

Too Close for Comfort?
Immigrant-Host Relations in sub-Saharan Africa

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Abstract

Why do some immigrant minorities in the developing world integrate into their host societies while others face rejection and hostility? Half of all immigrants settle in developing countries, yet we know little about this immigrant experience. This paper introduces the variation in immigrant-host relations in sub-Saharan Africa. It then explains this variation as the result of immigrant leaders' incentives to preserve the networks they lead and host members' incentives to protect their own positions in society. Finally, using original data from surveys and interviews collected during twelve months of field research in West Africa, this paper tests the prediction that cultural similarities between immigrants and hosts exacerbate immigrant-host relations because immigrant leaders act to preserve their distinct group identity and host members reject those they fear will easily blend in. The findings suggest that cultural similarities hurt immigrant-host relations, countering the conventional wisdom that cultural proximity facilitates social integration.

Introduction

Half of all international migrants settle in the developing world, including 10% in sub-Saharan Africa, where the immigrant experience covers a wide range of outcomes.¹ Although a growing body of work informs our understanding of the origins and consequences of prejudice against immigrant minorities in industrialized nations (Barry 2001; Favell 1998; Kitschelt 1997; Sniderman et al. 2000; Sniderman et al. 2004), we know little about the dynamics that govern relations between immigrant minorities and host populations in developing countries. An overview of expulsion events in sub-Saharan Africa since 1960 indicates that immigrants face insecurity, but that exclusionary reactions to immigrants vary by host country and immigrant group.² For example, Nigerian Hausas in Ghana's capital, Accra, have integrated within the society's Muslim minority, to the point that many indigenous Ghanaians consider the Hausa language a native Ghanaian language and the Hausa tribe a native Ghanaian tribe. In contrast, Nigerian Hausas in Niger's capital, Niamey, are excluded by their hosts, both in the marriage market and in the political arena. Why are Nigerian Hausas integrated into Ghanaian society in Accra but rejected from Nigerien society in Niamey?

This paper proposes a simple yet counter-intuitive answer to this question. I argue that cultural similarities between immigrant minority and host community actually

¹ For data on the distribution of international migrants, see Jason DeParle (2007) and International Organization for Migration (2005).

² Addo (1982), Adepaju (1984), Afolayan (1988), Brennan (1984), Henckaerts (1995), Peil (1971), Ricca (1989), Sise (1975), Weiner (1993), for example, discuss the prevalence of mass immigrant expulsions in independent African countries.

exacerbate immigrant-host relations in the developing world. Immigrant group leaders face incentives to sharpen cultural boundaries in order to preserve the distinctive identity of the communities they lead. Furthermore, host society members feel threatened by, and are thus more likely to reject, immigrants who can easily integrate through the cultural repertoires they share with their hosts. Conversely, if immigrant groups share few or no cultural traits with their host society, their leaders face a lower threat of group identity loss. They lack incentives to highlight boundaries they perceive already naturally exist. Additionally, hosts feel less threatened by communities they can easily mark as foreigners and are therefore less likely to reject them.

The idea that cultural similarities might hurt immigrant-host relations contrasts with the conventional wisdom that cultural proximity facilitates social integration. Gradstein and Schiff (2006) argue that the social cost of minority integration into a majority depends, among other factors, on the cultural distance between the two groups. Caselli and Coleman (2006) explain conflict between ethnic groups as a function, *ceteris paribus*, of the depth of differences that define the ethnic cleavage. Sniderman et al. (2004) claim that the prominence of group differences, such as skin color, manner of dress, and language, increases the salience of concerns over national identity on the part of the host country. Posner (2004) compares the Chewas in Malawi and Zambia to the Tumbukas in Malawi and Zambia in order to “rule out the possibility that the difference in the salience of the Chewa-Tumbuka cleavage was a product of greater objective differences between these groups on one side of the border than on the other.”³

³ See Posner 2004, 533.

In these perspectives, the less alike A and B are, the less likely A and B will integrate; conversely, the more alike A and B are, the more likely A and B will integrate. This assumption, however, overlooks the fact that cultural entrepreneurs in both minority and majority groups may have an incentive to highlight differences and reify boundaries (Barth 1969; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Fearon 1999; Laitin 1995; Laitin 1998; Laitin 1999). Consistent with this approach, I argue that, the more alike A and B are, the more susceptible A and B become to boundary-creation.

I test the observable implications of the argument using data I collected during twelve months of fieldwork in Ghana, Nigeria and Niger, where I interviewed and surveyed two major immigrant communities, Nigerian Yorubas and Hausas, in two main urban migrant destinations, Accra and Niamey. In selecting my cases for fieldwork, I chose a combination of immigrant communities and host cities that yields a wide range of variation on the independent variable of interest: the ethnic and religious overlap between immigrant group and host society. Selecting cases on an explanatory variable has both a practical and a methodological advantage. First, in the absence of existing data on all immigrant minorities in sub-Saharan Africa, it is difficult to define the distribution of the dependent variable and to select cases on that basis. Second, selecting cases on an explanatory variable and controlling for it in the analysis, which I do, avoids selection bias and inference problems since there is no restriction on the degree of possible variation in the dependent variable (King, Keohan and Verba 1994).

In this empirical section, I draw findings from a comparative analysis of survey responses of immigrant minorities and host populations in each locality. The data indicate a wide range of variation in immigrant-host relations across immigrant groups and across

host societies. Furthermore, the data are consistent with the expectation that immigrants participate less in, and experience lower acceptance from their host societies when hosts and immigrants share significant cultural traits.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, I provide a brief overview of the literature on migrant communities in the developing world and elaborate on the definition of the main concepts I study. Second, I develop the two-pronged argument that (1) immigrant group leaders want to preserve the distinct groups they lead; and (2) host societies are more threatened by, and more likely to reject, immigrant groups with whom they share cultural traits than those more easily marked as foreigners. I then elaborate the empirical strategy to test the argument, present the main results, and address alternative explanations. Finally, I conclude by discussing the broader implications of my findings for social integration in sub-Saharan Africa.

Immigrants in Africa

Existing research on immigrant minorities in the developing world does not explore immigrant-host relations: it analyzes primarily the organizational structure and economic impact of migrant communities. This body of work has documented a number of contributions of migrants in developing countries. Hausas were instrumental in the development of the kola nut trade between Ghana and Nigeria (Cohen 1969). The Lebanese and Fula expanded trade from Freetown to the Protectorate in Sierra Leone (Jalloh 1999). Yoruba migrants developed commerce and the Esusu institution of rotating credit throughout West Africa (Igué 2003). Maghrebi traders instituted long distance trade across North Africa (Greif 1993). While this literature examines the mechanisms by

which minorities perform key economic functions, it never considers the conditions that allow them to carry out such functions in the first place.

The literature on inter-group conflict offers some insights into immigrant-host relations in the developing world. Modernization theory suggests that more developed economies are more likely to welcome diversity (Durkheim 1938; Huntington 1968; Weber 1949). Scholars who study the impact of political institutions on ethnic relations suggest that certain types of electoral rules exacerbate the salience of ethnic differences between groups (Horowitz 1991).

The main problem with these explanations is that they operate at the country level. As a result, they fail to see and account for variation across groups within a single country. Either modernization theory or electoral rules might explain why Ghana is generally more accepting than Niger. These theories cannot explain, however, why the Yoruba minority faces more exclusion than the Hausa minority in Ghana or why the Hausa minority faces more exclusion than the Yoruba minority in Niger.

A more probable set of explanations is group specific. Chua (2003) analyzes non-indigenous ethnic minorities in Asia, Africa and Latin America and finds that minorities that succeed economically tend to experience social backlash and violence when developing countries transition to democracy and a market economy. Although Chua's contribution sheds light on an important tension in developing nations, her analysis falls short of providing a comprehensive picture of the immigrant experience in developing countries on two fronts: first, she focuses narrowly on non-indigenous economically successful ethnic minorities; second, her explanation implies a common fate for all such minorities. The evidence in this paper, however, demonstrates a wide variation in the fate

of immigrant minorities, for the same immigrant group across different countries as much as for various immigrant groups within a single country. Holding economic success constant, immigrant minorities experience different relations with their hosts.

The argument in this paper links the personal incentives of immigrant leaders and host society members to integration outcomes. This paper therefore explains more of the variation in immigrant-host relations. My central premise is that, immigrant minority leaders' incentives to preserve their group's identity, and host members' incentives to protect their relative position in their society, have adverse effects on immigrant-host relations in developing countries.

In this paper, I use the term *immigrant* to mean *non-indigenous ethnic origins*. Although immigrant typically denotes a legal status, developing countries lack the state and institutional capacity to formulate a path to citizenship. In a region where border crossings become informal markets and immigrant mass expulsions ignore citizenship status, ethnicity trumps citizenship. The question of immigrant-host relations in this paper pertains to non-indigenous minorities, whose members may or may not have citizenship status in their host societies.

This paper further defines degrees of integration as types of immigrant-host relations. Scholars studying immigration in industrialized countries employ the term to qualify the ways in which international migrants incorporate into their host countries (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Koopmans and Statham 1999). In this body of work, advanced industrialized democracies design immigration policies that shape the ways in which immigrants integrate in their host societies. This conceptualization of integration is

inadequate for the study of immigrant-host relations in African countries, where effective immigration policy does not exist.

This paper follows instead Schermerhorn's conceptualization of integration as both (1) the participation of the subordinate group in the institutional and associational life of the dominant group, and (2) behavior patterns of subordinate and dominant group members that are indicative of conflict and/or harmonious relations (Schermerhorn 1970). The degree of integration therefore depends on the interaction between (1) immigrant group participation in the larger socio-political entity and (2) host society acceptance or rejection of the immigrant minority.

The micro-foundations of immigrant-host relations

Resistance from immigrant leaders

Individual immigrants face a choice upon entering their host society: a migrant can seek socio-economic opportunity by either reaching out to host society members (fostering out-group ties) or turning to her own immigrant community members (relying on in-group ties).⁴ The benefits that immigrant community networks bring to the individual migrant are tangible. Not only do they provide a social support system upon arrival, they offer a venue of economic opportunity for a migrant in search of work. A new Yoruba migrant in Accra, for example, can obtain a loan to start her business when she attends meetings for her hometown association. Even if immigrants are better off in the long run coordinating to invest in out-group ties because these might open up new economic opportunities or ensure greater safety through social assimilation, a critical

⁴ Some may do both – this possibility is discussed in further detail in the empirical section.

mass of individual immigrants must foster such ties before it becomes rational for any single immigrant to invest in an out-group tie. There are two reasons for this. First, the cost of fostering out-group ties decreases if a kin has already fostered out-group ties. Many young migrants, for example, settle into their host societies as apprentices for an elder family member. They benefit not only from the training they acquire through this framework, but also from the social connections they gain and eventually use when they start their own business.⁵ Second, immigrant minority leaders find it easier to sanction a single defector from the group than a mass of defectors. Fostering out-group ties, therefore, is a risky individual strategy.⁶

Immigrant group leaders are well-known members of the immigrant community who are either elected or nominated to their leadership position. The Yoruba leader in Accra is the elected Chairman of the Yoruba Association; the Yoruba leader in Niamey is the Yoruba Chief, a hereditary position. Each leader is surrounded by an executive council of elected and nominated members. Leaders accrue financial and social benefits by virtue of their position. Leadership councils collect regular contributions from their members, both in the form of annual fees and dues and in the form of charitable donations at meetings and events. Leaders oversee the disbursement of these funds. They also enjoy social status and recognition, both on the part of their immigrant constituents

⁵ This example is based on interviews by the author with Yorubas in Tema and Accra, Ghana: February 6, 2007.

⁶ Scholars formalize the process as a tipping point: see Schelling (1978), Laitin (1994), Laitin (1998).

and on the part of local officials in their host society. They become popular and socially influential members of their community by virtue of the very authority they herald.⁷

Leaders gain financial benefits and social benefits from their leadership positions. They have a stake in the preservation of a distinctive group identity that forms the very basis for the organization and the mobilization of their constituents. Given these interests, leaders have an incentive to resist constituent defection and exit from the group.⁸

Shared cultural traits between immigrants and hosts motivate immigrant leaders to engage in strategies that increase the cost of individual immigrant defection for two reasons. First, shared traits increase the likelihood of individual defection by lowering the perceived risks of fostering out-group ties for the individual migrant. A Christian immigrant in Accra can join one of many Christian churches and interact with Ghanaian society through a shared religious institution and a shared religious identity. Similarly, a *Nigerian* Hausa can pass as a *Nigerien* Hausa through a shared language, custom, dress and ethnic identity. Second, shared traits increase the leader's perception of the likelihood of individual defection. Leaders are keenly aware of the opportunities individual migrants

⁷ Interviews by the author with leaders of the Nigerian Community Union in Accra, Ghana (January through May, 2007), Cotonou, Benin (June through August 2007) and Niamey, Niger (September through December 2007).

⁸ Leaders need not only have selfish interests for these incentives to hold. Fearon and Laitin (1996) argue that ethnic leaders may have an incentive to sharpen ethnic boundaries so as to promote inter-ethnic cooperation. Leaders interested in protecting their constituents and promoting cooperation with their host society also face an incentive to sharpen boundaries.

face to blend in with their host society.⁹ When overlapping traits lower the risks, real and perceived, of individual assimilation, immigrant leaders act to lock in their benefits through the formalization of the immigrant group and its membership.

How can immigrant group leaders sharpen group boundaries? I argue that immigrant leaders protect their interests by raising the cost of defection and exit for the individual migrant. They do so by offering exclusive benefits to members in the form of (1) protection from social and civil harassment and (2) financial support.

Leaders protect their loyal constituents by striking deals with local state officials that guarantee their group's protection conditional on proof of membership. Nigerians in West Africa, for example, can procure Embassy Identity cards, a form of identity recognized by local authorities and that guarantees the support of immigrant community leaders in the face of civil and social trouble. Members pay fees to their tribal leaders to support their tribal union, their community union and their Embassy. Tribal leaders subsequently procure the identity card for the applicant, which typically remains valid for a period of two years and is renewable indeterminately. The card acts as a certificate of identity that local police forces recognize in exchange for regularized cooperation from dependable community leaders.¹⁰ Moreover, if a cardholder ends up at the police station after all, community leaders use their connections with the local police to bail them out.

⁹ Interviews by the author with immigrant community leaders in Cotonou, Benin and in Niamey, Niger: August 15, August 22, and September 27, 2007.

¹⁰ Interviews by the author with Police Chief and with Associate Police Chief in Cotonou, Benin: August 24, 2007.

Immigrants who opt not to purchase their Embassy Identity card cannot claim access to such benefits. Indeed, community leaders shun immigrants who have no card. The Secretary General of the Nigerian Community Union in Cotonou explains that, “if you are arrested without your ID card, I may not even intervene.”¹¹ The President of the Nigerian Community Union in Niamey further explicates that “you can’t get anything from the Nigerian Embassy without that card. If you want a business, an account, have children in school, anything that has to do with authority, you have to have the card.”¹²

A migrant acting strategically could procure the card and defect just the same. Three constraints, however, make this scenario unlikely. First, community leaders procure these cards for their members by acting as conduits between the migrant and the embassy. The leader has the power to either slow down the process or block it altogether if he wishes. Therefore, if the applicant is not a regular participating member of the community, she may not accrue the social capital necessary to gain the support of her leader. Second, the card must be renewed every year in Ghana and every two years in Niger. Regular card renewal processes increase immigrant leaders’ monitoring power.¹³

¹¹ Interview by the author with the Secretary General of the Nigerian Community Union, Cotonou: August 15, 2007.

¹² Interview by the author with the President of the Nigerian Community Union, Niamey, Niger: September 27, 2008.

¹³ This raises a puzzle: why don’t immigrants, who elect their leaders, demand longer card validity periods? There is evidence suggesting that they try: in Accra, Yorubas have expressed their discontent with the one-year validity period. They have been promised a change, which has not yet been implemented (interview by the author with a member of

Third, although the card provides some degree of security, local police continue to exercise discretion over those they arrest. At the police station, the community leader bails out card-bearing community members. The card therefore becomes a necessary but insufficient method of protection.¹⁴

A second strategy leaders use to raise the cost of exit is the exclusive access members have to funds that support those in need. Leaders use pooled resources from membership dues and donations to provide financial support of various forms: the repatriation of the deceased to Nigeria; startup loans and credits for informal traders; and financial support for ceremonial gatherings, such as weddings and funerals. For example, the Public Relations Officer of the Organization of Nigerian Citizens in Niger grew from a young apprentice tailor working for his master when he first arrived in Niamey a decade ago, to a self-employed tailor who lives and runs his tailoring shop in the office space held by the organization. Not only does he enjoy rent-free living and working space, many of his clients are staff members of the Nigerian Embassy in Niamey, clients he acquired through his connections with the leadership of the Nigerian community

the Yoruba Community, Accra, Ghana: December 9, 2007). If leaders collude, however, immigrants have little power to change this policy: they may refuse to renew their card in protest, but this decision is vulnerable to collective action problems.

¹⁴ Interviews with local police and immigrant leaders in Ghana, Benin and Niger suggest that the police conduct raids on immigrants on a regular basis, and more so when crime rates increase. During those raids, the police arrest all aliens, card-carrying or not.

union. From his perspective, the economic benefits he accrued over time were directly correlated with his participation in the Nigerian community union.¹⁵

In sum, leaders raise the cost of exit by offering two types of club goods to their members: a minimum level of social and civil security and access to financial resources. Where immigrants share cultural traits with their hosts, leaders counter the risk of migrant defection by institutionalizing access to these club goods through formal group organization and membership: consequently, individual immigrants are more likely to formally commit to, and participate in, their immigrant organization. This argument generates the following observable implications:

Hypothesis (1): Immigrants who share broader cultural repertoires with their host societies participate less in their host society institutions than those who share narrower cultural repertoires with their host societies.

Hypothesis (2): Immigrants who share broader cultural repertoires with their host societies maintain stronger links to their immigrant group than those who share narrower cultural repertoires with their host societies.

Rejection by host members

Previous work on inter-group conflict and prejudice informs us that groups tend to reject other groups when the latter pose a perceived threat to their relative position in society (Blumer 1958; Lieberson 1980; Quillian 1995; Sniderman et al. 2000).

Specifically, economic competition among rival groups produces hostile attitudes (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Forbes 1997; Olzak 1992; Quillian 1995). Urban African societies

¹⁵ Interview by the author with the Public Relations Officer for the Nigerian Community Union in Niamey, Niger: March 2, 2007.

comprise of large informal trading sectors in which migrants can easily participate, and do so often successfully. This participation may pose a threat to the livelihoods of indigenous merchants engaging in petty trade because immigrants directly compete with them. Similarly, marginalized indigenous minorities are likely to perceive immigrant minorities as a salient threat to their already-tenuous positions in society. Consistent with the literature on economic competition and inter-group rivalry, these actors might face an incentive to exclude immigrants from their economic playing field.

At the aggregate level, threatened groups in the host society may press for legal restrictions on alien economic activity for example, and may even lobby for more drastic measures such as expulsions.¹⁶ At the individual level, indigenous actors who compete with immigrants are more likely to adopt exclusionary behavior toward them.

But not all immigrants threaten these actors to the same extent. I argue that cultural similarities between a subordinate and a main group also exacerbate relations since the prospect of integration may threaten the main group's relative advantages. Host society actors who stand to gain from marginalizing migrants are therefore more likely to reject immigrants who face low cultural barriers to entry. This argument generates the following observable implications:

Hypothesis (3): Host societies are more likely to adopt exclusionary attitudes toward immigrants who share wider cultural repertoires with them than those who share narrower cultural repertoires.

¹⁶ Interviews with Yoruba victims of Ghana's 1969 expulsion suggest that Ghana's indigenous Kwahu ethnic group pressured President Busia to decree an expulsion because they could not compete with the Yoruba trading monopoly in Ghana.

Hypothesis (4): The drivers of immigrant exclusion are more likely to adopt exclusionary attitudes toward immigrants who share wide cultural repertoires with host societies than with immigrants who don't.

Hausa and Yoruba relations with their hosts in Accra and Niamey

To study immigrant-host relations in the developing world, I collected data on two immigrant groups – Nigerian Yorubas and Nigerian Hausas – in two urban migrant destinations in West Africa: Ghana's capital Accra and Niger's capital Niamey. Nigerian Yorubas and Hausas have migrated from their homelands and throughout West Africa for over a century (Igué 2003; Sudarkasa 1977). They are primarily urban migrants, settling and trading in cities. Yoruba and Hausa immigrants settled in Accra and in Niamey since the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In Accra, many Yorubas and Hausas were brought to Ghana by way of the British military to help the Ga people of Accra fight the Ashanti of central Gold Coast. Their families and descendants remained in Ghana ever since.¹⁷ At the same time, both groups of migrants arrived as cloth and kola nut traders from the coast and from the North. The circumstances surrounding the original arrival of Yoruba and Hausa immigrants into Niamey are less well known, but Yorubas appear to have settled since the early 20th century primarily as economic migrants.¹⁸

¹⁷ Interviews with Yorubas and Hausas in Accra, January through May 2007. See also *The Daily Guide*, November 13, 2006, p. 9; *The Daily Guide*, November 28, 2006, p.9.

¹⁸ Interview by the author with the Chief of the Yoruba Community in Niamey, Niger Republic: September 27, 2007. Also see Igué (2003).

Research Design

I surveyed Yoruba and Hausa immigrants in Accra and Niger to gain insight on the range and sources of immigrant-host relations in sub-Saharan Africa. In the absence of data on the universe of non-indigenous groups in developing countries, I selected my cases on the independent variable of interest, cultural overlap.¹⁹ The Yorubas are equally split as Muslims and Christians, while the Hausas are predominantly Muslim.

Furthermore, Accra is a largely Christian city while Niamey is a largely Muslim city. Finally, neither Yorubas nor Hausas are indigenous to Accra. Niamey, on the other hand, belongs to historic Hausaland. The case selection of Yorubas and Hausas in Accra and Niamey yields a wide range of variation in cultural overlap, which I summarize below.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Due to the dearth of statistical indicators on the demographic representation and distribution of Hausa and Yoruba migrants in West Africa, I collected original survey data on a convenience-sample of Yoruba and Hausa migrants in Accra (N=192) and in Niamey (N=120) during twelve months of field research.^{20 21} With help from contacts

¹⁹ The Minorities At Risk dataset has, since 2006, committed to expanding its universe of cases to all communal groups as opposed to only those considered “at risk.” At that point, the MAR dataset may be a useful source for the underlying universe of cases in my research.

²⁰ Only the 1960 Ghana Census breaks down its alien population by ethnicity. See Hill (1970) for a discussion of these figures.

²¹ Weisberg (2005) defines a convenience sample, or availability sample, as one that “studies cases that are readily accessible” (p.231) and explains that such samples are

through the Nigerian High Commission in each country, I recruited survey enumerators who were themselves Nigerian Yorubas and Hausas living in Accra and in Niamey. The survey I administered collects information on basic demographic data, migration history, and a variety of indicators that measure immigrants' participation in their host society as well as their links to their own community. I construct two indices from this data. The first measures the extent to which immigrants participate in host society institutions, organizations and relations. The second measures the extent to which they maintain social, institutional and financial ties with their own community.²²

Furthermore, I collected original survey data on a random sample of residents in Accra (N=200) and Niamey (N=400) to measure host acceptance and rejection of Yorubas and Hausas. In each city, I recruited two local enumerators to execute a random-walk sampling methodology and administer a short questionnaire probing sentiments of acceptance and rejection of Yorubas and Hausas among the host populations. I built from Posner (2004) to develop measures of acceptance and rejection. The surveys were conducted either in English or the respondent's preferred local language in Accra, and either in French or the respondent's preferred local language in Niamey. The questions I asked were:

necessary if the researcher cannot otherwise identify respondents in a cost-effective way. Since this is a non-probability sample, it is impossible to estimate standard errors. For these reasons, I used similar recruiting techniques in each locality (similar enumerator, similar recruiting process) and limit my statements to cross-sample comparisons.

²² A full list of variables used in the construction of these indices is available upon request.

- Do you think that Ghanaians/Nigeriens here would vote for a Yoruba/Hausa for President?
- What about you, would you vote for a Yoruba/Hausa for President?
- [If not married] Would you marry a Yoruba/Hausa?
- What, if anything, makes Yorubas/Hausas different from Ghanaians/Nigeriens?
- [For Niger sample only] What, if anything, makes Nigerian Hausas different from Nigerien Hausas?

In Ghana, 100 respondents were randomly asked whether they would vote for or marry a Hausa, and the other 100 were randomly asked whether they would vote for or marry a Yoruba. Given that neither Hausas nor Yorubas are indigenous to Ghana, the questions were useful in that both *Hausa* and *Yoruba* are non-indigenous tribes. In Niger, I adopted a different strategy: 54% of the population of Niger is Hausa. The term *Hausa* in Niger does not connote *non-indigenous tribe* the way it does in Ghana. I resolve this problem by adding two ethnic groups in the Niger case: *Kanawa* and *Katsinawa*. These are sub-groups of the Hausa tribe that refer to two of the historical Hausa city-states, Kano and Katsina, both in northern Nigeria. However, Katsinawas in Niger are generally considered to be an indigenous tribe while Kanawas are not.²³ To summarize, the relevant questionnaires used in the Niamey sample were questionnaires on *Yorubas* (N=100) and *Kanawas* (N=100), each referring to a non-indigenous tribe. *Hausa* (N=100) and *Katsinawa* (N=100) questionnaires were used as baselines for comparison. The rest of this paper refers to Kanawa Hausas when discussing the acceptance of Hausas in Niger.

²³ When the Fulani jihad leader Usman dan Fodio conquered Katsina in 1804, Katsina's Hausa nobility resettled and proclaimed a Hausa Katsina chiefdom in Maradi, Niger.

The acceptance of (Kanawa) Hausas and Yorubas in Accra and Niamey

The first three questions in the survey forced the respondent to make a yes or no decision about the political and social inclusion of non-indigenous tribes. The open-ended fourth and fifth questions gave the respondents an opportunity to elaborate on the reasons why they might have said yes or no to the political and social inclusion questions. The results are informative: while respondents in Accra are much more likely to accept Hausas than they are to accept Yorubas, respondents in Niamey are more likely to accept Yorubas than they are to accept Kanawa Hausas. These results are strongest for questions on political acceptance.

In Tables 1 and 2, I present exclusion results for Accra and Niamey respectively, from a series of logit regressions in which I control for respondents' gender, age, level of education, and tribal affiliation; I also control for enumerator bias since I recruited two enumerators to administer the survey, the number of years respondents have lived in the capital city, and whether or not respondents were located in a Nigerian area at the time the survey was administered.²⁴ Table 1, Models 1 through 4 present, respectively, logit estimations of the probability that a respondent answered yes to whether she believed other Ghanaians would vote for a Yoruba/Hausa (*Othervote*), whether she would vote for a Yoruba/Hausa (*Youvote*), whether she would marry a Yoruba/Hausa (*Youmarry*), and whether she cited nationality differences when asked what – if anything – differentiates Yorubas/Hausas from Ghanaians (*Natdiff*). Table 1 provides a direct comparison between Ghanaian respondents' exclusion of Yorubas and their exclusion of Hausas through the

²⁴ I categorized areas as Nigerian or non-Nigerian according to the neighborhoods my Nigerian enumerators took me to when surveying Nigerian immigrants.

Yoruba Treatment variable, which takes the value 0 if respondents received the Hausa questionnaire and the value 1 if respondents received the Yoruba questionnaire. Table 2, Models 1 through 5 present, respectively, logit estimations of the probability that a respondent answered yes to whether she believed other Nigeriens would vote for a Yoruba/Kanawa/Katsinawa/Hausa (*Othervote*), whether she would vote for a Yoruba/Kanawa/Katsinawa/Hausa (*Youvote*), whether she would marry a Yoruba/Kanawa/Katsinawa/Hausa (*Youmarry*), whether she cited nationality differences when asked what – if anything – differentiates Yorubas/Kanawas/Katsinawas/Hausas from Nigeriens (*Natdiff*), and whether she claimed that there are no differences between Nigerian Hausas and Nigerian Hausas (*Nodiff*). The differences in Nigerian respondents' acceptance of each group is captured through each treatment variable (Yoruba Treatment, Kanawa Treatment and Katsinawa Treatment) and assessed relative to the baseline Hausa. In addition, Table 2 presents results from non-linear hypothesis tests of differences in the coefficients between Yoruba Treatment and Kanawa Treatment.

Tables 1 and 2 illustrate a number of important results. In Accra, on all dimensions except for inter-marriage, respondents are more accepting of Hausas than they are of Yorubas, holding all other variables constant. In fact, only 2.82% of respondents would vote for a Yoruba presidential candidate while 16.88% of respondents would vote for a Hausa presidential candidate.²⁵ This finding holds across respondents' sex, age, education level and tribe. No other factor significantly affects the likelihood that a respondent will vote for a Yoruba or Hausa presidential candidate beyond the question

²⁵ Estimates are calculated using *Clarify* and setting all other variables at their mean (continuous variables) or median (dummy variables).

of whether the candidate is a Yoruba or a Hausa. Respondents are also significantly more likely to cite differences in national origins when asked what, if anything, makes Yorubas different from Ghanaians than when asked what, if anything, makes Hausas different from Ghanaians.²⁶

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

In Niamey (Table 2), Yorubas and Kanawas are significantly less accepted than the baseline Hausas on both voting and marriage questions. Furthermore, respondents were less likely to think that Nigeriens would vote for a Kanawa than for a Yoruba presidential candidate: holding all other variables at their mean, 12.88% of respondents claimed they believe Nigeriens would vote for a Yoruba presidential candidate while only 4.11% of respondents claimed they believe Nigeriens would vote for a Kanawa presidential candidate.²⁷ This is surprising and informative, given that Kanawas are Hausas.

²⁶ Respondents may be unwilling to express their prejudice. Two factors, however, mitigate concerns with the biases this may pose. First, I recruited local enumerators for this part of the data collection in order to minimize any resistance respondents may have to divulging their prejudices in front of a foreigner. Second, any resulting bias is likely to under-estimate the level of prejudice, making my test a more difficult one for detecting respondents' exclusionary attitudes.

²⁷ Additionally, 11.76% of Nigerien respondents claimed they would vote for a Yoruba presidential candidate while only 2.73% said the same for a Kanawa presidential candidate. This difference, however, just misses statistical significance at the 90% confidence level.

Model 5, Table 2, presents additional evidence that Kanawa Hausas evoke greater exclusionary reactions among Nigeriens than do Yorubas. It presents results from an embedded experiment in which all respondents, after being primed with their respective questions on Yorubas, Kanawas, Katsinawas or Hausas, were asked what, if anything, differentiates Nigerien Hausas from Nigerian Hausas. The results in Table 2 indicate that respondents were less likely to say that there are no differences between Nigerien and Nigerian Hausas if they were previously asked about their willingness to vote for or marry a Kanawa than if they were previously asked about their willingness to vote for or marry any other ethnic group (Yoruba, Katsinawa, Hausa). Holding all other variables at their mean, only 15.39% of respondents who received the Kanawa treatment claimed there were no differences between Nigerien and Nigerian Hausas, compared to 34.13% of respondents who received the Yoruba treatment, 39.92% of respondents who received the Katsinawa treatment, and 43% of respondents who received the baseline Hausa treatment. The Kanawa effect is the only statistically significant effect on the likelihood that a respondent claims that there are no differences between Nigerien and Nigerian Hausas, and it is negative. When a respondent is primed to think about Kanawas, she is less likely to perceive Nigerian Hausas and Nigerien Hausas as similar groups.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

The results from logit analyses of various exclusion measures of Hausas and Yorubas in Accra and in Niamey indicate that Yorubas are less accepted than Hausas in Accra, but that Kanawa Hausas are accepted just as little as, if not less than, Yorubas in Niamey. All results hold regardless of the respondent's sex, age, tribe, education level,

length of residence in the city of study, and location at the time the survey was administered.

The Participation of Hausas and Yorubas in Accra and Niamey

The flip side of acceptance is whether Nigerian Hausas and Yorubas participate in their host societies and in their immigrant communities. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) illustrate the indices of participation and attachment of Yorubas and Hausas, as well as the index of political exclusion of Yorubas and Hausas, in Accra and in Niamey respectively. Figure 2 shows that cases with high group attachment also tend to face greater exclusion from their hosts. Conversely, cases with low group attachment also tend to face lower exclusion from their hosts. Figure 2 further shows that the relationship between group participation in its host society and host exclusion is ambiguous: in Accra, Hausas participate more and experience lower exclusion from Ghanaians; but in Niamey, Hausas participate more and experience higher exclusion from Nigeriens. The data therefore indicate a trade-off between group attachment and acceptance by hosts, but an ambiguous relationship between group participation and acceptance by hosts.

My qualitative impressions from the field support these quantitative patterns. In Accra, Yorubas are highly organized into town unions, ethnic associations and church organizations. They formally elect and/or nominate their leaders, and they all mobilized through the Yoruba Baptist Church (Yoruba Muslims as well) to acquire their Embassy identity cards. Hausas in Accra, on the other hand, lack a clear formal organization and leadership. Although many Nigerians claim that the Hausa community organization exists, no one was ever able to direct me toward the official Hausa leadership. In Niamey, the contrast is striking. Not only does a Hausa head the Nigerian community union, 53%

of Nigerian Hausas surveyed knew his name. Only 26% of Yorubas in Niamey, by contrast, knew the name of their Yoruba Chief.

To summarize the patterns that emerge out of both quantitative survey data and qualitative impressions, immigrant groups with lower community attachment tend to also experience greater acceptance from their hosts and immigrant groups with higher community attachment tend to also experience lower acceptance from their hosts.

Why do immigrant-host relations favor some immigrant groups over others?

Why are Yorubas less integrated than Hausas in Accra, while Hausas are less integrated than Yorubas in Niamey? My theory predicts that cultural similarities between immigrant groups and their hosts limit immigrant integration. To test its observable implications, I constructed a measure of cultural overlap that increases as ethnic and religious similarities between immigrants and hosts increase. To do so, I lay out the ethnic and religious compositions of each immigrant group and of each host society based on the samples of immigrant and host populations I collected. I then multiplied the share of the immigrant group with the share of the host population on each ethnic and religious category. Finally, I summed up each product to construct an ethnic overlap index and a religious overlap index. Cultural overlap is the average of the two indices: it conveys the extent to which immigrant groups and host societies share cultural repertoires, based on overlapping ethnic and religious cleavages. It ranges from 0.005 for Hausas in Accra to 0.71 for Hausas in Niamey.

In Figures 2(a) and 2(b), each immigrant group is ordered on the x-axis by its level of cultural overlap: groups further to the right have higher overlap values than groups further to the left. Figure 2(a) clearly indicates that Hausas in Accra, who share

less overlap with Accra society than do Yorubas in Accra, participate more in Accra society, maintain fewer ties with their own community, and face less exclusion from Ghanaians. Figure 2(b) further indicates that Yorubas in Niamey, who share less overlap with Niamey society than do Hausas in Niamey, maintain fewer ties with their own community and face less exclusion from Nigeriens. Contrary to predictions from Hypothesis (1), however, Yorubas in Niamey participate less in Niamey society than their Hausa counterparts. The trends in Figure 2 provide empirical support for Hypotheses (2) and (3): exclusion by hosts and immigrant attachment to kin increase as overlap increases. The results, however, remain inconclusive for Hypothesis (1): immigrant participation in the host society does not necessarily decrease with overlap.

In order to probe further the relationship between overlap and immigrant participation in their host society and in their own community, I take advantage of an existing cleavage among the Yoruba community in Accra. Unlike Nigerian Hausas, who are overwhelmingly Muslim (and only Muslim in the communities I surveyed), Nigerian Yorubas are equally split between Christian and Muslim. The Yoruba presence in Accra is unique in that it reproduces this religious cleavage: 44% of the Yorubas I surveyed in Accra are Muslim and 56% are Christian.²⁸ Accra is a predominantly Christian city; it is therefore possible to compare the participation and exclusion of Christian and Muslim Yorubas in Accra, and to test the observable implication that Christian Yorubas, with a significantly higher overlap index, participate less and are less secure in Accra than their Muslim counterparts. This comparison is particularly useful in that it examines differences in integration *within the same ethnic group*.

²⁸ This was not so in Niamey, where only 11 of the 90 Yorubas surveyed were Christian.

The data comparing host participation, immigrant attachment and insecurity levels for Christian and Muslim Yorubas in Accra indicate that Muslim Yorubas, who have close to no overlap with Christian Accra, tend to participate much more in their host societies (host participation index of 0.56 for Muslim Yorubas versus 0.38 for Christian Yorubas) and to maintain fewer ties with their kin (group attachment index of 0.18 for Muslim Yorubas versus 0.40 for Christian Yorubas) than their Christian Yoruba counterparts. They were also substantially less affected by the 1969 expulsion order than Christian Yorubas were. Indeed, only 40% of Muslim Yorubas surveyed asserted being personally affected or having a family member that was affected by the decree; that figure rises to 55% for Christian Yorubas. This difference is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.²⁹

The analysis above lends considerable support for Hypotheses (1), (2) and (3): immigrants who share larger cultural repertoires with their host societies tend to participate less in them, face greater rejection from them, and maintain stronger ties with

²⁹ I use data on expulsion as a measure of insecurity because the host population survey of acceptance of Yorubas and Hausas does not differentiate between Christian and Muslim Yorubas. The next best indicator of insecurity for Christian and Muslim Yorubas in Accra is thus the extent to which these communities were affected by the 1969 Alien Compliance Order.

their own communities. The only caveat arises at high levels of overlap, where both host society participation and immigrant group attachment are high.³⁰

To test Hypothesis (4), I return to the random sample of Ghanaian and Nigerien acceptance or rejection of Hausas and Yorubas. We already know from Tables 1 and 2 that host societies are more likely to reject groups with whom they share greater cultural overlap: Ghanaians in Accra are less accepting of Yorubas than of Hausas; Nigeriens in Niamey are less accepting of Kanawa Hausas than of Yorubas. Hypothesis (4) claims that the drivers of immigrant exclusion are also more likely to exclude immigrant groups with greater cultural overlap.

In logit estimations of the political acceptance of Yorubas and Hausas, it is possible to categorize respondents by their occupation and their ethnic affiliation, and thus identify which actors in Ghanaian and in Nigerien society are drivers of immigrant exclusion. Results from this estimation indicate that in Accra, members of the Ewe ethnic group drive the exclusion of Yorubas and Hausas. In Niamey, both traders and members of the Zerma ethnic group drive the exclusion of Yorubas and Kanawa Hausas.³¹

Which immigrant groups do these exclusionary actors reject more strongly? Table 3 presents the differences in acceptance of immigrant groups between Ewes and non-Ewes in Accra, between traders and non-traders in Niamey and between Zermas and non-

³⁰ This finding, however, does not negate the theoretical claims in this paper. At high levels of cultural overlap, leaders may continue their strategies for group preservation, but be less successful at segregating their members from their host society.

³¹ The tables are not presented here but are available upon request.

Zermas in Niamey.³² It indicates that in Accra, the Ewe exclusionary effect is equivalent to a 100% reduction in the likelihood of voting for a Yoruba compared to only a 52% reduction in the likelihood of voting for a Hausa. This effect, therefore, is stronger for the Yorubas than for the Hausas, and it is statistically significant at least at the 95% confidence level. Similarly, the results indicate that the trader exclusionary effect in Niamey is equivalent to a 61% reduction in the likelihood of voting for a Yoruba compared to a 75.5% reduction in the likelihood of voting for a Kanawa Hausa. This effect, therefore, is stronger for the Kanawa Hausas than for the Yorubas and it is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. Finally, the results indicate that the Zerma effect in Niamey is equivalent to a 51% increase in the willingness to vote for a Yoruba compared to a 63% decrease in the willingness to vote for a Hausa. This effect, therefore, is positive for the Yorubas and negative for the Hausas. Although the Zerma results in this sample are consistent with predictions in Hypothesis (4), they are not statistically significant at the conventional confidence levels. To summarize, Ewes in Accra reject Yorubas more than they reject Hausas, and traders in Niamey reject Kanawa Hausas more than they reject Yorubas. Drivers of immigrant exclusion react more strongly against immigrant groups who share greater cultural overlap with their host societies.

³² In a logit estimation, Stata drops the interaction terms between the type of questionnaire (Yoruba/Hausa) and respondents' demographic characteristics (Ewe, Zerma, trader) because they tend to perfectly predict the outcome.

Alternative Explanations

In this section, I consider four alternative explanations for why Yorubas are more integrated than Hausas in Niamey but less integrated than Hausas in Accra. A prevalent explanation is Chua's (2003) analysis of the backlash economically successful ethnic minorities tend to experience. Are Yorubas better off than Hausas in Accra and Hausas better off than Yorubas in Niamey? The economic success of Yorubas and Hausas in Ghana and Niger, in fact, does not explain the patterns of rejection and acceptance described in the previous sections for two reasons. First, immigrant survey data on Yorubas and Hausas in Accra and in Niamey indicates that, while sampled Yorubas may be the wealthier group in Accra, sampled Hausas are not the wealthier group in Niamey. In Accra, 72.39% of sampled Yorubas live in houses with cement walls, while only 50% of sampled Hausas live in houses with cement walls; conversely, while only 5.22% of sampled Yorubas live in houses with mud walls, 18% of sampled Hausas live in houses with mud walls. In Niamey, however, 40% of sampled Yorubas live in houses with cement walls while 33.33% of sampled Hausas live in houses with cement walls; conversely, 58.89% of sampled Yorubas live in houses with mud walls while as much as 66.67% of sampled Hausas live in houses with mud walls.³³ The data indicate that sampled Yorubas are better off than sampled Hausas in both Accra and in Niamey. Economic wellbeing, therefore, cannot account for the differences found across cities.

³³ Monetary income data are difficult to collect from survey respondents in developing countries, and offer a less reliable measure of wellbeing than the constitution of their homes. Here, cement walls indicate greater wealth than mud walls.

Actual wealth, however, may be less important than perceived economic wellbeing on the part of host societies. Do Ghanaians in Accra perceive Yorubas to be economically better off than they are, while Nigeriens in Niamey perceive Kanawa Hausas to be economically better off than they are? The evidence suggests otherwise. Not a single Ghanaian respondent evoked differences in economic wellbeing when asked what, if anything, made Hausas or Yorubas different from Ghanaians. Moreover, while 8% of Nigerien respondents in Niamey mentioned economic differences between Kanawa Hausas and Nigeriens, 13%, mentioned such differences between Yorubas and Nigeriens. If neither Yorubas nor Hausas in Accra are perceived as economically better-off than Ghanaians, and if Yorubas in Niamey are more likely perceived as economically better off than Nigeriens than are Kanawa Hausas, perceived economic well-being cannot explain why Ghanaians reject Yorubas and Nigeriens reject Kanawa Hausas.

A second explanation focuses on demographic factors (Quillian 1995; Posner 2004) and migration waves (Olzak 1989). The demographic explanation would argue that Yorubas are less accepted than Hausas in Accra because they form a bigger demographic entity; similarly, Kanawa Hausas are less accepted than Yorubas in Niamey because they are the larger group. According to this argument, Accra Yorubas and Kanawa Hausas in Niamey are more threatening because they represent greater competition for scarce resources (Quillian 1995) or because they can be mobilized by political entrepreneurs (Quillian 1995; Posner 2004). Actual demographic data does not exist for immigrant populations by ethnicity in Ghana and in Niger; it is therefore difficult to assess the veracity of these claims. Two pieces of evidence from the field, however, suggest that demographics cannot explain the variation in Yoruba and Hausa acceptance in Accra and

in Niamey. First, interviews with Nigerian community leaders in Niamey indicate that Yorubas, not Hausas, are the larger immigrant group in Niamey.³⁴ Second, host society respondents rarely mention demographic factors in their open-ended answers. Only 3% of host respondents in Niamey cited population size as a differentiating characteristic of Yorubas in Niamey; none cited population size as a differentiating characteristic of Kanawa Hausas in Niamey or Yorubas in Accra.

A related explanation would argue that Yorubas in Accra are more recent migrants than Hausas in Accra and that Kanawa Hausas in Niamey are more recent migrants than Yorubas in Niamey. According to this argument, host societies perceive these groups as more threatening due to their recent influx. The evidence, however, suggests that both Yorubas and Hausas have settled in Accra since the late 19th century; in Niamey, the arrival of Yorubas dates back to the early 20th century but that of Nigerian Hausas is unknown. It is likely to be at least just as old, however, given the geographical proximity of Nigerian Hausas and the fluidity on the northern Nigerian border.

A third explanation is the claim that groups with more legal citizens of the host country are better integrated. Survey data indicate that more sampled Hausas in Accra indeed have Ghanaian passports than do sampled Yorubas in Accra (68% versus 47%). However, only 10% of sampled Yorubas in Niamey – compared to 20% of sampled Hausas in Niamey – have Nigerian passports. Naturalization, therefore, cannot explain why Yorubas are better integrated than Hausas in Niamey. Furthermore, naturalization may constitute part of an immigrant's exit strategy. In this case, naturalization cannot be

³⁴ Interview by the author with the Secretary General of the Nigerian community union in Niamey (a member of the Igbo ethnic group), Niger: February 18, 2007.

used as an exogenous factor explaining immigrant integration: immigrants choose to naturalize, and host societies can choose to make such a process easy or difficult for the applicant.³⁵

A final explanation for the varying acceptance and rejection of Yorubas and Hausas in Ghana and in Niger is the historical role these non-indigenous minorities may have played in their respective host countries. For example, the Beninois became easy scapegoats and were expelled throughout West Africa due to the special attention they received from the French. Challenor (1979) explains that the French placed the relatively well-educated Beninois (then Dahomeyans) into colonial bureaucracies throughout West Africa and that, once independent, nations such as Côte d'Ivoire and Niger expelled all their Beninois immigrants in reaction to this imposition (Challenor 1979). Did the Yoruba play a particularly antagonistic role in the history of Ghana? Similarly, did Nigerian Hausas impose themselves in Niger?

The British indeed used Hausa and Yoruba subjects to help stave off the Ashanti incursions into the land of the Gas in the 19th century. However, both Hausas and Yorubas played a role in fighting the Ashanti wars, meaning that any differentiation in Ghanaian attitudes toward Hausas or Yorubas cannot stem from this colonial legacy. Finally, Niger was a French colony, and Nigeria a British colony: Yorubas and Hausas never interacted with Nigerien society through the colonial system. There is thus no empirical evidence supporting the claim that relations between Ghanaians and Yorubas

³⁵ The Chief of the Yoruba Community in Niamey explains that, “most Yorubas have the Nigerian passport because if you naturalize then it’s assumed you don’t go back to your country.” Interview by the author, Niamey, Niger: September 27, 2007.

on one hand, and Nigeriens and Nigerian Hausas on the other are a product of antagonistic relations shaped by colonial powers.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have used surveys of Hausa and Yoruba immigrants and surveys of host populations in Accra and Niamey to make two important points about immigrant integration in sub-Saharan Africa. The first is that, while immigrant communities are insecure in Africa, there is wide variation in immigrant-host relations across groups and localities. The second is that cultural similarities may exacerbate, not ameliorate, immigrant-host relations given the incentives immigrant leaders have to preserve their group identities and the incentives host society players face to reject groups that can most easily blend in. Together, these findings suggest that cultural differences matter for immigrant security and integration in African countries.

In Accra, Yorubas share religious similarities with Ghanaians while Hausas, who are overwhelmingly Muslim, are culturally distinct. Yet Hausas have integrated significantly more than their Yoruba counterparts. In Niamey, Nigerian Hausas share a wide cultural repertoire with indigenous Nigeriens, through both a shared ethnicity (Hausa) and a shared religion (Muslim). Yet these migrants are less integrated in Niamey than their Yoruba counterparts. Although their cultural similarities enable them to participate in Nigerien society, they maintain strong links to their own immigrant community and face rejection from Niamey residents. Finally, the religious split among the Yorubas of Accra allows for an additional controlled comparison of integration based on cultural overlap. The evidence clearly shows that Christian Yorubas, who share a

larger cultural repertoire with Christian Accra than do Muslim Yorubas, participate less and face higher levels of exclusion from their host society.

The arguments advanced in this paper have a number of implications beyond the contributions they make to the immigrant question in Africa. First, they highlight the salience of ethnic and religious cleavages and institutions for social integration. Religious affiliations crosscut ethnic categories, and religious institutions could play an important role in building trust and cooperation between members of different ethnic groups. These opportunities are missed, however, when religious leaders use ethnicity as a rallying point for organization and recruitment, and effectively “ethnicize” religious institutions. The tension between the opportunities religious institutions create for cooperation and their vulnerability to ethnicization is an important phenomenon in Africa today as world religions such as Christianity and Islam grow. Second, the findings in this paper bring to light the persistent relative fragility of national identities relative to ethnic ones in West Africa. Many conversations in Accra and Niamey revealed a tendency for hosts and immigrants alike to equate national identity with ethnic identity: a Yoruba is a Nigerian, whether she is born in Ghana or in Nigeria. This is salient when the citizenship question becomes a tool to exclude candidates politically (as was attempted in Niger against President Tandja, whose father was Mauritanian) or entire ethnic groups socio-economically (as it played out for the Burkinabés in Côte d’Ivoire).

Migrant communities develop trade and investment networks. In Africa, where borders are porous and state institutions generally weak, communities travel and settle to improve their economic wellbeing. At the same time, they represent potential engines of growth for the societies that host them. Whether or not African countries harness or stifle

such potential will shape the socio-economic fates of migrant and host communities alike.

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Figure 1: Case selection

		<u>Immigrants</u>	
		Yoruba	Hausa
<u>Hosts</u>	Accra	No ethnic overlap Religious overlap (Christianity)	No ethnic overlap No religious overlap
	Niamey	Religious overlap (Islam) No ethnic overlap	Religious overlap (Islam) Ethnic overlap (Hausa)

Table 1: Exclusion of Hausas and Yoruba in Accra

	Othervote (1)	Youvote (2)	Youmarry (3)	Natdiff (4)
Yoruba Treatment	-1.542 ** (0.554)	-2.137 *** (0.650)	-0.721 (0.860)	1.505 * (0.650)
Sex	0.276 (0.524)	0.523 (0.570)	1.499 ^ (0.871)	-0.004 (0.690)
Age	0.010 (0.027)	0.003 (0.029)	-0.045 (0.046)	0.005 (0.032)
Education	-0.185 (0.196)	-0.132 (0.227)	-0.590 * (0.237)	0.192 (0.205)
Enumerator	0.801 (0.547)	1.218 * (0.591)	-1.315 (0.829)	1.878 * (0.824)
Number years since moved Accra	-0.004 (0.027)	-0.017 (0.029)	-0.039 (0.048)	-0.028 (0.035)
Nigerian area	-0.486 (0.542)	-0.485 (0.590)	-0.524 (0.908)	-0.241 (0.720)
Ga	-0.073 (0.933)	-0.178 (1.026)	Dropped	-1.116 (1.433)
Ewe	-0.533 (0.682)	-1.381 (0.864)	0.259 (1.039)	-0.549 (0.767)
Constant	5.924 (54.746)	30.131 (58.428)	82.535 (95.752)	46.792 (69.433)
Pseudo R ²	0.15	0.24	0.16	0.17
N	113	113	46	113

Robust standard errors in parentheses;

Significance levels: ^ $p \leq 0.10$; * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$

Table 2: Exclusion of Hausas and Yorubas in Niamey

	Othervote (1)	Youvote (2)	Youmarry (3)	Natdiff (4)	Nodiff (5)
Yoruba Treatment	-5.228 *** (0.902)	-5.330 *** (0.913)	-4.125 *** (1.287)	0.686 (0.822)	-0.430 (0.474)
Kanawa Treatment	-6.648 *** (1.060)	-7.002 *** (1.034)	-4.224 *** (1.147)	-1.321 (1.185)	-1.549 ** (0.558)
Katsinawa Treatment	-2.315 ** (0.846)	-1.923 ** (0.754)	-1.331 (1.177)	-1.222 (1.169)	-0.153 (0.430)
Sex	-0.211 (0.532)	0.191 (0.549)	1.145 (0.757)	0.626 (0.754)	0.266 (0.344)
Age	0.020 (0.027)	0.027 (0.032)	0.059 (0.071)	-0.046 (0.035)	-0.004 (0.018)
Education	0.160 (0.138)	0.176 (0.142)	0.007 (0.227)	0.113 (0.175)	0.039 (0.100)
Enumerator	0.007 (0.191)	0.086 (0.197)	0.152 (0.301)	0.245 (0.269)	-0.206 ^ (0.120)
Number years since moved to Niamey	0.008 (0.032)	0.041 (0.036)	-0.016 (0.061)	-0.072 * (0.028)	-0.006 (0.020)
Nigerian area	0.119 (0.491)	0.371 (0.543)	0.313 (0.649)	0.369 (0.706)	0.149 (0.352)
Zerma	0.581 (0.563)	0.300 (0.596)	0.918 (0.858)	-0.084 (0.924)	0.300 (0.413)
Tuareg	-1.084 (1.123)	-0.854 (1.196)	Dropped	0.499 (1.556)	1.070 (0.818)
Constant	-12.604 (65.276)	-80.089 (71.840)	31.761 (122.555)	140.463 * (57.411)	11.650 (39.405)
Pseudo R ²	0.55	0.58	0.35	0.16	0.07
N	187	187	63	187	187
Non-Linear Hypothesis Test (Kanawa vs. Yoruba)	p = 0.073	p = 0.111	p = 0.925	p = 0.133	p = 0.074

Robust standard errors in parentheses;

Significance levels: ^ p ≤ 0.10; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001

Figure 2: Integration of Hausas and Yorubas in Accra and Niamey




Table 3: Indigenous traders and minorities on Yoruba/Hausa exclusion

GHANA				
	Non-Ewes	Ewes	Difference of means	Ewe Effect
Would you vote for a Yoruba?	9.72% (N=72)	0% (N=24)	-9.72 ** (3.52)	100% decrease in willingness to vote for a Yoruba
Would you vote for a Hausa?	36.11% (N=72)	17.39% (N=23)	-18.72 * (9.89)	51.84% decrease in willingness to vote for a Hausa
NIGER				
	Non-traders	Traders	Difference of means	Trader Effect
Would you vote for a Yoruba?	12.07% (N=58)	4.76% (N=42)	-7.31 ^ (5.45)	60.56% decrease in willingness to vote for a Yoruba
Would you vote for a Kanawa?	8.16% (N=49)	2% (N=50)	-6.16 ^ (4.43)	75.49% decrease in willingness to vote for a Kanawa
	Non-Zermas	Zermas	Difference of means	Zerma Effect
Would you vote for a Yoruba?	6.98% (N=43)	10.53% (N=57)	9.00 * (5.68)	50.86% increase in willingness to vote for a Yoruba
Would you vote for a Kanawa?	6.67% (N=60)	2.5% (N=40)	-4.17 (4.10)	62.52% decrease in willingness to vote for a Kanawa

Significance levels: ^ $p \leq 0.10$; * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$