Ethnic Politics and Job Performance in the Kenyan Police 1957-1970*

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Abstract

Using a panel of 6,725 Kenyan police officers 1957-1970, we show how ethnic politics encroached and changed the daily behavior of the members of the police force as soon as after Kenya's first multiparty elections in 1961. We find a significant detoriation in discipline for Kikuyu officers after 1961, when the Kikuyu-dominated KANU party emerged as the most powerful political force. We investigate the channels of this detoriation in discipline. We find little evidence for selection: The quality of new recruits did not detoriate, nor did well-performing police officers disproportionately leave the force at independence. We also find little evidence that the reorganisation of police divisions caused the divergent trends. The effects appear to be driven by individual policemen changing their behaviour. (JEL:)

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1 Introduction

Protecting citizens and their property is one of the most fundamental public goods that the state provides. However, in spite of profound welfare implications, many developing countries lack an efficient law enforcing body. Limited state capacity could be one driver of poor police performance.[1] Another and possibly related driver could be political interference and partisan interests that undermine the effectiveness and discipline of the police. This channel should be particularly relevant when ethnic groups that vie for political power are represented in the police force. In spite of the importance of law enforcement, there is a dearth of work on police performance in low income countries, and its interaction with ethnic politics has received almost no attention. Relying on unique historical data from Kenya, our paper will assess how the rise of ethnic politics during Kenya's transition towards independence affected the performance of its police force.

The Kenya Police Force (KPF) provides a particularly interesting context to study the interaction between ethnic politics and police performance. Kenya's Police consistently ranks among the top 5 most corrupt police forces in the world. Indeed Kenyans perceive the police as the most corrupt among all their state institutions (International, 2013).[2] At the same time, the police is perceived as highly inefficient in preventing and detecting crime (Anderson, 2002; Ruteere, 2011; Okia, 2011; Akech, 2005). The ruling party and powerful individuals interfere in the police, not necessarily legitimately so. Kenyan politics has a strong ethnic component, drawing support from and polarising along ethnic lines. The failure and shortcomings of the police as well as the ethnic dimension have been most well-documented for the 2007/08 post-election ethnic clashes that followed after the disputed victory of Kibaki over Odinga that left 1,133 dead and about 350,000 people displaced (Waki, 2008, p. 351, 358).[3] There were numerous instances of police brutality; 405 "senseless deaths" were allegedly inflicted by the police, with citizens "unlawfully shot from behind" (Waki, 2008, p. 417). Police officers did often not respond, even committed crimes themselves. Police investigations were unprofessional and absent. The clashes also revealed an ethnic

[1] It is often argued that governments in any political system, whether democracy or autocracy, should have a strong interest in a disciplined police force. After all, if laws were not enforced, legislation and executive would have little reach. However, this ignores the trade-off between efficiency and political loyalty.

[2] In 2013, Kenya's Police was leading the corruption perception index with 95% of survey respondents stating that the Police 'is corrupt or extremely corrupt'. In 2006, respondents paid an average of 5 bribes to police officers in the last 12 months.

[3] Kibaki drew support among Kikuyu, Embu and Meru, whereas Odinga ran on an alliance of Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin, and coastal peoples.

dimension. In some areas, the police took sides depending on the ethnicity of perpetrators and victims (Okia, 2011).

In this paper we use new, absolutely unique data obtained from personnel records that allow us to track 6,725 Kenyan police officers over their entire career. For each officer, the files describe the offenses committed while serving, mostly cases of absenteeism, disobedience, and drunkenness. We study the period 1957-1970, because ethnic politics has featured prominently in Kenya ever since its first multi-party elections in 1961. Thus, the political transitions that led up to and culminated in Kenya's independence (1963) marked the start of a new era in which certain ethnic groups began to dominate policy-making. The years before the first multi-party elections provides us with a comparison period in which ethnic politics was not necessarily absent, but less pronounced and possibly favouring different ethnic groups. We find that the rise of ethnic politics after the 1961 elections had an immediate effect on discipline in the police force. Kikuyu police officers started to perform significantly worse and commit more offenses. We then investigate the underlying channels. We are able to rule out that ethnic favouritism had an effect through adverse selection of human capital: We find that neither the quality of policemen entering nor the quality of those exiting the force changed significantly after 1961. In contrast, our results appear to be driven by individuals changing behaviour. Division and individual characteristics (other than ethnicity) cannot explain the changing behaviour by themselves. We find that the promotion opportunities of the Kikuyu improved after 1961, although they were also punished more heavily for past misconduct. The latter results are broadly consistent with ruling ethnic group (incorrectly) anticipating lower costs of "shirking" in the light of preferential promotion.

Our paper contributes to two main strands of literatures. First, our work adds to research on ethnic politics and the economic costs of ethnic diversity. There is a large literature that links ethnic diversity to poor local public goods provision at the local level (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Habyarimana et al., 2007) and poor economic growth at the macro level (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Desmet, Ortuno-Ortin and Wacziarg, 2012; De Luca et al., N.d.). In Kenya, Miguel and Gugerty (2005) show that schooling facilities and access to water suffer from ethnic diversity. Burgess et al. (2015) show how Kenyan road building was concentrated in the districts that share the same ethnicity as the president in power - an effect that is stronger in periods of non-democracy. Kramon and Posner (2016) find similarly positive impacts on education levels for the coethnics of the minister

of education, even in periods of multi-party elections. Our paper provides micro-evidence on how the rise of ethnic politics affected the functioning of the states bureaucracy and the performance of its personnel at the very micro, day-to-day level. In the context of Kenya's flower market, Hjort (2014) conducts a similar micro study of how ethnic tensions in an organization affect individual performance. This author finds that political violence increases the costs of ethnic diversity. In the very different organization set-up of Kenya's police administration, our results confirm that political tensions between ethnic groups affect the day-to-day performance of policemen. However, in our context, it is not ethnic diversity in itself, but the political dominance of certain ethnic groups that appears to drive poor performance.[4] This result could reflect that both the nature of political shocks (violent ethnic conflict versus increased political power) and the nature of the organization (private firms producing in teams versus public service) matter for the relationship between ethnic politics and job performance.

Second, we contribute to the literature on the quality of public service provision in developing countries. Absenteeism in the health and education sector features prominently in this literature (Banerjee and Duflo, 2006; Duflo, Hanna and Ryan, 2012). The same is not true for the police, even though functioning law enforcing institutions are arguably at least as important for economic development (Auerbach, 2003). One notable exception is the work by Banerjee et al. (2012), who use an RCT to study the effects of improved work conditions and increased monitoring of policemen in Rajasthan.[5] In parallel to work focusing on the performance of public sector "workers", a growing literature also considers the performance of higher level "bureaucrats". Among the determinants of bureaucratic effectiveness, existing work has studied the role of training and career background (Bertrand et al., 2015), personality traits (Callen et al., 2015), and turn-over (Iyer and Mani, 2012).[6] Most bureaucrats change postings at high frequency and are working far from their homes, like the police in Kenya. Moreover, certain contributions to this literature use complete career data similar to the information we exploit for the Kenyan police. Still, the broad literature on public service

[4]While our paper takes differences between ethnic groups or alliances as given, Posner (2004) studies the conditions under which ethnic cleavages become politically salient by comparing the relations between the same set of ethnic groups in the very different political environments of Zambia and Malawi.

[5]Quantitative studies on police organization are rare, even for high-income countries. Exceptions are Crawford and Disney (2014) studying pension reforms on ill-retirement in the police in England and Wales, and Mas (2006) who finds that pay raises for the police below a reference point reduces job performance.

[6]Bo, Finan and Rossi (2013) study how advertised work conditions for bureaucratic posts affect the pool of applicants.

provision has paid little attention to how ethnic tensions shape the behaviour of public servants. Our paper shows that the political context in which policemen operate can affect their behaviour in their day-to-day jobs.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we give a background of ethnic politics in general and in the police in particular. Section 3 describes the data and the measurement of police performance. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 describes the main results. Section 6 explores the channels of poor performance. Section 7 concludes.

2 Background

2.1 The Rise of Ethnic Politics

Kenya's population is made up of more than forty ethnic groups. Based on the 1962 population census, Kenya's main ethnic groups are the Kikuyu (18.8%), Luo (13.4%), Luhya (12.7%), Kalenjin (10.8%), and Kamba (10.5%). These ethnic groups predate British colonial rule but boundaries between them were often not well defined. Centralized political structures based on ethnic lines were largely absent. Authority was typically personal and at the village level, often a function of lineage, age, and wealth and not ethnic allegiance (Mamdani, 1996; Herbst, 2000; Lynch, 2011).

The politicization of ethnicity has its roots in settler capitalism and its uneven penetration of ethnic homelands. In the Central Province, among the Kikuyu ethnic group, the economic penetration resulted in proletarianization on a considerable scale and, at the same time, engendering a concentration of a landed and propertied class (Cowen and Kinyanjui, 1977). In fact, the Mau Mau uprising in the 1950s was largely a conflict between the landed and the landless. Nyanza province, on the other hand, remained largely unaffected by settler capitalism, leaving pre-colonial modes of production intact. Confronted with minimal agricultural potential, lack of infrastructure, and markets for wage goods, the Luo responded to the colonial economy as suppliers of labour, primarily as railway workers and eventually at the docks in Mombasa (Ajulu, 2002; Omolo, 2002). Thus, the Kenya's settler economy created stark economic differences between ethnic groups, which found their reflection in the later African political organizations.

While there were attempts to form pan-ethnic political organizations by Africans (e.g., the East African Association (EAA) in 1919 and the Kenyan African Union (KAU) in 1946), they were short

lived and banned within a couple of years of their inception (Ajulu, 2002). The government followed a "divide-and-rule" policy, discouraging the formation of nation-wide African political activity, but encouraged ethnic associations, which over time resulted in a proliferation of ethnic associations and contributed to the differentiation of ethnicities with distinct political interests (Omolo, 2002). This lead to eight politically relevant ethnic groups[7] at the time of independence: the Kikuyu (18.8%), the Luhya (14%), the Luo (12%), the Kamba (11%), the Kalenjin (10.8%), the Kisii (6%), the Mijikenda (5%), and the Somali (2%) (Posner, 2004; Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010).

The defeat of the Mau Mau in 1956 lead to the relaxation of political activity and the first direct (although severely limited franchise) African elections to the legislative council in 1957. African political parties were fully sanctioned at the Lancaster House Conference in January 1960. That following March, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) was formed under Jomo Kenyatta (a Kikuyu). It drew the bulk of its leadership, membership, and support from the Kikuyu and Luo. Subsuming existing organizations, such as the Kenya Federation of Labour and the Kenya Independence Movement, KANU became an intensely anticolonial and nationalist party. Driven by the fear of Kikuyu and Luo dominance, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) was formed. KADU united a diverse set of local associations that represented minority ethnic groups (the Kalenjin, Masai, Turkana, and Samburu) and was led by Daniel arap Moi (a Kalenjin) (Ndegwa, 1997, 605). These two parties competed in the first open, nation-wide, multi-party election in 1961 (KANU won 19 and KADU 11 of the 33 open seats), negotiated the constitutional structure of the new state in two subsequent conferences in 1962 and 1963, and contested the first post-independence elections in 1963. KANU won these "independence elections" overwhelmingly, taking 66 seats against KADU's 31 in the lower house and 19 seats against KADU's 16 in the Senate. By 1964 KADU and KANU had merged (Ndegwa, 1997, 606).

The merger of KANU and KADU shifted the balance of power within the ruling party in favour of the conservative elements, which led to the defection of the left-leaning Luo-lead wing, the Kenya People's Union (KPU) in 1966. They opposed the perceived growing conservatism and pro-western

[7]Following Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010, 99) we "classify an ethnic group as politically relevant if at least one political organization claims to represent it in national politics or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination. Discrimination is defined as political exclusion directly targeted at an ethnic community – thus disregarding indirect discrimination based, for example, on educational disadvantage or discrimination in the labour or credit markets. The coding rules allow for the identification of countries or specific periods in which national politics was framed in nonethnic terms".

orientation of Kenyatta and the KANU leadership, which by then was composed exclusively of members of the Gema and Kamatusa alliance (Ajulu, 2002, 260). In the subsequently held "Little General Election", KANU expanded its majority in both houses of parliament and following the anti-communist logic of the Cold War, banned the KPU in 1969 on national security grounds, ushering a more than 20 year period of single party rule.

2.2 Police Organization and Development

The *Kenya Police* is Kenya's main law enforcing body. It was also always an instrument of regime protection. During colonial times the police answered only to the Governor. At independence this unchecked concentration of power passed to the President (Auerbach, 2003). The police is therefore vulnerable to political influence, which may ultimitately affect the performance. Our study covers the last years of colonial rule 1957-1963 and the first years of independence 1963-1970. It excludes the Mau Mau uprising 1952-1956.

There was always an ethnic component in the composition of the Police Force (Throup, 1992). British officers believed to find men of soldierly qualities and whose loyality could be trusted among the Kamba and Kalenjin (the so-called 'martial races'). In contrast, very few Kikuyus entered the Police Force.[8] Only after the end of Mau Mau and with independence approaching a deliberate attempt was made to bring the ethnic composition in line with that of the population (Clayton, 1989).[9] In addition, a process of Africanization in the higher ranks was initiated. Asian and European senior officers were gradually replaced by newly-promoted African officers.

When president Jomo Kenyatta took control changes in the police followed the same pattern as in the most important ministries (Hornsby, 2012). Kenyatta relied on ethnic loyalities and alliances. He appointed Bernard Hinga, an ethnic Kikuyu, as Police Commissioner in 1964. By 1967 all branches and departments were led by an ethnic Kikuyu (except the Criminal Investigation Department which went to a Kikuyu in 1973).[10] Kenyatta particularly relied on the *General Service Unit* (GSU). The GSU is a paramilitary branch of the police, well-equipped and well-trained,

[8] In 1956, 22.6%, 21.6% and 3.2% of police officers were Kalenjin, Kamba and Kikuyus, whereas the 1962 Census population put their share at 10.8%, 10.5% and 18.8% respectively (Kenya Police Annual Reports; Census 1962).

[9] Figure **??** shows the evolution of the share of Kikuyu policemen in the force. The gradually increasing share matches the increasing political clout of the Kikuyu.

[10] Kenya's second president, Daniel Arap Moi, an ethnic Kalenjin, acted similarly and moved Kalenjin into important positions (Hornsby, 2012).

and highly political. It was employed against internal political threads, and specifically formed a counterweight to the army. Kenyatta shifted the GSU's officer corps and ethnic composition in favor of the Kikuyu, especially Luo officers had to go. These appointments were clearly politically motivated. Kenyatta used his presidential powers, bypassed the Police Service Commission Board, ignoring for example seniority as criterion for promotions (Frazer, 1994, as cited in N'Diaye, 2002).

The geographical organisation followed a fourfold hierarchy with the headquarter in Nairobi, then police divisions, stations and finally police posts that could be as small as a road block.[11] The Kenya Police was not evenly or equally distributed. Reflecting longstanding colonial interests, the police was heavily concentrated in the urban commercial and European residential areas. They also served the 'White Highlands' where Europeans owned farms. In 1957 as a legacy of Mau Mau, the police was also well presented in Kikuyu and the bordering Kalenjin areas (Throup, 1992). With the end of violence, however, the number of police posts were reduced in those areas. The majority of African rural areas in contrast was underserved.[12] After independence the policing network expanded, particularly to African areas. Our data indicates that Kikuyu and Kalenjin areas still received a disproportionate share of policing.

A related issue to where police divisions were located is who was stationed there. The colonial regime feared fraternisation and abuses, if police officers were policing their own ethnic kin or homeland. Police regulations in 1957 permitted up to 45% of personnel serving in their own home area (Clayton, 1989).[13] Being stationed close to home was certainly more attractive to police officers.

3 Data and Measurements

3.1 Collection and Sampling

Our primary data source are the *Kenya Police Service Registers*. These service records contain systematic and comprehensive information about a police officer over the full length of his ca-

[11] Policing areas did not necessarily overlap with administrative divisions.

[12] African reserves were originally policed by the 'Tribal Police' (it became the 'Administration Police' in 1958), which dealt with offenses against district council by-laws and customary law. The Kenya Police dealt with offenses against the Penal Code and general legislation (TNA CO1037/41).

[13] Previous rules were stricter allowing policemen in their home area only after six years of service when they had demonstrated their loyality.

reer.[14] In particular, the service registers recorded personal details at recruitment (name, ethnicity, height, marital status, place of birth and residence), any training beyond the obligatory six months, names of divisions at which the policer officer served with dates of transfers, any misconducts/commendations and corresponding punishments/rewards, promotions/demotions and particulars of discharge (date, reason, overall conduct).

These personnel files are from non-active police officers and were sorted out for destruction in 2009. Awaiting appraisal by the Kenya National Archives the files were dumped in a depot at the outskirts of Nairobi.[15] The files did not follow any obvious order and leaks in the roof destroyed a good share of the records. Our sampling strategy was to collect all readable registers, with the exception of police officers of Kamba ethnic origin recruited before 1950, that we deliberately undersampled as they were numerous in the Police Force before 1950.[16] While our sampling procedure does not raise any obvious concerns that our sample may be non-random (apart from the undersampling of Kamba police officers pre-1950), we checked whether the ethnic composition in our sample follows the statistics officially reported in the *Kenya Police Annual Reports*. Figure 1 shows the comparison. The Kamba undersampling is visible. Apart from this, there is a very strong agreement between the two sources. We are therefore confident that our sample is largely representative of the Kenya Police Force.

INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE

Overall, this type of individual level data on police officers is absolutely unique. For our purposes, we brought the data into a police officer-service year panel structure. In total we have a sample of 6,725 police officers doing their service between 1957 and 1970.

3.2 Measurements

For each police officer, we know the dates of entry and exit, family background, ethnic group, education, place of birth, a full promotion record, assignment history, salary, acts of misconduct, punishment for misconduct, good behavior, training undertaken, rewards for good performance, and

[14] The Service Registers were introduced in the late 1930s. By the early 1940s all active policemen were covered.

[15] We thank Kenya Police HQ for granting us access to the records, and Kenya National Archives for support in retrieving them.

[16] It was easy to identify the year of recruitment as the colour of the service registers turned from blue to red in the 1950s.

the character assessment on discharge. Among these variables, the richest information is contained in the conduct and punishment variables. These cover an extremely wide range of misbehavior by policemen (e.g., from successful arrest and its corresponding reward, to falling asleep with its corresponding fine, to murder and its prison sentence), recorded at very high frequency. We observe 10,325 offenses in our sample. In the raw data, these offenses are described in great detail, one officer for example is reported to have stolen a "leopard's skin". Still, most acts of misconduct fall into a limited number of categories. The most common offenses are failure to attend duty and absent without leave (2,391 cases out of 10,325), disorderly behaviour (1,083 cases), drunkenness (904 cases), being idle (799 cases), being dirty (744 cases), disobedience (727 cases), falling asleep on duty (418 cases), and allowing prisoners to escape (331 cases). 60% of policemen commit at least one offense. The average number of offenses for an individual-year is 0.2, implying that an act of misconduct is committed every five years.

Table 1 presents additional summary statistics for other key variables. About 16% of officers serve in regions where their own ethnicity is the largest group (i.e., their ethnic homelands), and a higher percentages serve in police divisions in which their own ethnic group is dominant either at large or in the senior ranks. About 32% of policemen signed their booklet, while the remaining officers provided just a thumbprint. Formal education is limited, with an average of just 3 years. The rank of every policemen is summarized on a 1 to 4 scale, where 1 corresponds to constables and recruits; 2 to Corporals; 3 to Sergeants; and 4 to Inspectors and higher ranks. The average rank is close to 1. The police booklets also provide a character assessment at discharge, ranging from "Bad" to "Exemplary", which we code on a scale between 0 and 4, where the sample mean is around 2.

Acts of misconduct can be fined, and conditional on committing an offense the average fine in our sample is about 15 Kenyan Shilling. We also construct a residual fine measure, which is obtained from regressing the log of fine on the type of offense as well as year effects and a tenure control. By construction, the mean of this variable is close to zero, but the standard deviation is large, suggesting that fines are not mechanically linked to a given type of offense. This means that the residual fine measure captures discretion in the punishment of misbehaviour.

4 Empirical Strategy

Our paper studies how the increased political clout of the Kikuyu from 1961 onwards affected the behaviour of this ethnic group in the police administration. We rely on a difference-in-difference approach for our main results, comparing the Kikuyu (which were at the centre of Kenya's dominant post-independent party, the KANU, which won the first multiparty elections in 1961), before and after 1961 and after 1963 (independence).

Our baseline econometric specification is the simple difference-in-difference model:

$$Offense_{i,d,t} = \alpha + \beta * Post1961_t + \gamma * Kikuyu_i + \delta * Kikuyu_i * Post1961_t + \epsilon_{i,d,t} \quad (1)$$

where the dependent variable is the number of offenses, for policeman i, serving in division d, and in year t. $Post1961_t$ is a dummy variable indicating the period starting with the 1961 multi-party elections, and $Kikuyu_i$ is a dummy variable equal to one for Kikuyu policemen. While Kenya's first multiparty election is clearly an important political shock, it was part of a larger transition period. To uncover the exact timing of effects in the transition process, we augment the baseline model to estimate the effect of the first elections in 1961 as well as independence two years later in 1963.[17]

In our sample, policemen enter and leave the sample on a rolling basis. Baseline specification 1 does not allow us to identify whether any differential offense rates of the Kikuyu after 1961 are driven by changing behaviour of existing policemen or by selective recruitment and dismissal of policemen. Evidence on behavioural change comes from the inclusion of individual fixed effects in our main specification. In this approach, we need to restrict our sample to individuals who serve in the force before and after 1961 (for which the offense trends are shown in figure 3). Our results section describes the sensitivity of results to sample restriction choices in detail. In order to provide explicit evidence on selection, we will look at the cumulative offense profile of policemen leaving the force at certain points in time and at the behaviour of new recruits in their first year of service.

[17] We think of these dates as proxies for the time periods in which the Kikuyu rose to political power, but the fact that there is no clear temporal treatment in our context obviously constrains our difference-in-difference approach.

Causal identification of the difference-in-difference coefficient δ relies on the common trend assumption: in the absence of the political transitions starting in 1961, the Kikuyu would have followed the same trends as the other ethnic groups. Figures 2 and 3 provide evidence in support of this assumption. It is further corroborated through a placebo test in which we shift the timing of the treatment 2 years forward (table A.13). The analysis of pre-treatment trends, however, does not address the concern that the Kikuyu could have had certain characteristics that affected behaviour differentially after the first elections. This concern is particularly relevant, because socio-economic differences between ethnic groups existed before 1961.[18] Our treatment group might also have been assigned selectively to divisions with higher offense rates. To address these questions, we augment the baseline specification to include control variables and their differential effect after the first elections:

$$\begin{aligned} Offense_{i,d,t} = \alpha + \beta * Post1961_t + \gamma * Kikuyu_i \\ +\delta * Kikuyu_i * Post1961_t + \kappa * X_{i,d,t} + \lambda * X_{i,d,t} * Post1961_t \\ +\mu * Kikuyu_i * X_{i,d,t} * Post1961_t + \epsilon_{i,d,t} \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

In addition to exploring the role of individual and division-level characteristics X as potential confounders, we can also examine them as sources of heterogeneity. Individual and division characteristics could also give rise to heterogeneous treatment effects and shed light on the channels linking changing offense rates to the political clout of ethnic groups. These effects are captured by the triple interaction the specification above.

A important limitation of our data is that the misconduct events are recorded by the police, and the political shocks we study might have changed the nature of reporting. The fact that the service registers we use for our data set were not public in the time period we study makes strategic reporting less likely. To assess the scope for selective reporting further, we analyse the unexplained variation in fines as well. We argue that the absence of preferential fining supports the assumption that reporting is not preferential.

[18] In Table A.12 of the appendix, we show that the Kikuyu differed significantly from other ethnic groups in terms of key characteristics before 1961.

5 Main Result

Figure 2 shows the annual offense rate of Kikuyu officers, officers of other ethnicities and the difference together with its 95% confidence interval. It nicely illustrates our main result.

INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 HERE

Between 1955 and the first election in 1961 the difference in offense rates is below zero and the 95% confidence intervall wide, including zero. After the first election the difference in offense rates is greater than zero, the confidence interval becomes narrower, and includes zero only at the margin. While both the average offense rate of Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu police officers increase after the first election, the increase of Kikuyu officers in considerably larger. Between 1961 and 1970 the offense rate of non-Kikuyu officers increases from 0.15 to 0.25 offenses per year (i.e., 167% increase), whereas the offense rate of Kikuyu officers increases from 0.15 to 0.3 offenses per year (i.e., 200%) during the same time period, which is a 33% increase relative to police officers of other ethnicities. Figure 3 shows the difference in offense rates between the Kikuyu and other groups for a balanced panel of officers serving between 1958 and 1966. The intensification of offense rates for the Kikuyu after 1961 is even more pronounced in this sample.[19]

In Table 2, we move beyond the graphical analysis and employ the regression framework specified in the previous section.

INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

Column 1 confirms the pattern shown in Figure 2. Kikuyu officers have a significantly higher offense rate than the officers of other ethnic groups after the first election. On average they commit 0.064 between 1961 and 1963 and 0.086 offenses more per officer between 1964-1970, which is roughly 1/9 and 1/7 of the standard deviation, respectively. Columns 2 and 3 sequentially introduce annual and ethnic fixed effects to account for overall time trends and time invariant

[19]Figure A.5 shows the difference in offense rates between the ethnicitities represented in KANU in a particular year (the Kikuyu, Embu en Meru throughout, the Kamba until 1962, the Luo until 1966, and the "Kamatusa" groups from 1964 onwards) and all other ethnic groups. As in the main results, in which we consider the Kikuyu alone, the KANU groups see higher offenses starting in 1961. An earlier version of the paper confirmed that the Gema and Kamatusa groups considered together also saw an intensification of offenses, in particular after independence. Hence, the results are robust to considering different sets of "politically dominant" groups. In this version of the paper, we focus on the Kikuyu because their rising political clout is best documented in the historical literature. In our data, it is also the individual ethnic group that experiences the clearest change in behaviour in the early 1960s.

differences between ethnic groups. Including those additional controls does not affect our main result: Kikuyu officers still commit on average between 0.059 and 0.091 offenses per officer and year more than the police officers of other ethnic groups. Finally, while the coefficient estimates of the post-first-election interaction are smaller than those of the post-independence interaction, the difference is not statistically significantly different from zero. Hence, in subsequent regressions we limit our analysis to the post-first-election difference in offense rate.

Appendix Table A.13 presents results from the same regression model, but including a placebo time period (1959-1960) to assess the parallel trend assumption. The coefficient estimate of the interaction between the placebo time period and Kikuyu officers is positive, but statistically indistinguishable from zero for all three specifications, providing evidence that the parallel trend assumption holds. In the appendix, we also show that the main results hold separately for "absenteeism" and for all other types of offenses (Table A.19).

6 Mechanisms

So far we have established that Kikuyu police officers have on average a higher post-first-election offense rate than other police officers. In this section we investigate the reason for this. First, we consider whether this difference is due to selection. In particular, we look at whether the quality of Kikuyu recruits changed after the first election or whether a disproportionally large number of high quality Kikuyu officers left the force thereafter. Next, we look at whether the difference in offense rates is due to behavioral changes. That is, we look at whether Kikuyu police officers serving during the independence period change their performance after 1961. Third, we discuss whether key individual characteristics other than ethnicity appear to drive or strengthen the observed increase in misbehaviour. Fourth, we consider the role of division characteristics. In the final subsection, we discuss how punishment and promotion change for the Kikuyu after independence.

6.1 Selection Effects

Post-first-election ethnic patronage in public sector jobs is a potential reason for the observed decrease in discipline among the Kikuyu officers. Table 3 presents the results of our investigation of selection effects. Columns 1 and 2 present the results on entry selection and Columns 3-5 on

exit selection.

INSERT TABLE 3 HERE

Column 1 presents the results for all years and officers. Interestingly, we find that Kikuyu recruits that joined after the first election had a slightly lower offense rate than those enlisted before 1961, which would speak against patronage selection. However, since looking at all years conflates selection and behavioural effects, we limit ourselves in Column 2 to the first year of enlistment. Now we find no significant difference in the first year offense rate between pre- and post-first-election Kikuyu officers. This suggests that the difference in performance between Kikuyu officers and officers of other ethnic groups cannot be due to lower quality recruits.

Columns 3 and 4 consider the offense rate of police officers upon exit. Column 3 looks at all years and officers in our sample and Column 4 looks at only the last year of service to rule out any underlying behavioural changes. Similar to our results in Columns 1 and 2, we find a positive and significant effect when considering all officers and all years, but no significant difference in last year offense rate between pre- and post-first-election Kikuyu officers exiting the force. Column 5 looks at a different outcome: the exiting officers' final character assessment, which may range from "Bad" (0) to "Exemplary" (4). Consistent with the offense rate regressions in Column 4, we find that Kikuyu officers leaving the force after the first election had a slightly worse overall conduct than their fellow exiting officers from other ethnic groups, but that difference is not statistically significant. Overall, these results suggest that the differential performance of officers from the ethnic groups in power is not due to an exit of disproportionally good performing Kikuyu officers post-1961, as we might have expected to an increase in more attractive outside employment options in the public sector. If anything, the results suggest that at least in the immediate period after the first election the Kenyan police remained largely independent of patronage pressures and controlled performance of its members ethnically unbiased and fairly well.

6.2 Behavioural Changes

Table 4 presents the results of a series of individual fixed-effects regressions assessing the extent to which our main finding can be explained by behavioral changes. Panel A looks at fixed and

balanced samples of officers over time and Panel B looks at biannual cohorts of recruits across a fixed number of years.

INSERT TABLE 4 HERE

Column 1 in Panel A looks at all officers and years, showing that even in an individual-fixed effects regression our main result from above persists. However, since this specification conflates selection and behavioural changes Columns 2-5 look at a fixed set of officers over time. Focusing on the coefficient estimates of the interaction term, we see that Kikuyu officers, independent of when they joined the force, started to behave worse after the first election compared to non-Kikuyu officers. This result remains consistent independent of the entry and exit years chosen. This result suggests that a consistent behavioral shift accounts for the observed ethnic differential in performance post-1961.

The results of the cohort analysis in Panel B support this conclusion. While at times insignificant due to the smaller sample size, the coefficient estimates are consistently positive, suggesting again that Kikuyu officers of all cohorts started to perform worse after the first election. Together Panels A and B of Table 4 provide consistent and strong evidence that a behavioural change among Kikuyu officers is the driver of our main result. The following subsections investigate the reasons underlying this behavioural change.

6.3 Individual characteristics

While the fixed effect analysis of Table 4 accounts for a large set of confounding factors, the results could still capture the time-varying impact of individual characteristics that are correlated with ethnicity.

INSERT TABLES 7, 8, AND 9 HERE

Table 7 controls for the rank of policemen (on a 1-4 unit scale), as well as its interactions with a post-1961 dummy, and the "treatment" interaction. In all specifications, the main difference-in-difference coefficient retains its magnitude. The triple interaction in column (3) confirms that increased misconduct of the Kikuyu is strongest for the lower ranks, although this finding does not translate to the balanced sample in column (6). Our data records whether the recruit signed

or thumbprinted his service register, which can be interpreted as a proxy for literacy.[20] Allowing "literate" policemen to behave differently after 1961 does not change our findings (Table 8). The results on formal education go in the same direction (Table 9): there is no signficant triple interaction for the number of years of education.

6.4 Division characteristics

The changing behaviour observed in Table 4 could be the result of the assignment of Kikuyu to divisions with poorer discipline after the first elections won by the KANU. Table 5 introduces division-year fixed effects in addition to individual fixed effects. The coefficients remain close to those of Table 4, confirming that the effects are driven by changes in behaviour by the Kikuyu compared to other groups serving in the same division.[21]

INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 HERE

Even if changes within divisions drive our results, the match between individuals and divisions could matter. In the colonial period, the extent to which ethnic groups could police their own homelands was limited. The effect of serving in the homelands is not clear-cut. On the one hand, being stationed in homelands might provide more leisure opportunities.[22] On the other hand, being stationed close to their families might make policemen more keen to keep their jobs. In Table 6, we confirm that our finding is not explained by a general homeland effect (columns 1 and 4), or a differential homeland effect after the first elections (2 and 5). There is also no evidence that the main treatment effect is stronger for Kikuyu serving in the homelands (columns 2 and 6). The chaning behaviour of Kikuyu officers takes place in a context of increased prominence of the Kikuyu at the national level, both politically and in terms of the share of the total police force. However, the "local dominance" of the Kikuyu, at the level of police divisions, does not appear to explain the deterioration of discipline among Kikuyu officers. In the appendix, we confirm that a triple interaction for Kikuyu, post-first-elections, and the share of one's own ethnicity in one's division

[20] Signature literacy is widely used among historians (Rachal, 1987).

[21] In line with this general finding, division-level ethnic diversity and the General Service Unit (the most political police unit) are not driving the results (Tables A.18 and A.14).

[22] Focusing on a different performance outcome than ours, Lyall (2010) finds that co-ethnic security personnel are more effective counter-insurgents. Being based far from one's homeland could also hurt work satisfaction (similarly, Bo, Finan and Rossi (2013) estimate the compensation public servants require to work in remote locations).

is also insignificant (Table A.15).[23] For an alternative measure of "ethnic dominance", based on the share of one's ethnicity among the senior officers in the division, we do not find a significant heterogeneity either (Table {Seniordominance). These findings suggest that the main mechanism is not the prefential treament of Kikuyu by their direct co-ethnic senior officers.[24]

6.5 Promotion and punishment

The increased misbehaviour of the Kikuyu after 1961 could be the result of better outside options for these groups. This interpretation would be consistent with the literature on patronage and ethnic favouritism. Another possibility is that the way the police disciplines its rank and file changes suddenly after the first elections, so that the politically powerful ethnic groups are punished less for misconduct. Punishments can take different forms in this context. Offenders can be denied promotion opportunities, they can be fined, and they can be dismissed. We will test if these responses to offenses change for Kikuyu ethnicities after the first elections.

INSERT TABLES 10 AND 11 HERE

Table 10 reports promotions. In Table 10, we test how the average annual number of offenses in a policeman's career affect his promotion prospects. In general, higher offense rates make promotions less likely and dismissals more likely (as shown in the first row). Interestingly, there is some evidence of preferential treatment of the Kikuyu, in the sense that they get promoted with a higher probability, but at the same time their past misconduct harms promotion chances more than for other ethnicities. One way to read these findings is that Kikuyu policemen were counting on preferential treatment, but were not correctly anticipating the responsiveness of promotions and dismissals to bad behaviour.

Table 11 analyses the fines in a sample of individual-years with at least one offense. The odd columns focus on total fine amounts, while the even columns focus on the variation in fines that is not explained by the type of offense, rank, or tenure of the offender. In both cases, there is no evidence of preferential treatment immediately after the offense. The absence of favouritism in the immediate punishments also mitigates the broader concern of reporting bias to some extent.

[23] This measure of ethnic dominance is very strongly (positively) correlated with the homeland indicator.

[24] In line with the idea that dominance matters at a higher level than the division, we find a positive interaction of our main treatment with an indicator for whether the officer commanding a police region (combining multiple divisions) is a Kikuyu. This interaction effect is significant for the full sample, but not for the balanced sample.

7 Conclusions

During Kenya's political transition in the 1960ies, the Kikuyu emerged as the most powerful ethnic group. While ethnic favouritism and political patronage have been documented in existing work on Kenya, our paper can leverage unique data on the day-to-day functioning of individual public servants in one of the most important public administrations: the police. We find that Kikuyu policemen started to misbehave worse after the first election that brought the KANU party to power, as measured by acts of misconduct that were recorded in their official police booklets.

Why do the Kikuyu officers commit more offenses when their ethnic group rises to political prominence? Based on our analysis, the police did not start recruiting "bad" policemen from this group after independence, nor fire its good Kikuyu policemen. Instead, we observe the same individuals committing more offensens after the 1961elections. This shift in behaviour does not seem to be driven or strengthened by the characteristics of the divisions in which Kikuyu policemen were serving or their educational background. While we do find that Kikuyu officers are less likely to be dismissed and more likely to be promoted after 1961, a history of misbehaviour tends to mitigate this bias towards Kikuyu. As such, the Kikuyu policemen might have miscalculated the extent to which political clout would allow them to get away with shirking behaviour.

The micro-evidence of this paper suggests that ethnic politics shape public service provision, not just through the direct allocation of public goods, but also through the behaviour of ethnic groups within the state's bureaucracy. The deep-rooted nature of the changes that took place in the aftermath of Kenya's independence could explain why ethnic tensions have continued to dominate politics in Kenya until today.

8 Figures

Figure 1: Representativeness of Police Sample by Ethnicity Over Time



Figure 2: Offense Rate and Difference of Kikuyu and Police Officers of Other Ethnicities Between 1955-1970



Figure 3: Offense Rate and Difference of Kikuyu of Other Ethnicities (1958-1966, balanced)



Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Obs	Mean	Stdev	min	max
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Number of offenses	47699	0.22	0.55	0	11
Character at discharge (0-4)	5555	2.15	0.96	0	4
Tenure	47699	7.30	5.91	0	45
Rank index (1-4)	47699	1.20	0.53	1	4
Homeland ethnicity	38219	0.16	0.37	0	1
Dominant ethnicity in division	38219	0.34	0.47	0	1
Dominant ethnicity in higher ranks	38219	0.22	0.41	0	1
Ethnic diversity (ELF)	38219	0.89	0.03	0.76	0.95
Kikuyu	6725	0.18	0.38	0	1
Literacy (signed booklet)	6725	0.32	0.47	0	1
Years of education	6725	3.03	3.92	0	12
Fine (Ksh)	7910	15.60	17.50	0	200
Fine residual	7910	-0.01	0.67	-4.14	4.25

Notes: Observations at the individual-year level for 6,725 officers who served between 1957 and 1970. Homeland is a dummy indicating whether a person serves in a division that is stationed in his ethnic homeland. The rank index is 1 for a constable and 4 for an Inspector or above. Homeland indicates whether a person's division is located in his ethnic homeland. Dominant ethnicity in the division indicates whether a person's ethnicity is the largest group in his division. A similar measure is constructed for whether the higher ranks are dominated by an individual's division. Literacy is approximated by whether the individual has signed his personnel booklet or given a thumbprint. "Fine residual" is the fine conditional on committing an offense, the fine residual is the component of the logarithmic fines unexplained by the type of offence, year, tenure, and rank.

Table 2: Main Result

	line	line	line
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Outcome:	# of Offenses (mean=0.216; se=0.551)		
Kikuyu	line	line	line
	-0.038*	-0.036	0.034
	line	line	line
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.068)
First Election (1961-63)	line	line	line
	-0.054***		
	line	line	line
	(0.007)		
Kikuyu ×	line	line	line
	0.064**	0.059**	0.066**
First Election	line	line	line
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.015)
Independence (1964-70)	line	line	line
	0.022***		
	line	line	line
	(0.008)		
Kikuyu ×	line	line	line
	0.086***	0.081***	0.091***
Independence	line	line	line
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Year Fixed Effects	line	line	line
	No	Yes	Yes
Ethnic Fixed Effects	line	line	line
	No	No	Yes
R-Squared	line	line	line
	0.004	0.005	0.008
Observations	line	line	line
	47699	47699	40317
Clusters	line	line	line
	6725	6725	5802

Notes: Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table 3: Selection Effects

	line (1)	line (2)	line (3)	line (4)	line (5)
	Entry Selection		**Exit Selection**		
Outcome:	line # Offenses	line # Offenses	line # Offenses	line # Offenses	line Conduct
	line All Years	line First Year	line All Years	line Last Year	line Last Year
Kikuyu	line 0.041***	line -0.004	line 0.015	line 0.142	line -0.362***
	line (0.016)	line (0.017)	line (0.010)	line (0.196)	line (0.051)
Enlisted after first election	line 0.079***	line	line	line	line
	line (0.009)	line	line	line	line
Kikuyu ×	line -0.055***	line 0.002	line	line	line
Enlisted after first election	line (0.020)	line (0.020)	line	line	line
Exit after first election	line	line	line 0.141***	line	line
	line	line	line (0.008)	line	line
Kikuyu ×	line	line	line 0.060**	line -0.007	line -0.109
Exit after first election	line	line	line (0.024)	line (0.206)	line (0.142)
R-Squared	line 0.007	line 0.012	line 0.018	line 0.017	line 0.032
Observations	line 47699	line 3824	line 47699	line 2894	line 2794
Clusters	line 6725	line 3824	line 6725	line 2894	line 2794

Notes: All regressions include year fixed effects. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table 4: Behavioral Effect

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Outcome: # Offenses				
Panel A: Overlapping Cohort Samples of Police Officers					
	All Cohorts	Entry $\leq$ 1957 Exit $>$ 1966	Entry $\leq$ 1958 Exit $>$ 1966	Entry $\leq$ 1959 Exit $>$ 1966	Entry $\leq$ 1960 Exit $>$ 1966
First Election (1961-1970)	0.164***	0.036**	0.038**	0.041**	0.050***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Kikuyu $\times$	0.147***	0.098**	0.108***	0.083*	0.133***
First Election	(0.029)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.035)
R-Squared	0.262	0.149	0.164	0.183	0.209
Observations	47699	14200	14364	13848	12880
Clusters	6725	1420	1596	1731	1840
Panel B: Split Cohort Samples of Police Officers					
	All Cohorts	Entry $\leq$ 1954	Entry [1955,1956]	Entry [1957,1958]	Entry [1959,1960]
	Exit $>$ 1966	Exit $>$ 1966	Exit $>$ 1966	Exit $>$ 1966	Exit $>$ 1966
First Election (1961-1970)	0.164***	0.022	-0.015	0.178***	0.175***
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.046)	(0.035)	(0.042)
Kikuyu $\times$	0.147***	0.058	0.215**	0.048	0.097*
First Election	(0.029)	(0.060)	(0.101)	(0.050)	(0.052)
R-Squared	0.262	0.153	0.148	0.161	0.195
Observations	47699	9300	2900	3584	1843
Clusters	6725	930	290	376	244

Notes: All regressions include individual fixed effects. The samples start in the most recent entry year of the cohort and end in 1967. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table 5: Division FE

	(1) All	(2) Entered $\leq$ 1958 Exit $>$ 1966
Kikuyu $\times$	0.192***	0.146***
First Election	(0.039)	(0.043)
R-Squared	0.262	0.164
Observations	47699	14364
Clusters	6725	1596

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects and division-year fixed effects. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table 6: Homelands

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		All			Entered ≤ 1958 Exit > 1966	
Kikuyu × First Election	0.151***	0.137***	0.156**	0.122***	0.107**	0.132*
	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.064)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.073)
Homeland	-0.014	-0.030	-0.013	-0.036	-0.052	-0.030
	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.049)
Homeland × First Election		0.022	0.036		0.025	0.030
		(0.031)	(0.035)		(0.041)	(0.046)
Homeland × Kikuyu			-0.045			-0.123
			(0.078)			(0.110)
Kikuyu × Homeland × First Election			-0.039			-0.047
			(0.080)			(0.095)
R-Squared	0.266	0.266	0.266	0.160	0.160	0.161
Observations	38219	38219	38219	11280	11280	11280
Clusters	5799	5799	5799	1377	1377	1377

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects. Homeland is a dummy indicating whether a person serves in a division that is stationed in his ethnic homeland. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table 7: Rank

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		All			Entered ≤ 1958 Exit > 1966	
Kikuyu × First Election	0.150***	0.148***	0.219***	0.109***	0.109***	0.112
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.076)
Rank	-0.047***	-0.017	-0.019	0.002	0.002	-0.003
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Rank × First Election		-0.031***	-0.028***		-0.000	0.000
		(0.008)	(0.009)		(0.010)	(0.011)
Kikuyu × Rank			0.052*			0.045
			(0.031)			(0.075)
Kikuyu × Rank × First Election			-0.062***			-0.008
			(0.022)			(0.035)
R-Squared	0.261	0.261	0.261	0.162	0.162	0.163
Observations	45682	45682	45682	13806	13806	13806
Clusters	6443	6443	6443	1538	1538	1538

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table 8: Signed booklet (versus thumbprint)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		All		Entered $\leq$ 1958 Exit $>$ 1966		
Kikuyu $\times$ First Election	0.147***	0.144***	0.136***	0.108***	0.104**	0.110**
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.044)
Literacy $\times$ First Election		0.017	0.014		0.025	0.027
		(0.017)	(0.018)		(0.021)	(0.021)
Kikuyu $\times$ Literacy $\times$ First Election			0.026			-0.021
			(0.069)			(0.098)
Observations	47699	47699	47699	14364	14364	14364
Clusters	6725	6725	6725	1596	1596	1596

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects. Literacy is approximated by whether the individual has signed his booklet or provided a thumbprint. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table 9: Years of Education

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		All		Entered $\leq$ 1958 Exit $>$ 1966		
Kikuyu $\times$ Education (year)	0.147***	0.113***	0.134***	0.108***	0.085**	0.092*
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.053)
Education $\times$ First Election		0.101***	0.108***		0.078***	0.081***
		(0.020)	(0.021)		(0.024)	(0.025)
Kikuyu $\times$ Education $\times$ First Election			-0.051			-0.019
			(0.060)			(0.085)
Observations	47699	47699	47699	14364	14364	14364
Clusters	6725	6725	6725	1596	1596	1596

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table 10: Promotion conditional on conduct

	(1) All	(2) Entered $\leq$ 1958 Exit $>$ 1966	(3) Dismissed
Cumulative offenses	-0.123***	-0.109***	0.285***
	(0.013)	(0.031)	(0.025)
Kikuyu $\times$	0.044	0.080	-0.122*
Cumulative offenses	(0.039)	(0.061)	(0.070)
Cumulative offenses $\times$	0.062***	-0.221***	-0.005
First Election	(0.015)	(0.046)	(0.026)
Kikuyu $\times$ t	0.055	0.111**	-0.124***
First Election	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.037)
Kikuyu	-0.073**	-0.064	0.155**
Cumulative offenses $\times$ First Election	(0.036)	(0.150)	(0.074)
R-Squared	0.195	0.207	0.096
Observations	42176	13634	79823
Clusters	6120	1538	7071

Notes: All regressions include year fixed effects effects. The outcome in columns (1) and (2) is a rank index taking values between 1 and 4. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table 11: Punishment conditional on offense

	(1) Log(Fine)	(2) Fine Residual	(3) Log(Fine)	(4) Fine Residual
	All		Entered $\leq$1958 Exit $>$ 1966	
Kikuyu	-0.063	-0.035	0.234	0.041
	(0.152)	(0.086)	(0.349)	(0.124)
Kikuyu $\times$	0.050	0.040	-0.323	-0.090
First Election	(0.154)	(0.089)	(0.368)	(0.151)
R-Squared	0.019	0.007	0.015	0.005
Observations	2211	3036	3025	3995
Clusters	1089	1286	1498	1725

Notes: All regressions are limited to individual-year observations with at least one offense. "Fine residual" is the fine conditional on committing an offense, the fine residual is the component of the logarithmic fines unexplained by the type of offence, year, tenure, and rank. They include year fixed effects. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

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A Appendix Tables and Figures

Figure A.4: Share of Kikuyu Policemen



Figure A.5: Offense Rate and Difference of Ethnicities represented in KANU Between 1955-1970



Table A.12: Pre-independence differences between Kikuyu and other groups

	(1) Kikuyu	(2) Other groups	(3) T-stat (2)-(1)
Offenses	0.16	0.24	3.12
Character at discharge (0-4)	2.24	2.35	3.4
Maximum tenure	3.43	6.81	12.14
Maximum rank index (1-4)	1.15	1.22	2.20
Literacy (signed booklet)	0.37	0.16	-7.02
Years of education	4.06	0.25	-12.25
Observations	254	3632	

Notes: Observations for officers who served between 1957 and 1960. Literacy is approximated by whether the individual has signed his personnel booklet or given a thumbprint. The observations reported to not reflect missing values for individual variables.

Table A.13: Main Result with Placebo Timing

Outcome:	line (1) # of Offenses (mean=0.216; se=0.551)	line (2)	line (3)
Kikuyu	line -0.061*	line -0.060*	line 0.008
	line (0.031)	line (0.031)	line (0.071)
Placebo (1959-60)	line -0.037***	line	line
	line (0.010)	line	line
Kikuyu ×	line 0.045	line 0.044	line 0.046
Placebo	line (0.040)	line (0.040)	line (0.041)
First Election (1961-63)	line -0.072***	line	line
	line (0.009)	line	line
Kikuyu ×	line 0.086**	line 0.083**	line 0.092***
First Election	line (0.035)	line (0.035)	line (0.036)
Independence (1964-70)	line 0.005	line	line
	line (0.009)	line	line
Kikuyu ×	line 0.108***	line 0.105***	line 0.116***
Independence	line (0.033)	line (0.033)	line (0.034)
Year Fixed Effects	line No	line Yes	line Yes
Ethnic Fixed Effects	line No	line No	line Yes
R-Squared	line 0.004	line 0.005	line 0.008
Observations	line 47699	line 47699	line 40317
Clusters	line 6725	line 6725	line 5802

Notes: Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.14: Ethnic diversity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		All			Entered $\leq$ 1958 Exit $>$ 1966	
Kikuyu × First Election	0.151***	0.151***	0.156***	0.123***	0.124***	0.121***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.045)
ELF	-0.308*	-0.232	-0.394	-0.159	-0.087	-0.197
	(0.177)	(0.244)	(0.252)	(0.255)	(0.325)	(0.334)
ELF × First Election		-0.116	0.005		-0.120	-0.084
		(0.300)	(0.312)		(0.405)	(0.418)
Kikuyu × ELF			2.427**			2.309
			(0.980)			(1.645)
Kikuyu × ELF × First Election			-2.121*			-0.627
			(1.090)			(1.699)
Observations	38219	38219	38219	11280	11280	11280
Clusters	5799	5799	5799	1377	1377	1377

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects. Ethnic diversity is measured as fractionalisation at the division level. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.15: Ethnic dominance in division

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All			Entered $\leq$ 1958 Exit $>$ 1966		
Kikuyu × First Election	0.150***	0.150***	0.192**	0.112**	0.111**	0.136
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.097)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.137)
Ethnic group share	0.009	-0.028	-0.037	0.102	0.041	0.021
	(0.052)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.084)	(0.106)	(0.107)
Ethnic group share × First Election		0.050	0.052		0.089	0.089
		(0.064)	(0.065)		(0.087)	(0.088)
Ethnic group share × Kikuyu			0.314			0.610
			(0.533)			(0.883)
Kikuyu × Ethnic group share × First Election			-0.276			-0.312
			(0.525)			(0.770)
Observations	38219	38219	38219	11280	11280	11280
Clusters	5799	5799	5799	1377	1377	1377

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects. Ethnic group share is calculated for each individual in his division. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). "Dominant" indicates Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.16: Ethnic dominance in higher ranks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		All			Entered $\leq$ 1958 Exit $>$ 1966	
Kikuyu $\times$	0.153***	0.149***	0.099**	0.124***	0.122***	0.158**
First Elections	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.070)
Ethnic senior share	-0.021	0.030	0.021	-0.012	0.009	0.010
	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Ethnic senior share $\times$		-0.072	-0.095**		-0.032	-0.026
First Elections		(0.047)	(0.048)		(0.062)	(0.062)
Ethnic senior share $\times$t			-0.473			0.230
Kikuyu			(0.448)			(0.606)
Kikuyu $\times$ Ethnic senior share			0.645			-0.436
First Elections			(0.451)			(0.659)
R-Squared	0.267	0.267	0.267	0.161	0.161	0.161
Observations	38143	38143	38143	11259	11259	11259
Clusters	5796	5796	5796	1377	1377	1377

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.17: PPO Match

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All		Entered $\leq$ 1958 Exit $>$ 1966	
Kikuyu $\times$	0.147***	0.143***	0.067*	0.065
First Elections	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Kikuyu $\times$ First Elections		0.076*		0.029
$\times$ Regional Commander match		(0.044)		(0.096)
Observations	47699	47699	14850	14850
Clusters	6725	6725	1350	1350

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects. "Regional Commander Match" is one if the individual shares the ethnicity with the officer commanding a police region (there are 8 regions, above the division level). Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.18: General Service Unit

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		All			Entered $\leq$ 1958 Exit $>$ 1966	
Kikuyu $\times$	0.152***	0.152***	0.154***	0.124***	0.123***	0.122***
First Elections	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.047)
GSU	-0.017	-0.032	-0.034	-0.020	-0.032	-0.018
	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.034)
GSU $\times$		0.021	0.024		0.019	0.018
First Elections		(0.035)	(0.037)		(0.039)	(0.042)
Kikuyu $\times$			0.051			-0.213*
GSU			(0.100)			(0.120)
Kikuyu $\times$ GSU			-0.054			0.011
$\times$ First Elections			(0.096)			(0.109)
R-Squared	0.266	0.266	0.266	0.161	0.161	0.161
Observations	38219	38219	38219	11280	11280	11280
Clusters	5799	5799	5799	1377	1377	1377

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table A.19: Type of offenses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All		Entered $\leq$ 1958 Exit $>$ 1966	
	Absenteeism	Other offenses	Absenteeism	Other offenses
Kikuyu ×	0.055***	0.089***	0.023	0.081***
First Elections	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.028)
Observations	47699	47699	14364	14364
Clusters	6725	6725	1596	1596

Notes: All regressions include individual and year fixed effects. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.