

Vote Buying and Turnout in Kenya's 2002 Elections¹

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Abstract

Vote buying has and continues to be pervasive in many electoral regimes. Yet the relationship between vote buying and voting behavior, particularly in the context of the secret ballot, remains largely unknown. In this paper I study the effect of vote buying on voter turnout in Kenya, using a nationally representative survey that includes questions about the country's 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections. Estimating the causal effect of vote buying on voter turnout is complicated by its strategic nature, and so this study also examines the strategic logic of vote buying in Kenya. The results suggest that poor individuals and “swing” voters in the country's most electorally competitive districts are vote buyers most likely targets. Using these results, I use matching to estimate that individuals who were approached by a vote buyer were about 14 percentage points more likely to vote than those who were not, while the least educated individuals were the most highly influenced by vote-buying. These results present a puzzle. If voting is secret and voluntary, why does vote buying have this impact? I propose and test the empirical implications of three explanations: individual monitoring, community-level monitoring, and credibility signaling. Evidence is consistent with individual monitoring and credibility signaling, though not with community-level monitoring: vote buying influences perceptions of party monitoring and involvement in violence, and improves perceptions of party credibility.

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Where people vote, vote buying has tended to follow. From the Roman Republic (Yakobson, 1995), to 19th century Britain and the United States (O'Leary, 1962; Anderson and Tollison, 1990), and to such newer electoral regimes as the Philippines, Argentina, Sao Tome and Principe, and Nigeria, (Schaeffer, 2008; Stokes, 2006; Brusco et al., 2004; Vicente, 2008; Bratton, 2008), the practice of vote buying has been commonplace in politics. Vote buying is prevalent in Africa's electoral regimes, where the distribution of t-shirts, fertilizer, food, small amounts of cash, and other gifts is a common and to varying degrees dominant campaign tool. Survey data from 18 African countries reveal that as many as 45 percent of citizens in some countries are offered bribes in exchange for their vote (Afrobarometer Round 3 Surveys). Yet despite its persistence, there is little theoretical convergence regarding the relationship of vote buying to voting behavior, particularly in the context of the secret ballot and voluntary voting. Does vote buying influence the political behavior of potential voters? And if so, why?

I examine these questions by studying the effect of vote buying on individual voter turnout in Kenya, using individual-level survey data from a nationally representative sample of over 1,200 Kenyans collected by Afrobarometer. Kenya's 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections serve as a good case, as vote buying was widespread during the campaign but the polls themselves were relatively free of meddling and distortion. The survey asks respondents about their experiences and behavior before and during the elections, and using statistical techniques I test for the effect of exposure to vote buying across a broad range of model specifications.

That vote buying is a strategic rather than a random act on the part of political parties poses a challenge to estimating vote buying's causal effect. This challenge is compounded by the lack of theoretical and empirical convergence regarding the strategies that vote buying parties are likely to employ, rendering it impossible to make *a priori* assumptions about the strategies of

Kenyan vote buyers that can then be accounted for in the estimation procedure. As such, this paper also analyses strategies of vote buying Kenya and contributes to literature that has focused on the strategic logic of public expenditures and campaign spending (see for example, Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). Results suggest that individuals in more electorally competitive areas and those who support relatively weak political parties are most likely to be targeted. Using these results about vote buying strategy, I use matching techniques to account for them in the estimation strategy.

The results are robust and substantively strong: Individuals who have been approached by a vote buyer are about 14 percentage points more likely to vote than those who were not approached. I also find evidence that the least educated citizens are those whose decision to vote is most influenced by vote buying, while I estimate that vote buying has no effect on the likelihood that a highly educated person will vote. These results suggest that education and learning might mediate the impact of vote buying on individual behavior.

That vote buying has such a strong effect on voter turnout is puzzling. If voters incur costs to go the polls, as the rational choice calculus of voting model suggests (Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1967), then they should, in the context of secret and voluntary voting, be better off accepting the bribe or gift but remaining home on election day. Drawing ideas from the literature on turnout and clientelism, I argue that vote buying might influence an individual's decision to vote through three channels: an individual-level monitoring and punishment mechanism, a community-level monitoring and punishment mechanism, and a credibility-signaling mechanism (Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008; Robinson and Verdier, 2002). The second part of the paper presents and tests empirical implications of these arguments in the Kenyan context. Results lend support to the individual-level monitoring and credibility-signaling mechanisms,

suggesting that vote buying influences individual perception of political party monitoring capacity and violent activity, and signals the credibility of the vote-buying politician.

Related Literature

Vote buying is a type of clientelism—the distribution of particularistic or private material benefits with the expectation of political support—a form of political mobilization common to many poor countries, as well as some wealthier ones. Rather than attract voters with ideological or programmatic appeals, many political parties use the distribution of private material benefits (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Scholars agree that widespread clientelism and vote buying may have negative consequences. Vote buying and clientelism are purported to lead to the underprovision of public goods (Robinson and Verdier, 2002), to damage the economy (Baland and Robinson, 2007), to create incentives for politicians to promote underdevelopment (Stokes, 2007a), and to undermine political equality and democracy (Stokes, 2007b).

Where the ballot is secret and voting is voluntary, vote buying is puzzling because of the seeming unenforceability of vote-buying bargains (Stokes, 2005). Much of the literature on vote buying and clientelism thus seeks to explain how the commitment problem might be solved, in an effort to identify what Stokes (2007a) refers to as the “glue” linking patron to client. Early literature on clientelism focused on social norms. Scott (1972), for instance, argues that norms of reciprocity in peasant societies reinforce clientelistic relationships. For his part, Lemarchand (1972) conceived of clientelism as a product of rural social relationships. Recent work by Finan and Schechter (2009) seeks to test these hypotheses about the vote buying-reciprocity link, and the authors find that the most reciprocal individuals are those most likely to be targeted by a vote buyer and to have their behavior influenced by a vote-buying attempt.

Others have argued that voters cooperate with patrons because they fear losing future benefits upon which they are often dependent for survival. Brusco et al. (2004) and Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2008) apply this logic to their studies of clientelism in Argentina and Mexico, respectively. Others have focused on the role of political machines in monitoring, if imperfectly, the political behavior of clients (Stokes, 2005), an ability that enables political machines to overcome the commitment problem. Nichter (2008) argues that parties do not attempt to buy votes but rather turnout, a strategy that bypasses commitment problems. Stokes (2007a) emphasizes the repeated nature of clientelistic interactions. Because patrons and clients are often embedded in social networks, she argues, clientelistic interactions should be modeled as the types of repeated games that support stable patterns of cooperation over time.

Though the current literature provides valuable lessons about vote buying and clientelism, a drawback of many approaches is a tendency to presuppose the empirical puzzle; taking as given the effect that vote buying will have on a voter and focusing the attention on explaining why the relationship exists. Yet empirical support for the notion that vote buying or clientelism more broadly has a causal effect on voters is limited and mixed, particularly in the African context. In an experimental study conducted in Benin, Wantchekon (2003) finds evidence that voters are more responsive to rhetoric that he defines as clientelistic rather than universal. In a study of Ghana, Lindberg and Morrison (2008) find, on the other hand, that voters evaluate candidates based on their policy prescriptions rather than on ethnic or clientelist bases. Similarly, Young (2009) finds no evidence that in Kenya and Zambia clientelism has improved the voteshare of incumbent MPs. Bratton's (2008) study of Nigeria finds that exposure to vote buying decreases the likelihood that an individual votes. He argues that vote buying and electoral violence create disillusionment amongst the electorate causing them to exit the political

process. In a randomized field experiment in Sao Tome and Principe, Vicente (2008) finds, on the other hand, that vote buying increases voter turnout by “energizing” potential voters.

I contribute to this literature in several ways. First, I estimate the causal effect of vote buying on voter behavior, illustrating that there is a puzzle to be explained. In so doing, I also shed light on the vote-buying strategies of political parties, contributing to literature about the distributive logic of campaign spending and public expenditures. And in testing the empirical implications of two mechanisms linking vote buying to voter turnout, I add to our understanding of why electoral bribery remains common despite apparent commitment problems.

I also contribute to literature on the determinants of voter turnout outside of the industrialized democracies. In a related study, Blaydes (2006) argues that in Egypt voters turnout because they expect material rewards. Chen and Zhong (2008) argue that in China those individuals who identify most closely with the regime are most likely to vote, and Shi (1999) finds that people vote in China's elections because of a desire to punish corrupt officials. Bratton (1999) finds that, in Zambia, political participation is determined by institutional linkages between individuals and the state. Kuenzi and Lambright (2005) find support for this argument, arguing that individuals with greater linkages to political parties are most likely to vote. In this paper, I contribute to this literature and illustrate the mobilizing impact of vote purchasing.

The 2002 Elections in Kenya

Kenya's 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections marked the third since the country's transition to multiparty politics in 1991. The elections marked the first peaceful turnover of executive power since the transition, with Mwai Kibaki of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) defeating the candidate of the long-ruling Kenyan African National Union (KANU), Uhuru Kenyatta. The elections were also the first in which former autocrat and KANU

leader Daniel Arap Moi would not be participating. Moi abided by constitutionally mandated term limits and appointed Kenyatta, son of Kenyan independence leader Jomo Kenyatta, as his successor. Once fragmented opposition groups overcame historical divisions and united under the umbrella of the NARC and its presidential candidate, Kibaki. Conventional accounts suggest that opposition divisions facilitated Moi victories in the elections of 1992 and 1997, and indeed Moi was victorious in these polls with well less than 50 percent of the vote (Ndegwa, 2003).

The elections also marked a newfound independence and assertiveness for the Kenyan Electoral Commission (Ndegwa, 2003). In previous elections the independence of the commission had been questioned, but in 2002 it took a more active role in ensuring transparency on election day. Vote counting and ballot verification were conducted at polling places and overseen by observers from parties and the international community, making it difficult to steal the election on election day, as many suspect had been done in the past (Ndegwa, 2003).

Yet despite the work of the electoral commission, parties and their supporters still worked to influence—sometimes illegally—the outcomes of the election before the day of the polls. Incidents of violence occurred in the period preceding the election and many Kenyans claim to have been prevented from registering. Political party operatives were also reported to have been offering small amounts of cash in exchange for votes. John Githongo—the now exiled former permanent secretary for governance and ethics in the Office of the President of Kenya—recalls observing “offerings of cash, T-shirts, and food in exchange for votes” (Githongo, 2007).

Data and Measures

I use data from Afrobarometer’s 2005 survey in Kenya. Afrobarometer draws nationally representative samples from each of its target countries and Kenya's Round 3 survey includes data on 1,278 individuals. The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure taking on a value of

1 if the individual voted in the 2002 election and 0 if the person did not vote in the election. I generate this variable from a survey question which asks the following question and allows for the following responses: *With regard to the most recent, 2002 national elections, which statement is true for you?:* a) You voted in the elections; b) You decided not to vote; c) You could not find the polling station; d) You were prevented from voting; e) You did not have time to vote; f) Did not vote for some other reason; and g) You were not registered.

Sixty-three percent of respondents reported voting in the 2002 elections. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) reports that national turnout for the 2002 election was about 57 percent (IFES Election Guide). Voter turnout is therefore higher in my sample but not substantially so. One respondent could not find the polling place, eight claim to have been prevented from voting, 144 were too young, five could not remember if they voted or not, and for two individuals the data are missing. Because such individuals may have wanted to vote or claim to have tried to vote, I drop them from the data leaving a sample size of 1,120.

The explanatory variable of focus is a second dichotomous measure taking on a value of 1 if the individual had in the run up to the 2002 elections been approached by a political party representative and been offered a bribe or a gift in exchange for a vote, and a 0 if the individual had not been approached. I generate this variable using another question: *And during the 2002 elections, how often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food or a gift, in return for your vote?* Respondents could answer “never,” “once or twice,” “a few times,” “often,” or “don't know.” Just over half of those surveyed (about 56 percent) report that they had never been approached by a candidate, about 15 percent report having been approached “once or twice”, 14 percent report having been approached “a few times,” and 12 percent report having been approached “often.” About 40 percent of

respondents claim therefore to have been approached at least once. Such individuals are assigned a value of 1 on the vote buying variable while all others are assigned a value of 0.²

A limitation of the data is that respondents do not report whether they accepted the bribe or gift. The data also contain no information about the magnitude of the gift. Rather, we know that a party representative or supporter with an offer to exchange money or resources for a vote approached them. It is perhaps best to interpret the treatment as exposure to a vote-buying offer.

The survey question also does not provide information about the precise timing of the vote-buying offer. If vote buyers targeted voters while they were on the way to the polls (having already decided and made the effort to vote), then the statistical results will overstate vote buying's influence on voter behavior. The present data do not allow me to fully rule out this possibility. Yet that about two-thirds of those who reported being approached by a vote buyer claim to have been approached "a few times" (14 percent of all respondents) or "often" (12 percent of all respondents) illustrates that much vote buying likely occurs before election day. Moreover, anecdotal evidence from the 2002 election as well as other elections in Kenya suggests that a great deal of vote buying occurs in the days and weeks leading up to elections. In an interview with a *New York Times* correspondent before the 2002 elections, one citizen reported: "A NARC agent stopped me at a bus stop and asked me who I was voting for. When I said KANU, he offered me 500 shillings [about 6 U.S. dollars] for my vote" (Lacey, 2002). Another Kenyan described his vote buying experience before election day as follows: "A man approached me in Naivasha at a bar and asked me what party I'm from. He said he's an agent for KANU and would buy my vote for 700 shillings" (Lacey, 2002). A study conducted by a Kenyan anti-corruption organization on the 2007 elections estimates that in the two weeks leading up the

² I also run the statistical models using as a dependent variable the disaggregated vote buying measure.

elections “candidates [spent] about 60 to 80 thousand shillings per day on distribution of money and other benefits to voters” (CAPF, 2007).³ These anecdotes do not rule out the possibility that vote buyers approached Kenyans on the way to polls, but they do indicate that substantial vote buying attempts are generally made in the days before elections.

Like any study that uses survey data, there are other potential sources of bias in the measures I employ. People tend to overstate their voting histories and to respond to surveys in ways that they believe might please the enumerator. Kenyans are exposed to a normative discourse suggesting that voting is the right thing to do and so there is the potential therefore for people to report having voted, even if in reality they did not. Moreover, anti-vote buying campaigns are common in Kenyan elections. I therefore expect that individuals would tend to under-report their experiences with vote buying when confronted by in-person survey questions.

The extent to which these potential tendencies for over- and under-reporting are damaging to the study’s inferences depends on which direction we expect these tendencies to bias the results. In this regard, the results are relatively safe from major distortion due to misreporting. To illustrate, there are four potential combinations of voting behavior and exposure to vote buying. The first is the combination where the person was approached by a vote buyer and turned out to vote. If such a person failed to report that they were approached, as we might expect, such a failure would bias the finding toward a null result. It is possible that the person would report not having voted, which in combination with a failure to report having been approached could be problematic, but such a situation is unlikely as respondents are far more likely to over rather than under report their voting history. For those who were not approached by a vote buyer and voted, we would not expect them to misrepresent their histories given their

The substantive results are similar and so I do not present them here.

behavior. For those who were not approached and did not vote, claiming to have voted when one did not would again bias the results toward a null result. The only combination that poses a potential problem is the one where individuals were approached by a vote buyer and did not vote. Such individuals might misrepresent their voting history, potentially inflating our estimate of the effect of vote buying. Yet this potential bias is attenuated by the fact that those who feel pressured to say that they voted in the past election are also likely those that feel pressured to say that they did not interact with vote buyers. These individuals who misreport are likely to answer each question falsely, giving the impression that they were not approached and did vote. As before, these responses would bias the estimated effect of vote buying toward zero.

Control Variables

The statistical models include a number of control variables to approximate other potential benefits from voting as well as to capture those individual characteristics that the literature has suggested are important turnout determinants. The competitiveness of the election at the local level may, for example, be relevant to potential voters. We might speculate that the closer the election, the greater the perceived probability of being the pivotal voter.⁴ As the perceived probability of being pivotal increases, so too does the expected benefit of voting. Moreover, the competitiveness of a district might matter for vote buyers. Kenya has a peculiar electoral system for the election of the president that requires the winner to earn at least 25 percent of the vote in five of the country's seven provinces. Political parties therefore have incentive to target campaigns to broad sections of the country and to win votes from areas outside of their strongholds. To control for these factors, I create a variable, *margin*, which is the percentage point difference in the proportion of votes won by the winner in a district and the

³ One thousand Kenya Shillings is about fifteen U.S. dollars.

proportion of votes won by the runner-up. I assume that potential voters can estimate how close an upcoming election might be and use results from the 2002 presidential elections to create the variable. I aggregate constituency-level presidential election data up to the district level and integrate the election margin variable into the individual-level dataset.⁵

I also include control variables indicating individual's political party preference. I create four dummy variables: one for the NARC, the main opposition coalition and winner of the election; one for KANU, the incumbent party; one for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP); and a fourth for those who support the minor parties or who did not express allegiance to any party.

Some theories studies suggest that individuals might derive benefits from voting because of its purported intrinsic value (Downs, 1957). When people value democracy and the act of voting, their utility from voting increases and they are more likely to accept the costs. I approximate an individual's intrinsic benefit from voting by using their stated support for elections as the best way of selecting leaders. Respondents were asked which of the following two statements they either strongly agree or agree with: 1) *We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections;* or 2) *Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders.* Respondents were also asked whether they believed that politicians are influenced by people like them, and could answer "never," "sometimes," or "always." Using this question I create a variable that captures an individual's political self-efficacy, which I include as a control because one's belief in her or his ability to influence politicians might have an effect on their decision to participate in politics.

⁴ Even in the closest of elections the probability of being the pivotal vote remains negligible.

⁵ Kenya had 210 electoral constituencies in 2002. Each district has from 1 and 5 constituencies. I aggregate to the district level as Afrobarometer does not collect constituency information.

Additional explanatory variables include the education level of the individual (no formal education, primary education, secondary education, or higher education) as well as two measures of an individual's economic condition. One measures whether the respondent has a cash income. Another measures whether the respondent's family has gone without sufficient food for substantial parts of the previous year. I also include controls for the age and gender of the respondent, as well as whether respondent lives in an urban or rural area.

Strategies of Vote Buying in Kenya

Vote buying is a strategic act on the part of political parties. Estimating the causal effect of vote buying on individual voter turnout therefore requires a systematic analysis of the vote buying assignment mechanism. As such, before estimating the effect of vote buying on individual turnout, I first present results from a statistical analysis designed to more fully identify the strategic logic of vote buying from the perspective of vote buying parties.

Table 2 presents results from probit analyses conducted to answer the question of who gets targeted by vote buyers. Results illustrate that those who claim to have gone without sufficient food in a recent period are more likely to be targeted by a vote buyer. Men are also far more likely to be targeted than women. The education level variables are not, however, statistically significant nor are the coefficients substantively big.

The results concerning the political variables are also illuminating. Though being a supporter of KANU is not a significant predictor, supporters of the opposition NARC are far less likely to be targeted than are the supporters of other parties or those who claim no allegiance. LDP supporters, on the other hand, are substantially more likely to have been a vote-buying target. This may have been because the LDP was not considered a serious contender in the election, and so their supporters may have been perceived to be attractable. Finally, an increase

in the political competitiveness of an individual's electoral district (the equivalent of a decrease in the vote margin variable) is statistically and substantively predictive of an increase in the probability that a vote buyer targets that individual. These results suggest that political parties were more likely to engage in vote buying in the most politically competitive districts and to target the poor, men, and the supporters of a presumably competing party with little chance of electoral victory. The finding runs contrary to a number of influential theoretical predictions, including those of Cox and McCubbins (1986), who argue that private goods (like bribes or gifts) are more likely to be targeted toward core supporters; Stokes (2005), who argues that vote buying will only occur where political machines are strong enough to monitor voters and ensure compliance; and Nichter (2008), who argues that parties do not buy votes but turnout, and seek to do so in places where they have the most unmobilized support.

Vote Buying and Turnout

What is the effect of vote buying on an individual's decision to vote? Because we are only interested in the effect of vote buying, I fit a number of probit models using different covariate combinations. The first three columns of Table 2 present these results. The estimated effect of having been offered a bribe or a gift in exchange for a vote on the probability that an individual does vote is stable across the specifications and the coefficient estimate is consistently positive and statistically significant at conventional levels.⁶ To estimate the substantive effect of a vote-buying attempt on the probability that an individual votes, I use Zelig (Imai et al., 2007) to simulate predicted probabilities of voting for “treated” and “un-treated” individuals in each of the specifications. The estimates suggest that a vote-buying attempt increases the probability of

⁶ As a robustness check, I also conduct a Bayesian analysis with “skeptical” priors. The data overwhelm even the most skeptical of priors, and the results are almost identical.

voting by about 10 percentage points (the 95 percent confidence intervals spans the interval from about 5 percent to about 15 percent).

Results also suggest that views about the legitimacy of elections influence an individual's decision to vote. In some models the support for elections variable is statistically significant and positive, and its magnitude is generally similar to that of the vote buying variable. The data also illustrate that individuals who associate themselves with the two most competitive parties are substantially more likely to vote than their counterparts who do not associate strongly with a political party. In particular, association with the main opposition coalition, the NARC, is strongly predictive of turnout. This finding is consistent with the results of Kuenzi and Lambright (2005), who argue that linkages to political parties strongly predict voting in Africa.

To test the hypothesis that vote buying will have a greater impact on poorer individuals, I interact the vote buying variable with two indicators of material wealth. Column 1 of Table 3 presents these results, which do not suggest any difference in the effect of vote buying for poorer or richer individuals.

I also test the hypothesis that the influence of vote buying might be different depending on an individual's education level. Column 2 of Table 3 presents the results from this analysis, in which the higher education dummy variable is the omitted reference category. The coefficients on the three interaction terms thus capture the difference in the effect of vote buying between those with higher education and those with the other three educational levels. The results suggest that vote buying's effect is conditioned by an individual's level of education. To facilitate interpretation, Figure 1 presents the estimated effect (with 95 percent confidence intervals) of a vote-buying attempt on the probability that an individual votes in each of the four education

categories.⁷ The estimated effect of vote buying is highest amongst those with no formal schooling. The effects for those with primary and secondary education are similar and are comparable to the aggregated effect estimated above. Yet the data suggest that vote buying has no effect on the probability that a highly educated person will vote.

Estimating the Causal Effect of Vote Buying Using Matching

An obstacle to estimating vote buying's causal effect arises from the fact that political parties do not buy votes randomly, but strategically. If vote buyers target those who are also more likely to turnout—perhaps because they know the returns to their investment are highest amongst such people—then the standard statistical analysis will overestimate vote buying's influence. A solution to this inferential problem lies in pre-processing the data using a method of matching that links the pre-treatment covariates to vote buying strategies.⁸ The matching procedure matches observations based upon the values of pre-treatment covariates using one of a number of methods—methods include “exact matching” and “nearest neighbor matching.” Observations that cannot be matched are dropped, producing a smaller dataset that approximates an experimentally collected one.

Aside from helping to account for the strategic logic of vote buying, pre-processing the data using matching has other advantages. Ho et al. (2006) argue that matching methods provide an effective way of reducing causal estimates' model dependency. The adjustment reduces the relationship between the treatment of focus and the pre-treatment covariates and the resulting estimated causal effect becomes less dependent on the functional form of the parametric model used in the analysis. As such, matching serves as a robustness check and a method for best estimating the causal effect of vote buying in the absence of random treatment assignment.

⁷ I use simulation to produce the estimated probabilities.

It is important to note that matching will not solve problems of omitted variables bias. Pre-processing the data helps to solve the inferential problems caused by the strategic allocation of vote buying, and is therefore an improvement upon the analyses run on the entire data set. Yet we can only match on the observable characteristics of individuals that are captured in the Afrobarometer survey. If vote buyers target those who they believe are most likely to turnout to vote for reasons unrelated to the pre-treatment covariates used in the matching procedure, some bias may remain. Therefore it is best to understand matching as a method with which to improve, rather than fully solve, the inferential problem posed by the non-random allocation of vote-buying offers.

I use the method of exact matching,⁹ using as pre-treatment covariates the education level indicators, the political party affiliation indicators, the economic indicators (cash income and insufficient food), as well as the gender, urban, and age variables.¹⁰ The process discards 364 individuals that cannot be matched, leaving a sample of 756.¹¹ Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 present results from probit analyses run on the pre-processed data, which indicate that the initial findings are robust to reductions in model dependency. Moreover, they suggest that the results from the initial analyses may underestimate vote buying's causal effect. The estimates predict that individual's approached by a vote buyer are about 14 percentage points more likely to vote (95 percent confidence interval runs from about 8 percent to about 20 percent). The average

⁸ For a theoretical explanation of matching see Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and Ho et al. (2006)

⁹ There is no "right" method to use. It is best to achieve the greatest amount of balance and overlap in the distributions of pre-treatment covariates in the treatment and control groups without dropping too much of the data.

¹⁰ The proper method for selecting variables to include in a matching procedure is contested in the statistical literature. Some suggest including as many pre-treatment (as opposed to intervening) covariates as possible. Yet Pearl (2000) illustrates that the inclusion of certain types of covariates can induce bias. I therefore run the matching procedure using different sets of covariates. The results are not influenced by these differences in matching procedure.

¹¹ There tend to be efficiency *gains* from discarding data when matching is used.

treatment effect on the treated (ATT), computed using a simple difference of means test, produces a similar estimate (0.14 with 95 percent confidence interval running from 0.07 to 0.20).

How politically important is this effect? The median margin of victory in Kenya's 210 electoral constituencies in 2002 was about 8,000 votes. If each vote buying attempt costs the vote buyer about five US dollars, as the anecdotal evidence presented above suggests, then 1,000 US dollars would purchase the turnout of about 30 individuals (if we assume, as the model predicts, that about 14 out of every 100 targeted potential voters turned out when they otherwise would not have). In the median district, it would therefore cost about 285,000 US dollars targeted to the proper individuals in order to influence the majority-winning candidate in the constituency. At first glance, this seems like a great deal of money, particularly for a relatively poor country, but reports from the 2008 elections suggest that the major parties spent up to 3 billion Kenya shillings during the campaign. If we take a more conservative estimate of about 2 billion Kenya shillings, approximately 26 million US dollars, then properly allocated vote buying could produce electoral majorities in about half of Kenya's 210 constituencies (if each has a raw vote margin of the median constituency), a potentially substantial effect on the presidential election outcome as well as on the composition of the Kenyan parliament (selected by majority-rule from the 210 single-member district constituencies). Thus vote buying has the potential not only to influence an individual's decision to vote, but also to influence the outcome of elections.

Explaining Vote Buying's Influence on Turnout

These results are puzzling. Where the ballot is secret and voting is voluntary, vote buying should not on its own influence the probability that an individual votes. If the probability of being a pivotal voter and the costs to voting remain fixed, no bribe should influence a voter's decision-making calculus. Yet this study illustrates that in Kenya, vote buying increases the

probability of voting by about 14 percentage points. The sections that follow present potential mechanisms linking vote buying and turnout, and explore their empirical support.

Individual Monitoring and Punishment Mechanism

One resolution stems from the fact that monitoring turnout is an easier task than is monitoring vote choice (Nichter, 2008). If parties can monitor the turnout of those whose votes they have purchased—or at least enjoy the perception that they can—and can issue credible punishment threats against non-compliance, such factors are likely to alter the decision making calculus of potential voters. Monitoring and punishment capacity raise the probability of a non-compliant citizen being discovered while increasing the costs to citizens of non-compliance.

Reports from elections observers suggest that Kenyan parties systematically monitored turnout and attempted to monitor vote choice during the 2002 elections. In Kenya, as in many countries, political party agents are present in most polling stations. The presence of party agents provides parties with monitors at the very local level, and often these party representatives are members of the communities in which the polling stations are located, providing them with the local knowledge with which to effectively monitor voter behavior.

Kenyan parties also took advantage of legal provisions allowing for “assisted voting.” According to Kenyan electoral law, individuals who feel they cannot properly vote by themselves are permitted to bring into the voting booth an individual of voting age to assist them. According to election reports, party agents were often involved in assisted voting and appear to have tried to use the rule to their advantage. Representatives from the Carter Center observed:

In practice it was not uncommon to see several party agents as well as the presiding officer crowding around the voting booth to observe the voting process. In one polling

station . . . nearly all women voters claimed illiteracy, requested assistance, and received assistance from the presiding officer (Carter Center Report, 29-30).

The same election observers go on to note:

In several cases assisted voting was conducted in full view of party agents, observers, and others in the polling station. In other cases, it appears that the provision of assisted voting for illiterate voters may have been abused, with an unusually high number of voters demanding such assistance in some stations and few or none in others (Carter Center Report, 33).

The use of assisted voting provisions to violate the secrecy of the vote is not a strategy unique to Kenya. Lehoucq (2007) reports that in Mexico, for instance, the Institutional Revolutionary Party relied on such rules to monitor citizen vote choice after the secret ballot was adopted.

While parties used strategies to monitor voters, Kenyan citizens had legitimate reasons to fear violence on the part of parties and their allies. During the 1992 and 1997 elections, militant youth organizations both formally and informally affiliated with KANU were active during the campaign, while ethnic cleansing attempts occurred in some areas of the country (Laakso, 2007).¹² Though the 2002 elections were generally considered far more peaceful than the previous two elections, the fact of recent election-related violence certainly weighed heavily on the minds of many Kenyans. Moreover, sporadic incidents of violence—for instance in the Rift Valley where youth groups threatened individuals with homemade weapons—occurred in the pre-election period. And the involvement in politics of such violent criminal groups as the *Mungiki* rendered the possibility of violence palpable. As such, the potential costs of violating, or being perceived to have violated, a vote-buying bargain could have been immense.

Though actual monitoring and violent threats are important, so too are individual perceptions. To examine vote buying's relationship to an individual's perception of these issues, I conduct two ordered probit analyses. I first use an Afrobarometer question that asks respondents whether they think the "freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured" is worse, better, or about the same as in years past. Though the question is not ideal for my purposes, it does probe the extent to which individual's feel that parties and other political agents can influence their vote. To examine the effect of vote buying on citizen perceptions of political party involvement in violence, I use an Afrobarometer question that addresses the relationship of political parties and party competition to violence. The question asks whether "political party competition leads to violent conflict" and respondents could answer "always," "often," "rarely," or "never." The question is a blunt measure of the concept I seek to operationalize, but it does measure the extent to which individuals believe that parties are responsible for violence.

Table 6 presents results from these ordered probit analyses. Vote buying has a substantial and statistically significant effect on respondents' perceptions of their freedom from pressure as well as on their perceptions of political parties and violence. To facilitate interpretation, I use Zelig (Imai et al., 2007) to simulate the models' predictions of vote buying's effect on citizen perceptions. Figure 3 illustrates that those who were approached by a vote buyer are about 10 percentage points more likely to believe that freedom from political party pressure on vote choice is either the same or worse, and almost 15 percentage points less likely to believe that it has improved. Importantly, the "same" is not a positive assessment given past transgressions of Kenyan political parties. Figure 4 illustrates that those who were approached by a vote buyer are between 10 and 15 percentage points more likely to believe that political party competition

¹² See Anderson (2002) for discussion of Kenyan vigilante groups and criminal organizations, and their

“always” leads to violence, while the same individuals are about 15 percentage points less likely to believe that such competition “rarely” or “never” leads to violence.

There are several ways to interpret this evidence. Vote buying could have a direct effect on individual perceptions. In amplifying both the perceived probability of being discovered of non-compliance and the perceived costs of non-compliance, vote buying would then influence the decision-making calculus of potential voter. It may also be that vote buyers target people who have these types of perceptions, as they are the least likely to defect from a vote-buying bargain. Or these forces may be mutually reinforcing. Regardless, the evidence is suggestive of vote buying's impact on individual decision-making and of party vote buying strategy.

Community-Level Monitoring and Mobilization

Another important dimension of monitoring arises from the fact that, despite their inability to fully monitor individual vote choice, electoral data is available at a sufficiently disaggregated level for parties to monitor the voting behavior of villages or communities. The ability to monitor at disaggregated levels and to punish communities who do not support the vote buyers (assuming the vote buyer wins office) allows parties to credibly threaten voters and creates incentives for citizens to turn out to vote (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2003; Stokes, 2005).

One implication of this explanation is that vote buying should be geographically concentrated. If vote buyers know that monitoring can only occur at the village or community level, we would expect them to target specific villages and areas with vote-buying efforts while more-or-less ignoring other communities. We might then interpret vote buying as being part of village or community level mobilization efforts. One feature of the Afrobarometer data permits an empirical examination of this explanation. Afrobarometer provides information about the

connection to politics.

location of the survey efforts. In Kenya, survey locations are made up of about 200 households, and about fifteen to twenty individuals are selected at random from each location to be surveyed. I use this data to create a location-level variable capturing the vote-buying density in an individual's area (simply the proportion of individuals in each location who were approached by a vote buyer). Figure 2 presents the distribution of vote-buying density across the 105 locations. These data suggest that vote-buying efforts are not restricted to areas of high concentration, providing initial evidence inconsistent with the community-level monitoring hypothesis.

Another implication of this argument is that the concentration of vote buying in one's immediate geographic area should be related to one's voting behavior and, in particular, should mediate the vote buying's influence. Where people observe substantial vote buying in their area, they might likely expect community-level punishment if the area does not vote with the vote-buying party. Table 5 tests this hypothesis, integrating the vote buying density variable into the probit models predicting individual voter turnout. The first column tests the independent effect of vote buying density, while the second and third columns tests the mediating influence of vote buying density on the effect of vote buying. Results suggest that vote buying density is negatively associated with the probability that an individual turns out to vote, and has no mediating impact on vote buying's direct effect. These results do not therefore lend support to the community-level monitoring and mobilization explanation.

Vote Buying as Credibility Signaling

An alternative explanation relates to the signals that vote buying might send to potential voters. In such low-information environments as Kenya's, information about politician performance, behavior, and credibility is difficult for voters to attain. Vote buying provides politicians and parties with a method to convey signals about their capacity in these areas. A pre-

election gift can signal to voters the credibility and commitment of the vote buying politician as well as the politician's willingness to distribute resources to supporters, creating the expectation that compliant voters might likely receive future benefits. To put it simply, the receipt of food, supplies, or money from a politician before an election might signal to voters that they will receive future benefits, contingent on the electoral success of the gift giver.

Scholars have suggested that vote buying might signal the credibility of the vote-buying politician. Van de Walle (2003), for instance, cites studies of Benin and Nigeria that suggest that pre-election transfers are symbolic and ritualistic, rather than direct attempts to purchase votes. Schaffer (2002) finds support for this view of clientelism in ethnographic studies of the Philippines and Taiwan. Such studies suggest that vote buying is more than an economic transaction, but also a ritual signaling the commitment that the vote buyer has to the recipient. These findings resonate with a formal model by Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) that characterizes clientelism as a cost-effective method for politicians to build credibility. Similarly Robinson and Verdier (2002) argue that clientelism is the cheapest way to signal credible commitment in weakly institutionalized systems, and Englebert (2002) argues that patronage provides an effective way of building legitimacy amongst citizens in contexts where state legitimacy is low.

To test the hypothesis that vote buying influences voter perceptions of politician credibility, I use a survey item that asks: *In your opinion, how often do politicians keep their campaign promises after elections?* Using responses to this question, I create a dichotomous measure of politician credibility perception. I code those who believe that politicians “always” or “often” keep their campaign promises as having positive perceptions of credibility, while those who believe that politicians “rarely” or “never” are coded as having negative perceptions.

Table 6 presents results from probit analyses designed to identify the relationship of vote buying to individual perception of politician credibility. Consistent with the hypothesis that exposure to vote buying improves individual perception of politician credibility; in each model the coefficient on the vote buying variable is positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. As such, the probability that an individual believes that politicians fulfill their campaign promises increases with the experience of vote buying. The evidence is therefore consistent with the notion that vote buying signals politician credibility and commitment to potential voters.

Implications and Conclusion

This paper attempts to identify and explain the relationship of vote buying to individual voting behavior in Kenya. I estimate that Kenyans who have been approached by a vote buyer are about 14 percentage points more likely to vote than those who have not. These results present a puzzle. Why are people more likely to vote after being offered a bribe when they could simply accept the gift and stay home on election day? I propose three possible answers: an individual-level monitoring and punishment mechanism; a community-level monitoring mechanism; and a credibility signaling mechanism. I find support for the notion that political parties in Kenya were active in monitoring voter behavior, and also find statistical evidence suggesting that exposure to vote buying increases the probability that an individual feels that parties can exert pressure on their vote choice and that parties are involved in violence. This suggests that exposure to vote buying increases an individual's perception of party monitoring and punishment capacity, a perception likely to affect decision-making about whether to vote. I also find evidence consistent with the credibility signaling mechanism. Exposure to vote buying is positively associated with individual perception of politician credibility, suggesting that pre-election gifts may serve as instruments for politicians to signal credibility and their commitment

to distributing resources to supporters. Evidence is not, however, consistent with the community-level monitoring and mobilization explanation.

The results also shed light on *who* parties tend to target with vote buying attempts. I find that vote buying is most probable in electorally competitive areas and that male supporters of a marginal party are most likely to be targeted. Supporters of the strongest opposition coalition, on the other hand, were less likely to be targeted. These results have implications for our understanding of party's distributive strategies. While some models predict that vote buying and private transfers will be targeted toward core supporters, with whom monitoring is easier and compliance is more likely, these findings suggest that vote buyers reach outside of their core to attract votes. That supporters of the LDP were most likely to be approached suggests that vote buyers view “swing” voters as acceptable targets. Thus though vote buying influences the probability that an individual will vote, patterns of vote buying in Kenya are not consistent with the strategy of buying turnout from unmobilized supporters (Nichter, 2008).

I also find that the least educated citizens are those whose behavior is most influenced by vote buying, though vote buyers target individuals of all education levels at similar rates. One interpretation of this result is that through education people come to believe that vote buying is wrong, or perhaps that educated people are more likely to “take the money and run.”

Analysis of the mechanisms linking vote buying to voter behavior suggests two alternative explanations. First, less educated individuals are likely easier for political parties to monitor. Such individuals are most likely to credibly request assistance in registering to vote, getting to the polls, and even voting. There are therefore multiple opportunities in the voting process for party officials to monitor turnout, and potentially even vote choice. Second, less educated individuals may have less access to information about the past behavior and future

credibility of politicians. For such citizens, the signals conveyed by vote buying will weigh more heavily in the decision making process than they will for individuals with a wider range of information sources. As such, their behavior is likely to be disproportionately influenced.

Finally, the results should lead us to reflect on the nature of democracy and its practice in such countries as Kenya. What does democracy mean when people are induced to participate by pre-election monetary and other rewards? Are such practices harmless “warts” on democracy's surface or substantial threats to the principles of accountability, responsiveness, and “rule by the people” that lie at its heart? If Kenyan anti-corruption activist John Githongo is correct when he argues that, “if you are a politician in Kenya today, people will line up and take your money, your T-shirts, and your food, but they will vote their consciences,” then perhaps we should not be too troubled (Githongo, 2007). If he is right, vote buying is a form of political mobilization, and one that we might expect to slowly disappear as parties realize its futility in attracting votes. But if Githongo is wrong and vote buying affects both vote choice and turnout, then political accountability and equality are surely at risk. This is particularly the case given the disproportionate influence of vote buying on the least educated members of society.

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Table 1: Probit Analyses of Vote Buying's Determinants

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
(Intercept)	-0.29 *	-0.25 *	-0.13	-0.12 *	-0.32 *
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.16)
Cash income	-0.06				-0.02
	(0.08)				(0.10)
Insufficient food	0.32 *				0.37 *
	(0.08)				(0.09)
Male		0.20 *			0.20 *
		(0.08)			(0.09)
Urban		0.12			0.14
		(0.08)			(0.11)
Age		-0.00			-0.00
		(0.00)			(0.00)
No ed.			-0.02		-0.06
			(0.15)		(0.20)
Primary ed.			-0.02		-0.04
			(0.11)		(0.15)
Secondary ed.			0.02		0.12
			(0.11)		(0.14)
KANU Supporter				-0.02	-0.13
				(0.13)	(0.15)
NARC Supporter				-0.20 *	-0.22 *
				(0.09)	(0.10)
LDP Supporter				0.46 *	0.46 *
				(0.12)	(0.15)
Vote margin					-0.27 *
					(0.12)
N	1120	1120	1120	1120	838
BIC	1590.22	1619.49	1628.67	1600.54	1374.44
Log L	-752.99	-753.58	-758.17	-744.10	-512.22

Standard errors in parentheses

** indicates significance at $p < 0.05$*

Dependent var.: Dichotomous measure of whether an individual was approached by a vote buyer.

Table 2: Probit Analyses of Voter Turnout

	Full Data	Full Data	Full Data	Matched Data	Matched Data
(Intercept)	0.48 *** (0.05)	0.87 *** (0.16)	0.16 (0.25)	-0.02 (0.23)	-0.10 (0.23)
<i>Vote Buy</i>	<i>0.31 *** (0.08)</i>	<i>0.28 *** (0.08)</i>	<i>0.34 *** (0.10)</i>	<i>0.40 *** (0.10)</i>	<i>0.42 *** (0.10)</i>
Elections Support		-0.15 ** (0.05)	-0.10 (0.07)	0.14 (0.14)	0.08 (0.14)
Political Efficacy		0.00 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.11)	0.05 (0.11)
Cash Income		-0.15 ^ (0.08)	-0.17 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.12)
Insufficient Food		0.15 ^ (0.08)	0.01 (0.10)	0.09 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)
Male			0.44 *** (0.10)	0.51 * (0.11)	0.45 * (0.11)
Urban			-0.03 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.13)
Age			0.00 (0.00)		
No Formal Ed .			0.20 (0.21)	0.22 (0.25)	0.20 (0.26)
Primary Ed.			0.10 (0.16)	0.12 (0.19)	0.08 (0.19)
Secondary Ed.			0.16 (0.15)	0.03 (0.18)	0.01 (0.18)
KANU Supporter			0.40 * (0.17)		0.21 (0.21)
NARC Supporter			0.39 *** (0.11)		0.39 * (0.12)
LDP Supporter			0.20 (0.16)		0.13 (0.20)
Vote Margin			0.14 (0.22)		
N	1120	1098	824	756	756
BIC	1337.53	1387.69	1241.98	1076.12	1126.70
Log L	-640.68	-609.83	-406.14	-392.24	-377.77

Standard errors in parentheses

*^ significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$*

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure indicating whether individual voted in 2002 elections.

Table 3: Probit Interaction Models to Determine the Conditioning Effect of Wealth and Education on Vote buying's Influence on Individual Turnout

	Wealth Model	Education Model
(Intercept)	0.54 ** (0.17)	0.69 *** (0.19)
Vote Buy	0.30 ^ (0.16)	-0.12 (0.21)
Insufficient Food	0.16 (0.11)	
Cash Income	-0.07 (0.11)	
Male	0.51 *** (0.08)	0.54 *** (0.08)
Elections Support	-0.13 * (0.06)	-0.13 * (0.06)
Vote Buy*Insufficient Food	-0.06 (0.17)	
Vote Buy*Cash Income	-0.03 (0.17)	
No Formal Education		-0.07 (0.21)
Primary Education		-0.15 (0.16)
Secondary Education		-0.17 (0.17)
Vote Buy * No Formal Ed.		0.59 ^ (0.33)
Vote Buy * Primary Ed.		0.42 ^ (0.24)
Vote Buy * Secondary Ed.		0.46 ^ (0.25)
N	1098	1098
BIC	1394.84	1436.42
Log L	-585.40	-578.18
<i>Standard errors in parentheses</i>		
<i>^ significant at p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01\$; *** p<.001\$</i>		
<i>Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure indicating whether individual voted in 2002 elections.</i>		

Table 4: Ordered Probit Models Testing Relationship of Vote buying to Citizen Perceptions

	Pressure on Vote Choice	Party Violence
<i>Vote Buy</i>	<i>-0.41 *</i> <i>(0.08)</i>	<i>0.40 *</i> <i>(0.08)</i>
Insufficient Food	0.07 (0.10)	0.07 (0.08)
Cash	-0.11 (0.10)	0.08 (0.08)
Male	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.08)
Political Efficacy	0.04 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.08)
Urban	-0.24 * (0.11)	0.37 * (0.09)
No Ed.	0.32 (0.22)	0.26 (0.17)
Primary Ed.	0.03 (0.16)	0.07 (0.13)
Secondary Ed.	-0.04 (0.14)	0.07 (0.12)
KANU Supporter	-0.37 * (0.15)	-0.12 (0.13)
NARC Supporter	0.29 * (0.12)	0.07 (0.09)
LDP Supporter	-0.28 (0.15)	0.13 (0.13)
Vote Margin	0.37 (0.22)	0.47 * (0.17)
N	838	838

Standard errors in parentheses

** indicates significance at $p < 0.05$*

Column 1 Dep. Var: Is Freedom to Vote Without Pressure Better Than in Previous Years?

Column 2 Dep. Var: Does political party competition lead to violence?

Table 5: Probit Models Testing Vote Buying Density and Turnout Hypothesis

	No Interaction	Interaction	Interaction with Controls
Intercept	0.48 * (0.22)	0.70 *** (0.10)	0.51 * (0.23)
<i>Vote Buy</i>	0.36 *** (0.10)	0.29 (0.21)	0.27 (0.22)
<i>Vote Buy Density</i>	-0.38 ^ (0.22)	-0.64 * (0.27)	-0.47 (0.29)
<i>Vote Buy * Vote Buy Density</i>		0.27 (0.41)	0.20 (0.43)
Elections Support	-0.12 * (0.06)		-0.12 * (0.06)
Political Efficacy	0.05 (0.09)		0.05 (0.09)
Cash Income	-0.11 (0.09)		-0.11 (0.09)
Insufficient Food	0.14 (0.09)		0.14 (0.09)
Male	0.46 *** (0.09)		0.46 *** (0.09)
Urban	-0.10 (0.10)		-0.11 (0.10)
Age	0.00 (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)
No Formal Ed.	0.08 (0.18)		0.08 (0.18)
Primary Ed.	-0.06 (0.14)		-0.06 (0.14)
Secondary Ed.	0.01 (0.13)		0.01 (0.13)
KANU Supporter	0.29 ^ (0.15)		0.29 ^ (0.15)
NARC Supporter	0.33 ** (0.10)		0.32 ** (0.10)
LDP Supporter	0.16 (0.14)		0.16 (0.14)
N	1098	1120	1098
Log L	-548.86	-631.14	-545.75

Standard errors in parentheses

*^ dagger significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$*

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure indicating whether individual voted in 2002 elections.

Table 6: Probit Models of Vote buying and Perceptions of Politician Credibility

	Model 1	Model 2
(Intercept)	-0.15 **	-0.24
	(0.05)	(0.24)
<i>Vote Buy</i>	<i>0.12</i> ^	<i>0.14</i> ^
	<i>(0.08)</i>	<i>(0.08)</i>
Urban		0.05
		(0.09)
No Formal Education		-0.40 *
		(0.16)
Primary Education		-0.19
		(0.12)
Secondary Education		-0.04
		(0.12)
Cash Income		0.16 ^
		(0.08)
Elections Support		0.03
		(0.05)
Interest in Politics		0.03
		(0.04)
Male		-0.17 *
		(0.08)
NARC Supporter		-0.04
		(0.09)
KANU Supporter		0.16
		(0.13)
LDP Supporter		0.02
		(0.13)
N	1120	1098
BIC	1587.16	1779.00
Log L	-765.50	-707.47

Standard errors in parentheses

*^ significant at $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$*

Dependent variable: Individual perception of politician campaign promise credibility.




Figure 1: Estimated Effect (with 95 percent confidence interval) of Vote buying on the Probability of Voting, by Education Level. The figure illustrates that vote buying has no predicted effect on the probability that a highly educated person will vote, while vote buying has a disproportionate impact on the probability that the least educated individuals will vote.




Figure 2: The Distribution of Vote Buying Density by Afrobarometer Survey Location. Vote buying density is measured as the proportion of individuals in each location who were approached by a vote buyer. The figure illustrates that vote buying is not heavily concentrated in some locations and relatively absent in others.




Figure 3: Estimated Effect (with 95 percent confidence interval) of Vote buying on Perception of Political Party Pressure on Vote Choice. Afrobarometer question: *Is “freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured” better, worse, or the same as a few years ago?* The figure illustrates that those who were approached by a vote buyer were far less likely to report that freedom to vote without pressure has gotten better.




Figure 4: Estimated Effect (with 95 percent confidence interval) of Vote buying on Perception of Violence and Political Party Competition. Afrobarometer question: *Does competition between political parties lead to violent conflict?* The figure illustrates that those who were approached by a vote buyer were far more likely to believe that competition between political parties always leads to violence.

