long tradition of taking advantage of ethnic groups partitioned by national boundaries in Africa (Asiwaju, 1985; Miles and Rochefort, 1991; Posner, 2006).

Within this region, myself and three local enumerators visited 10 rural villages along both sides of the border, interviewing 208 individuals in total. We visited three Malawian Chewa villages ( $n = 72$ ), two Malawian Tumbuka villages ( $n = 45$ ), two Zambian Chewa villages ( $n = 43$ ), and three Zambian Tumbuka villages ( $n = 48$ ). The survey included two different measures of stable ethnic and national identification and questions on trust in the four target groups. The pilot project did not address variation in the salience of the national identity.

In addition to measures of group identification and trusting attitudes, we also collected data on a number of demographic characteristics. Table 5 in the Appendix summarizes many of those variables for each of the four subsamples. Most analyses will consider the entire sample as a whole, so in order to be sure that observed differences between subsamples are not driving the results, I will include country and ethnic group dummies in some analyses, and the full list of control variables in others.

## Measuring Strength of Group Identification

Though the ultimate goal of the project is to measure both an individual's *strength* of group identification and the *salience* of that group identity within a given context, in the preliminary fieldwork I attempted to measure strength of national and ethnic group identification. To measure the degree of identification with the nation and ethnic group, I adapted a set of 16 first-person survey questions developed by social psychologists to measure a respondent's identification with different social groups (Henry et al., 1999). The battery includes sixteen first-person statements total, five to six for each of ways in which individuals identify with a social group (affectively, behaviorally, cognitively). Table 4 in the Appendix lists those items for the Malawian Chewa survey. (R) denotes an item that was reverse coded. All surveys were translated into the local language (either Chichewa or Chitumbuka) by a group of linguists at the University of Malawi, and the comparability of translations was discussed at length with the research team. For each item, respondents were asked whether they 'strongly agree', 'agree', 'disagree', or 'strongly disagree', which were coded as 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively. Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix show the frequency of response categories by item for each of the 16-item identification scales. There appeared to be strong acquiescence bias, something I will try to reduce in future surveys, which I discuss in the last section.

In order to aggregate each of these 16-item scales into single measure of the strength of group identification, I simply took the average degree of agreement over the 16-items. Table 8 presents the average strength of identification with the nation and the ethnic group for the full sample, and broken down by subsamples. For the analyses presented below, I mean-deviated each measure of group identification, in order to clarify interpretation of the estimated coefficients.

## Measuring Trust

Interpersonal trust in unknown individuals of four 'types' was measured for each respondent: trust in individuals of the same nationality and same ethnicity (SNSE), same nationality and different ethnicity (SNDE), different nationality and same ethnicity (DNSE), and different nationality and different ethnicity (DNDE). For each type of stranger, the respondent was asked the following four yes/no questions:



1. If you were traveling, would you worry about accepting food or accommodation from a \_\_\_\_\_?
2. Would you worry about getting cheated if you were to change currency with a \_\_\_\_\_?
3. If a \_\_\_\_\_ traveler came near your home, would you be scared to invite him into your home?
4. Would you worry about buying goods at the market from a \_\_\_\_\_?

The second and fourth items are most explicitly related to the type of trust that should be important for economic interactions, while the first and third items deal with common situations that require trust. As a first cut, I combined these four separate scenarios into a single measure of trust by calculating the frequency of ‘no’ (trusting) responses for each of the four types of ‘other’ for each respondent. Thus, for each respondent, I have a measure of trust, ranging from zero to one, for each type of individual: SNSE, SNDE, DNSE, and DNDE. Values closer to one reflect greater levels of expressed trust.

Measuring trust in this way allows me to evaluate the effect of strength of group identification (national or ethnic) on trust *within subjects*. This is desirable because the literature on the determinants of interpersonal trust find that a large degree of between-subjects variation in trust can be explained by differences in personality and risk acceptance across individuals. This set-up allows me to control for differences in general levels of trust, and focus only on how trust in different types of people is related to the strength of identification with groups common to them. Table 9 in the Appendix presents the average trust in the four types of strangers for the full sample, and for each of the four subsamples.

## Empirical Model

In order to analyze how strength of group identification affects trust based on shared group membership, I estimate the following model using standard OLS regression:

$$Trust_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 CoNational_{ij} + \beta_2 CoEthnic_{ij} + \beta_3 NatID_i + \beta_4 EthID_i$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& +\beta_5 \text{NatID}_i * \text{CoNational}_{ij} + \beta_6 \text{EthID}_i * \text{CoEthnic}_{ij} \\
& +\beta_7 \text{EthID}_i * \text{CoNational}_{ij} + \beta_8 \text{NatID}_i * \text{CoEthnic}_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}
\end{aligned}$$

The unit of analysis is respondent-target, with a measure of trust in each type of target ‘other’ (SNSE, SNDE, DNSE, DNDE), resulting in four different measures of trust for each respondent.  $\text{Trust}_{ij}$  is the measure of trust in type  $j$  by respondent  $i$ ,  $\text{CoNational}_{ij}$  is a dummy for whether the ‘other’ is a conational,  $\text{CoEthnic}_{ij}$  is a dummy for whether the ‘other’ is a co-ethnic,  $\text{NatID}_i$  is the mean-deviated continuous measure of strength of national identification, and  $\text{EthID}_i$  is the mean-deviated continuous measure of strength of ethnic identification. Each measure of strength of identification is interacted with each indicator of shared group membership with ‘other’  $j$ . Obviously, the four different measures of trust for each respondent are not independent of each other. In fact, around 50% of the total variance in trust is explained by individual differences. Thus, errors are clustered by respondent, resulting in 832 observations within 208 clusters.

## Results

Model 1 in Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients for this model using OLS. Model 2 of Table 3 is the same model but includes enumerator fixed-effects and a long list of control variables: various demographic characteristics (age, gender, education level, newspaper readership, having a wage income, speaking English, and ethnic ‘purity’), travel experiences (having left the district), political knowledge (knowing the name of one’s member of parliament), and connection to international information (knowing what the BBC is). In the interest of space, the estimated coefficients are not reported for individual control variables. While the overall fit of the model improves with these controls, the estimated coefficients of interest are fairly similar.

Because NatID and EthID both have a mean of zero, we can easily see that for average levels of national identification and ethnic identification, both conationality and coethnicity have a positive and statistically significant effect on trust. Further, these effects are of a similar magnitude. Thus, when controls are included (Model 2), on average SNSE are trusted at a rate of 0.75, SNDE are trusted at a rate of 0.58, DNSE are trusted at a rate of 0.58, and DNDE are trusted the least, at a rate of 0.41.

The first question of interest is whether strength of group identification

Table 3: Common In-group Identity Model

Variable	$\beta$	Model 1	Model 2
CoNational	$\beta_1$	0.17*** (0.019)	0.17*** (0.020)
CoEthnic	$\beta_2$	0.16*** (0.018)	0.17*** (0.019)
NatID	$\beta_3$	-0.18 (0.121)	-0.11 (0.119)
EthID	$\beta_4$	0.06 (0.138)	0.04 (0.126)
NatID * CoNational	$\beta_5$	0.25*** (0.083)	0.25*** (0.085)
EthID * CoEthnic	$\beta_6$	0.13* (0.070)	0.14** (0.072)
EthID * CoNational	$\beta_7$	-0.12 (0.091)	-0.13 (0.094)
NatID * CoEthnic	$\beta_8$	0.03 (0.073)	0.03 (0.075)
Intercept	$\alpha$	0.45*** (0.029)	0.41*** (0.097)
N Respondents		832 208	804 201
Enumerator FE		N	Y
Controls Included		N	Y
Adj. $R^2$		0.10	0.20

affects the degree to which trust is conditioned on shared membership in that group. In the case of the national group, then, **does strength of national identification determine the effect that conationality has on trust?** Social identity theory would predict that conationality would have a stronger effect on trust the more that an individual identifies with the national group. The large, positive coefficient on the interaction between national identification and conationality suggests that the effect of conationality on trust does indeed increase with the strength of national identification. Figure 7, in the appendix, graphs the marginal effect of conationality as a function of national identification, which is positive and statistically significant for national iden-

tification greater than -0.4, representing over 85% of respondents. We can see the substantive effect of this relationship in Figure 2, which shows the predicted level of trust in each type of individual as a function of the strength of national identification (strength of ethnic identification, like all control variables, is held at its mean). The four lines represent trust in each of the four types of people. Comparing the solid lines to each other (and the dashed lines to each other) the graph shows that at low levels of national identification, individuals trust conationals and non-conationals equally. This is true for coethnics (solid lines) and non-coethnics (dashed lines) alike. However, as national identification increases, the difference in trust towards conationals and non-conationals increases, for both coethnics and non-coethnics. At the highest levels of national identification the coethnic trust premium is reversed – individuals trust conational non-coethnics (SNDE) at a higher rate than non-conational coethnics (DNSE).




Figure 2: Predicted Trust in Four Types by Strength of National Identification

Similarly, the positive coefficient on the ethnic identification by coethnicity interaction term suggests that coethnicity has a larger effect on trust as strength of ethnic identification increases, which can be seen graphically in Figure 8 of the Appendix. Again, we can see the differential effect this has on

trust in different types of people in Figure 3. At low levels of ethnic identification, there is only a small trust premium for coethnics, for both conationals (solid lines) and non-conationals (dashed lines). However, at high levels of ethnic identification, the coethnic trust premium is around four times larger.




Figure 3: Predicted Trust in Four Types by Strength of Ethnic Identification

Taken together, these results suggest that, beyond just nominal membership in the same social category, the *degree* to which an individual identifies with that social group determines how much his or her trust is conditioned on shared membership in that in-group. These results suggest that, contrary to common practice in the social sciences, scholars should consider “identification” as a variable, rather than simply assuming that group membership will have similar effects on all members of that group (Brubaker, 2004).

The second question of interest is whether, in line with the Common In-group Identity Model, strength of identification with a superordinate identity is negatively related to the bias between sub-in-group members and sub-out-group members. So, **within a single national identity group, is strength of identification with the national identity negatively related to the size of the coethnic trust premium?** If the dual-identity version of the Common In-group Identity Model were supported in these

data, we would expect the coefficient on the national identification and co-ethnic interaction term ( $\beta_8$ ) to be negative.<sup>4</sup> Instead, the effect is positive, though not statistically different from zero. Figure 4 shows this graphically. At all levels of national identification, coethnics are trusted more than non-coethnics by about the same magnitude. In other words, while national identification does increase trust in non-coethnics, it does so at a similar rate as it does for coethnics. Thus, for this sample, strength of identification with the national group is not related to closing the gap in trust between coethnics and non-coethnics.




Figure 4: Predicted Trust in Conationals by Strength of National Identification

While this project is motivated by the relationship between national iden-

<sup>4</sup>We set  $CoNational$  to one, since we are interested in a coethnicity effect within a national in-group, and compute the difference in predicted trust by coethnicity. Thus, the effect of national identification on the coethnic trust premium is equal to  $\beta_8$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
 Trust_{ij} &= \alpha + \beta_1 + \beta_2 CoEthnic_{ij} + (\beta_3 + \beta_5) NatID_i + (\beta_4 + \beta_8) EthID_i \\
 &\quad + \beta_6 EthID_i * CoEthnic_{ij} + \beta_8 NatID_i * CoEthnic_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} \\
 Trust_{SNSE} - Trust_{SNDE} &= \beta_2 + \beta_6 EthID_i + \beta_8 NatID_i
 \end{aligned}$$

tification and the coethnic trust premium, because of the unusual nature of my fieldsite we can also look at ethnic groups as the overarching identity, with national groups nested within them. If the CIIM holds when considering ethnicity as overarching with sub-ethnic national groups, we would expect the coefficient on the ethnic identification and conational interaction term ( $\beta_7$ ) to be negative, which it is. To see this graphically, compare the two lines in Figure 4. Here we can see that as strength of ethnic identification increases, the conational trust premium decreases. In other words, the more an individual identifies ethnically, the more that he or she will trust a non-conational coethnic at the same rate as a conational coethnic. In short, at high levels of ethnic identification, all coethnics are trust similarly, regardless of whether they are conationals or not.




Figure 5: Predicted Trust in Coethnics by Strength of Ethnic Identification

Thus, we find evidence for the CIIM dual identity model for national groups nested within an ethnic group, but not for ethnic groups nested within a national group. Why is this the case? It may be due to status differences across ethnic groups. One of the conditions that must be met for the dual-identity version of the CIIM to hold is that the subgroups within the overarching common identity group must have equal status. This is presumably true of national groups (Malawians and Zambians) within an ethnic

group, but within a national group, there are status differences across ethnic groups. This is particularly true in Malawi, where there have been ethnic-based disparities since colonial times (Vail and White, 1991). There is some suggestive evidence that this may be the case. If I restrict the sample to Zambians, then we do see that national identification reduces the coethnic trust premium (i.e., the national identification and coethnic interaction term ( $\beta_8$ ) is negative) though the effect is not statistically significant.

In situations where there are status differences across sub-groups, the CIIM requires a one-group outcome instead of the dual-identity outcome. This means that in order to reduce subgroup differences, there must be both increased identification with the common identity *and* decreased identification with the subgroups. To model this, we would need to include an additional interaction between strength of national identification and strength of ethnic identification, and interact that term with all other terms in the model. This would lead to multiple three-way interactions, and a very complicated model. Thus, as a first step, I instead looked at this one-group CIIM possibility by breaking respondents down by degree of identification (high or low) for each group identity by splitting the sample at the median degree of identification. Because degree of national identification and degree of ethnic identification are so highly correlated within this sample, there are relatively few individuals with high identification with one group and low identification with other (around 15%). However, if we graph mean trust in the four different types of people by this degree of identification breakdown, the pattern is consistent with the one-group CIIM predictions. For example, the graph shows that individuals that identify strongly with the nation and weakly with the ethnic group trust all conationals equally, regardless of ethnicity.

Because respondents with strong national identification and weak ethnic identification seem to support the single group CIIM, a next step is to try identify the characteristics that distinguish these individuals from the rest of the sample.

## Planned Fieldwork

I am planning to carry out additional fieldwork/data collection in Malawi from July to December of 2011. Based on the preliminary results presented above, and the theoretical expectations not yet addressed, I plan to collect data similar to that already collected, with three major changes.

First, I would like to be able to capture greater variation in strength of






Figure 6: Average Trust in Four Types by High and Low National and Ethnic Identification

identification with the national and ethnic groups. As Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix make clear, there were very high levels of agreement with most items, limiting the degree of variation we can observe. This likely reflects the biased wording of items as much as underlying degrees of true agreement. Thus, I would like to reword the items on each scale, creating two neutrally-worded statements representing opposite positions between which respondents will choose. Asking respondents to choose between two alternatives rather than asking their degree of agreement/disagreement with a statement will also eliminate the main source of enumerator effects, which arose from differential use of ‘strong’ agreement/disagreement. A second strategy for capturing more variation in group identification relates not to better measurement, but to a more heterogenous sample. The data collected last fall focused only on individuals living in very remote villages right along the international border. As a result, there was very little variation in the kinds of life experiences that are likely to influence group identification (education, integration into the market economy, etc.). As a result, the next iteration of data collection will include both rural and more urban samples from the same region.

Second, in order to assess the effect of contextual identity salience on trust, I would like to introduce exogenous variation in the salience of the common national identity. In particular, I plan to randomly vary the salience of the over-arching national (Malawian) identity using a national prime. The use of national symbols, especially the state flag, has been used in several studies to prime national identity (Butz, 2009; Hassin et al., 2007). Simi-

larly, I will use the Malawian national flag as a cue to national identity, and randomize exposure to it before measuring outcomes. The prime will most likely take the form of several questions about the meaning and symbolism of the Malawian flag, accompanied by the flag's image, which will only be administered to the randomized subset receiving the prime. While Shelton and Sellers (2000) and Butz (2009) show evidence that increasing the salience of an identity with a subtle prime does not affect measures of the degree of stable identification, the prime will be introduced after measuring stable identification in order to preclude that possibility.

Third, the next iteration of data collection should include a behavioral measure of interpersonal trust. While the hypothetical situations already used are related to real world scenarios that require trust, there is some evidence that trusting attitudes expressed in surveys are not always predictive of observed trusting behavior (Glaeser et al., 2000). Thus, in order to validate these hypothetical degrees of trust with an actual behavior, I will employ a standard behavioral economic game appropriately named the "trust game" (Berg et al., 1995). The trust game is a two-player game in which Player A is given a sum of money and asked to decide how much money to send to Player B. Any money transferred from Player A to Player B is tripled by the experimenter, and Player B then decides how much of the tripled money to return to Player A. This amount of money transferred from Player A to Player B has been interpreted as the degree of trust Player A holds in Player B. Each respondent will play Player A for four games against an anonymous member of each of the four national/ethnic groups. The main concern typically expressed about using sender behavior in the standard trust game as a measure of trust is that the game conflates trust and risk acceptance (Barr, 2003; Karlan, 2005; Schechter, 2007). However, my research design has subjects play the trust game multiple times, with different types of partners. Measuring trust in this way will effectively control for variation across individual in *general* levels of trust and risk acceptance, characteristics which vary widely across individuals (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002), and instead capture only the within-subject differences in relative degrees of trust based on shared nationality or shared ethnicity.

## Conclusion

In a review of the literature relating trust to economic growth, Knack and Zak (2003) outline five conditions that promote trust within societies: formal institutions, social norms that restrain cheating, ethnic and economic homogeneity, wealth, and income. They claim that these five factors account for 70% of the variation in interpersonal trust across countries. They then go on to offer policy recommendations for bolstering these factors in societies with low levels of trust. However, they argue that because ethnic diversity cannot be altered short of ethnic cleansing or mass expulsions, they dismiss it as a possible source of policy prescription. However, while ethnic diversity may not be manipulatable in the short-term, the Common In-group Identity Model suggests that engendering identification with an overarching national identity may reduce the deleterious effects of ethnic diversity on generalized trust.

In this paper, I have presented some preliminary results with mixed support for the argument that national identification increases interpersonal trust in diverse societies. Using cross-national public opinion data from Africa, I found that national identification (relative to ethnic identification) is positively related to both generalized interpersonal trust and to trust in non-coethnics *vis-a-vis* coethnics at the individual level. Using original survey data collected in an ethnically diverse border region of Malawi and Zambia, I find evidence that the degree to which an individual identifies with the national group is positively related to how much she conditions her trust on shared membership in the national in-group. However, I do not find statistically significant evidence that increased national identification reduces the difference in trust individuals hold in coethnic and non-coethnic members of the national group. Thus, it seems that, based on these data, increasing the strength of national identification without lowering the strength of ethnic identification will not increase interpersonal trust within diverse societies. However, there may still be an effect of increased salience of national identity on trust in non-coethnics, especially among those individuals that already identify strongly with the national group.

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# Appendix

Sample Group Identification Measures for the Chewa of Malawi

	<i>National Group Identification</i>	<i>Ethnic Group Identification</i>
<b>Affective</b>	<p>I would prefer to be a citizen of a different state (R)</p> <p>Malawians generally like one another</p> <p>I enjoy interacting with other Malawians</p> <p>There are many Malawians that I don't like (R)</p> <p>I am sometimes embarrassed to be Malawian (R)</p> <p>Malawians don't have to rely on one another (R)</p> <p>All Malawians need to contribute to achieve our state goals</p> <p>Malawians must work together to achieve certain goals</p> <p>Malawians do not need to work together to get things done (R)</p> <p>What happens to Malawi affects me directly</p> <p>How well I do depends on how well other Malawians do</p> <p>Being Malawian is a big part of who I am</p> <p>I see myself as quite different from other Malawians (R)</p> <p>Being Malawian is not a big part of who I am (R)</p> <p>I see myself as quite similar to other Malawians</p> <p>Other people see me as Malawian</p> <p>If you are born Malawian, you will always be Malawian</p>	<p>I would prefer to be a member of a different ethnic group (R)</p> <p>Chewa generally like one another</p> <p>I enjoy interacting with other Chewa</p> <p>There are many Chewa that I don't like (R)</p> <p>I am sometimes embarrassed to be Chewa (R)</p> <p>Chewa don't have to rely on one another (R)</p> <p>All Chewa need to contribute to achieve our group goals</p> <p>Chewa must work together to achieve certain goals</p> <p>Chewa do not need to work together to get things done (R)</p> <p>What happens to the Chewa affects me directly</p> <p>How well I do depends on how well other Chewa do</p> <p>Being Chewa is a big part of who I am</p> <p>I see myself as quite different from other Chewa (R)</p> <p>Being Chewa is not a big part of who I am (R)</p> <p>I see myself as quite similar to other Chewa</p> <p>Other people see me as Chewa</p> <p>If you are born Chewa, you will always be Chewa</p>
<b>Behavioral</b>		
<b>Cognitive</b>		

Table 4: Respondents are asked to imagine all Malawians when answering questions about the national group, and to imagine all Chewa, even those in other countries, when answering questions about their ethnic group. Respondents rate each statement on a 4-point scale, with 1 = *strongly disagree* and 4 = *strongly agree*. (R) designates those questions that will be reverse coded.




Figure 7: Marginal Effect of Conationality on Trust by National Identification




Figure 8: Marginal Effect of Coethnicity on Trust by Ethnic Identification

Table 5: Participants' Descriptive Statistics, by Nationality and Ethnicity

	Malawian Chewa	Malawian Tumbuka	Zambian Chewa	Zambian Tumbuka	Full Sample
Male	0.50 (0.50)	0.50 (0.51)	0.58 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.52 (0.50)
Age	35 (12)	33 (12)	38 (13)	35 (14)	35 (13)
Education Level	1.19 (0.52)	1.02 (0.50)	1.05 (0.44)	0.88 (0.53)	1.05 (0.51)
No Formal Education	0.05 (0.23)	0.11 (0.32)	0.07 (0.26)	0.21 (0.21)	0.11 (0.31)
Newspaper	0.26 (0.44)	0.22 (0.42)	0.24 (0.43)	0.09 (0.28)	0.21 (0.41)
Radio	0.91 (0.29)	0.76 (0.44)	0.98 (0.15)	0.96 (0.20)	0.90 (0.30)
Cash Income	0.39 (0.49)	0.36 (0.48)	0.37 (0.49)	0.33 (0.47)	0.37 (0.48)
English	0.13 (0.33)	0.04 (0.21)	0.07 (0.26)	0.08 (0.28)	0.09 (0.28)
# Languages	1.46 (0.71)	1.62 (0.58)	2.18 (0.73)	1.63 (0.76)	1.68 (0.75)
'Pure' Ethnic	0.86 (0.35)	0.82 (0.39)	0.52 (0.50)	0.81 (0.39)	0.77 (0.42)
Left District	0.72 (0.45)	0.49 (0.51)	0.58 (0.48)	0.60 (0.49)	0.62 (0.49)
Know MP	0.74 (0.44)	0.62 (0.49)	0.65 (0.48)	0.27 (0.45)	0.59 (0.49)
Know BBC	0.60 (0.80)	0.33 (0.64)	0.44 (0.67)	0.19 (0.45)	0.41 (0.68)
N	72	45	43	48	208

<sup>1</sup>Corresponding education levels are 0 for no schooling, 1 for primary school, and 2 for secondary school. Only 15% of the sample had attended secondary school. The *Newspaper* and *Radio* variables designate regular use of those sources of information, and *Cash Income* designates that the respondent has a regular source of income (a majority of individuals living in this region are subsistence farmers). *English* represents conversational ability in English, which is quite low in this region. *# Languages* refers to the number of languages with which a respondent has conversational capabilities, and *'Pure' Ethnic* refers to respondents that had four grandparents of the same ethnicity. *Left District* is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent had ever left their home district (Kasungu in Malawi or Lundazi in Zambia). Finally, *Know MP* indicates that a respondent knew the name of their member of parliament, while *Know BBC* indicates whether he or she knew what the BBC (British Broadcasting Service) was.

Table 6: National Identification Item Response Frequencies

	<b>% Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>% Disagree</b>	<b>% Agree</b>	<b>% Strongly Agree</b>
Item 1	3.4	2.4	37.5	56.7
Item 2	3.9	16.8	31.7	47.1
Item 3	4.3	1.9	42.8	51.0
Item 4	2.4	25.0	44.2	27.9
Item 5	1.0	19.7	47.1	31.7
Item 6	2.4	1.0	14.4	82.2
Item 7	2.4	4.3	19.7	72.6
Item 8	1.0	1.0	37.5	60.6
Item 9	3.9	10.6	50.0	35.1
Item 10	2.4	12.0	25.5	58.1
Item 11	0.5	10.1	60.1	28.4
Item 12	1.0	5.3	41.4	51.9
Item 13	1.9	13.5	39.9	43.2
Item 14	1.4	3.4	54.8	39.9
Item 15	0.0	0.0	40.4	59.1
Item 16	1.0	11.0	38.9	49.0

Table 7: Ethnic Identification Item Response Frequencies

	<b>% Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>% Disagree</b>	<b>% Agree</b>	<b>% Strongly Agree</b>
Item 1	0.5	0.5	22.6	76.44
Item 2	0.5	8.7	35.1	55.8
Item 3	4.8	4.8	31.3	58.7
Item 4	2.4	4.8	35.6	57.2
Item 5	0.0	10.1	41.8	48.0
Item 6	0.5	1.0	44.7	53.4
Item 7	7.2	1.4	51.4	39.9
Item 8	2.4	15.4	44.2	37.5
Item 9	1.0	2.4	17.3	78.9
Item 10	3.4	4.8	39.9	50.1
Item 11	1.4	3.9	44.2	50.5
Item 12	0.5	1.9	34.1	63.5
Item 13	0.0	0.0	43.0	57.0
Item 14	0.0	18.3	44.2	37.0
Item 15	1.4	4.8	22.1	71.6
Item 16	1.4	0.5	12.0	86.1

Table 8: National and Ethnic Identification, by Nationality and Ethnicity

	<b>Malawian Chewa</b>	<b>Malawian Tumbuka</b>	<b>Zambian Chewa</b>	<b>Zambian Tumbuka</b>	<b>Full Sample</b>
NatID Avg	3.46 (0.38)	3.37 (0.27)	3.31 (0.30)	3.28 (0.33)	3.37 (0.34)
NatPCA	0.49 (2.25)	0.05 (1.60)	-0.33 (1.71)	-0.48 (1.93)	0.00 (1.97)
MD NatID Avg	0.09 (0.26)	0.00 (0.19)	-0.05 (0.31))	-0.08 (0.25)	0.00 (0.26)
EthID Avg	3.58 (0.33)	3.46 (0.29)	3.46 (0.28))	3.43 (0.33)	3.49 (0.32)
EthPCA	0.57 (2.11)	-0.23 (1.87)	-0.17 (1.78)	-0.48 (2.10)	0.00 (0.41)
MD EthID Avg	0.08 (0.25)	-0.03 (0.23)	-0.18 (0.29)	-0.48 (0.28)	0.00 (0.26)
N	72	45	43	48	208

Table 9: Average Trust, by Nationality and Ethnicity

	<b>Malawian Chewa</b>	<b>Malawian Tumbuka</b>	<b>Zambian Chewa</b>	<b>Zambian Tumbuka</b>	<b>Full Sample</b>
Trust in SNSE	0.76 (0.31)	0.81 (0.30)	0.84 (0.26)	0.78 (0.28)	0.79 (0.29)
Trust in SNDE	0.49 (0.38)	0.64 (0.38)	0.74 (0.34)	0.65 (0.39)	0.60 (0.39)
Trust in DNSE	0.47 (0.40)	0.54 (0.41)	0.82 (0.28))	0.67 (0.38)	0.60 (0.39)
Trust in DNDE	0.27 (0.35)	0.42 (0.41)	0.72 (0.36))	0.56 (0.42)	0.46 (0.42)
N	72	45	43	48	208