

**Women's Economic Rights and Policy Influence in Africa:
Portfolio Allocation across Executive Cabinets**

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More women are becoming cabinet ministers in African governments, but there remains considerable cross-national variation in the extent to which they exercise influence across policy domains. We argue that this variation is the result of enduring national differences in women's economic rights that originate in the colonial era. Where women are bound by *coverture constraints* — laws that oblige women to be subject to male authority in controlling economic resources — they are less able to build the political capital needed to compete for leadership positions in clientelistic political systems. Using an original dataset on the allocation of ministerial portfolios in African countries, we show that women have less diversified cabinet portfolios and are less likely to be appointed to high prestige portfolios where they face greater legal economic discrimination. Our results are robust to controlling for relevant factors such as level of democracy, legislative quotas, and customary laws.

Women's participation in government has increased worldwide over the past three decades. Their improved access to high-ranking political positions is particularly apparent across sub-Saharan Africa. Whereas 25 of 40 countries in the region had no women appointed to the cabinet in 1980, only 4 countries had no women ministers by 2000. Yet, even as women's presence in government has increased, more fundamental questions about the relationship between numeric representation and policy influence need to be asked. Are women cabinet ministers being appointed to the same type of policy portfolios as their male counterparts? Under what conditions are women cabinet ministers appointed to prestigious or powerful portfolios?

Certain African governments have made steady progress in integrating women into different policy domains, appointing women to such prestigious positions as prime minister or sought-after ministerial portfolios like foreign affairs and finance (Bauer 2011; Bauer and Okpotor 2013). However, as the data in Table 1 reveal, women's cabinet appointments in many African countries remain largely gendered. Over half of all portfolios assigned to women cabinet ministers, measured by the number of years they held those portfolios, have been in the single policy domain of social welfare, e.g., culture, education, and health. By contrast, only a fifth of men's portfolio years have been in the area of social welfare. Table 1 further shows that women occupy high prestige cabinet positions at less than half the rate of men. These African data are consistent with the global pattern shown by Reynolds (1999, 564), who finds "a worldwide tendency to place women in the softer sociocultural ministerial positions rather than the harder and politically more prestigious positions of economic planning, national security, and foreign affairs, which are often seen as stepping-stones to national leadership."

[TABLE 1]

Table 1. Policy and Prestige Distribution of Cabinet Appointments (%)

	Men	Women
<i>Policy Domain</i>		
Economic	42.65	23.46
Foreign affairs & national defense	9.33	3.72
Government operations	17.86	10.98
Law & order	8.97	4.92
Social welfare	21.20	56.92
<i>Prestige Level</i>		
High	29.08	13.04
Medium	64.68	67.49
Low	6.24	19.51
Portfolio years	20,865	1,748

Note: Figures are column percentages for cabinet portfolio years between 1980 and 2005. Prestige level rankings are based on Krook and O'Brien (2012), Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor Robinson (2005, 2009), Studlar and Moncrief (1999), and White (1998). Appendices A and B present the full classification of ministerial portfolios by policy domain and prestige level.

Research on cabinet politics in advanced industrialized countries suggests that women ministers lack policy influence commensurate with their growing numbers — and tend to be overrepresented in social welfare portfolios — due to enduring gender hierarchies that reinforce conceptions of “masculine” versus “feminine” spheres of government (Borrelli 2002; Paxton et al. 2007). Davis (1997, 19) argues that women’s appointment to social welfare ministries allows national leaders to “accommodate [women’s] presence while maintaining their prejudices.” Duerst-Lahti (1997, 15) similarly claims that appointing women to more powerful ministries, like defense or finance, requires disrupting entrenched gender expectations. Relatedly, the literature on women’s representation in African politics suggests that women are less likely to secure prestigious posts in government because “traditional” cultural norms, though often reinvented over time, prevent women from holding office when power is associated with male authority (Geisler 1995; Nzomo 1997).

Political explanations for the cross-national variation in women’s access to cabinet portfolios emphasize ideology and institutions. Examining cabinet appointments across Latin America, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005) show that women enjoy greater access to prestigious appointments in countries with leftist presidents. Jacob et al. (2014) corroborate this finding on leftist leaders in their analysis of appointments worldwide. While studies suggest an association between greater democracy and improved women’s cabinet representation (Reynolds 1999; Krook and O’Brien 2012), others condition this finding by demonstrating that governments based on coalition negotiations are less likely to include women cabinet ministers (Studlar and Moncrief 1997; Kobayashi 2004; Whitford et al. 2007). Krook and O’Brien (2012) further show that political institutions like legislative quotas are positively associated with women’s access to diverse, prestigious portfolios, extending earlier findings concerning the

positive effects of quotas on women's legislative representation (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Tripp and Kang 2008).

In this paper, we offer a political economy explanation for the cross-national variation in African women's access to diversified and prestigious cabinet positions. We argue that women's cabinet appointments are fundamentally affected by legal economic rights that were originally implanted during the colonial period. Gendered patterns of cabinet appointments are more likely to occur in African countries where women experience institutionalized forms of economic discrimination. A national legal framework that entrenches gender differences through what we describe as *coverture constraints* — laws that oblige women to be subject to male authority in the ownership and administration of economic resources — places women at a disadvantage not only in their domestic, private relationships, but also in their public, political relationships.

Resources are especially crucial for politicians seeking office in countries with the kind of clientelistic politics found in most African countries (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Chabal and Daloz 1999). Successful politicians in clientelistic systems require nearly continuous access to considerable sums of money in order to sustain a political clientele, finance election campaigns, offer gifts to voters, and meet the redistributive demands of constituents (Lindberg 2003; van de Walle 2007; Bratton 2008). Women who must operate under *coverture constraints* that limit their control of economic resources are unlikely to accumulate the capital needed to successfully compete against their male counterparts in the tournament for prestigious cabinet positions or policy portfolios.

Using data on cabinet appointments in 38 African countries between 1980 and 2005, we find that *coverture constraints* explain a significant proportion, statistically and substantively, of the cross-national variation in women's portfolio appointments. Women ministers are

systematically more likely to be concentrated in social welfare portfolios and less likely to be appointed to high prestige portfolios in countries where, for example, women lack equal marriage property rights or are unable to serve as the legal head of household. We find that the odds of a woman receiving a high prestige portfolio fall by nearly 95%, on average, when moving from minimum to maximum levels of legal economic discrimination. Furthermore, we show that the negative effects of legal economic discrimination swamp the positive effects of institutional reforms: in countries with high levels of gendered economic rights, increasing the number of women does not necessarily lead to diversified or prestigious portfolio appointments for women. Our results are robust to the control of factors such as the level of democracy, the practice of customary law, and the adoption of international conventions on women's rights.

The findings presented here indicate that gendered economic rights are one of the structural factors that give women “a distinctive relationship” with politics (Baldez 2010, 200). In practical terms, our findings suggest that efforts to improve women's political representation need to move beyond a singular focus on the reform of political institutions. Political institutions, like quotas or proportional representation, can increase the number of women in national office, but they do not ensure women's political influence. The dynamics that allow women to enter politics are not necessarily the same ones that shape their influence once in office. If women's political influence depends on their broader socioeconomic standing, as our findings suggest, then further advancing gender equality in politics will require legal reforms that create more equitable economic rights for women.

We proceed in this paper by first discussing how coverture constraints were implanted across sub-Saharan Africa during colonization, reflecting the imperatives of European colonizers rather than African societies. We then explain how enduring legal economic discrimination

negatively affects the ability of women to compete with men in the tournament for cabinet appointments in the clientelistic political systems of most African countries. After describing our data and methods, we present the findings from the cross-national statistical analyses. We conclude by discussing the broader implications of our findings on the political effects of gendered economic rights.

The Coverture Response to Gender Chaos

Gendered executive power in contemporary African countries is due, we argue, to the persistence of laws established during the colonization process in the early twentieth century. Between the time European powers acquired territories and granted them independence, they implanted a body of law that institutionalized a husband's legal control over his wife's person and property. These laws constituted a modern form of coverture, the medieval legal doctrine in which a woman loses her independent legal status upon marriage and becomes a legal minor under the guardianship of her husband (Holcombe 1983; Shanley 1989). Colonial officials used such laws to reconfigure gender roles across sub-Saharan Africa, overturning the relatively fluid relationships that existed in many pre-colonial societies (Sudarkasa 1986; Mikell 1997) and replacing them with hierarchical categories defined by law (Roberts and Mann 1991; Redding 2004).

European officials began to enact coverture-like laws in African colonies to contend with socioeconomic dislocations brought about through the formal administration of colonial rule and the monetization of the economy. Initially, the enforcement of some civil liberties by colonial courts, coupled with the growth of markets, enhanced the autonomy of women by allowing them to independently pursue their financial interests as well as to choose whom to marry (Lovett

1989; Osborn 2011; Jean-Baptiste 2014). But such developments were soon perceived as leading to “gender chaos,” the term employed by Allman (1996) in the context of colonial Asante, as women were widely blamed for the apparent moral decay of African society in terms of adultery, divorce, prostitution, and disease. In this context, European officials sought to ensure social order by using the law to regulate conjugal relations, bringing women under the control of men in unprecedented ways. By the end of the inter-war period, African women in many colonies had effectively lost legal control over their property, labor, and mobility (Chanock 1985; Hodgson and McCurdy 1999; Kanogo 2005).

The degree to which coverture-like laws were imposed on African women largely depended on the legal systems of their European colonizers. Women faced relatively less severe legal constraints in British colonies, though with considerable variation, because Britain itself had already begun to expand women’s property rights in the metropole by the early twentieth century. The Married Women’s Property Act of 1870 and subsequent acts had given married women the right to own and manage their own property as well as to be recognized as independent legal persons (Shanley 1989, 103). Such progressive reforms became the basis for court rulings in colonies like Nigeria that determined spouses married under a colonial ordinance could rely on common law to determine inheritance rights rather than native customary practice (Luckham 1976-77; Mucai-Kattambo, Kabeberi-Macharai, and Kameri-Mbote 1995).

Yet, while every British colony had an ordinance regulating marriage in accordance with the principles of common law, marriage ordinances also varied in the extent to which they contained explicit provisions for property rights. Women in colonial Kenya, for example, enjoyed greater property rights than their counterparts in Sierra Leone (Philipps 1953). Courts in some colonies tended to invalidate communal property in marriage, recognizing instead

individual property rights and granting them by default to male heads of household. This often placed married women at a distinct disadvantage in their household's economic affairs, as husbands' control over land as heads of household increased wives' dependency (Kang'ara 2012). Moreover, common law principles did not apply to questions of family or property in Britain's southern colonies, including Bechuanaland, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa, where Dutch-Roman law adopted by earlier Dutch colonists strictly defined married women as legal minors under the tutelage of their husbands (Amoo 2014).

African women faced greater constraints under the civil law systems of French, Portuguese, and Belgian colonizers. While the principle of coverture was gradually abolished in Britain throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the doctrine of marital power (*puissance maritale*) persisted far longer among the continental powers, endowing husbands with full legal authority over the administrative and financial affairs of their wives. The Napoleonic or civil code of 1804, for example, "affirmed the total legal incapacity of married women" (Bop 2010, 211), preventing them from entering into contracts or engaging legal proceedings under their own names. Even the reformed French civil code of 1958, which was extended to its colonies, maintained provisions that favored husbands as head of household, giving them the legal right to limit their wives' employment, control wives' access to bank accounts or loans, and serve as the family's exclusive interlocutor with the state (Duchen 1994).

The economic imperatives of European colonizers further influenced the severity of coverture-like constraints in certain colonies. In seeking to make their colonies economically profitable (Young 1994), European officials intensified legal restrictions in order to generate a mobile and steady supply of labor. When European-owned farms, mines, and plantations began to face labor shortages, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s, colonial officials responded by

passing new ordinances reinforcing the legal authority of male migrant laborers over their wives and instructing colonial magistrates to make divorce more difficult (Chanock 1985; Schmidt 1990; Roberts and Mann 1991), thereby “reassuring [male migrants] that the women at home remained under their control” (Barnes 1992, 589). European officials concerned by low and declining levels of fertility in some of their holdings adopted additional ordinances aimed at expanding the workforce through stable, fecund marriages that would lead to population growth (Wright 2004). Legal interventions specifically designed to induce women to have more children were pursued in places like Belgian Congo (Hunt 2008), Gabon (Jean-Baptiste 2014), Tanganyika (McCurdy 1999) and Uganda (Summers 1991).

Missionary pressure also shaped the content of coverture-like laws.¹ In seeking to have Christian principles embedded in the legal codes of African colonies where they proselytized, missionaries lobbied colonial officials to adopt ordinances that would reflect idealized notions of gender roles within monogamous marriage (Chanock 1985; Roberts and Mann 1991).

Missionaries in some colonies not only campaigned to overturn pre-colonial conventions regarding polygamous family structures, but also sought to use legal and institutional mechanisms to reinforce conjugal households with men at their head (Musisi 1999; Allman and Tashjian 2000). The net effect of such campaigns was legislation that added more restrictions on the autonomy of women in certain colonies. Access to divorce, for example, became more difficult for women in some British colonies versus others (Philipps 1953).

¹ The influence of Christian, if not Victorian, principles can be seen in negotiations between colonial officials and the local male leaders (e.g., chiefs) they consulted regarding customary practice. While this cooperation typically came at the cost of women’s personal autonomy and property rights (Lovett 1989; Jeppie et al. 2010), local leaders also came into conflict with colonial officials on exactly who should be empowered to control women. Local leaders sought to retain that authority in the hands of family or lineage heads, but colonial officials typically preferred to allocate those legal powers to husbands, thereby reinforcing the monogamous conjugal unit, even if it meant violating “customary” practice (Chanock 1985; Mann 1985; Kanogo 2005; Jean-Baptiste 2014).

By the time most African countries began to attain independence in the 1960s, coverture-like laws were well entrenched, and relatively few governments sought to revise them in the following decades (Philipps and Morris 1971; Redding 2004).² Civil society activists in some countries campaigned to overturn discriminatory laws of foreign origin (Goetz and Hassim 2003; Kawamara-Mishambi and Ovonji-Odida 2003), but amendments to existing marital and family laws rarely resulted in appreciable change. For example, when Senegal rewrote its family law in 1972, it maintained French provisions that granted husbands the exclusive status of head of household (Camara 2013). Before 2000, the few countries that abolished marital power laws, thereby expanding women's economic rights, typically did so only after broader political transformations like the end of Apartheid in South Africa in the mid-1990s. As a result of such legal continuities, African countries today generally grant women fewer legal economic rights than countries in most other regions of the world (Gautier 2005).

The persistence of coverture-like laws in some African countries impinges on the ability of women to accumulate financial resources and actively participate in economic life. Head-of-household laws limit women's rights to pursue economic opportunities outside the home or initiate legal proceedings related to property transactions. In Rwanda, up to the early 1990s, women were treated as legal minors who could only buy land or property in the name of a male relative or establish a corporation that represented her as a legal person (Joireman 2008, 1238). In countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, husbands can legally limit a woman's right to pursue a profession outside the home. In Gabon, women require the permission of their husbands to open a bank account and to conduct basic bank transactions (Hallward-Driemeier and Hasan 2013).

² Legal reforms in metropolitan countries did not automatically extend to their colonies. British colonies varied considerably in the extent to which they referenced changes made in London. French colonies also required specific amendments before reforms made in Paris could be applied (Philipps 1953). At independence, most civil law countries enacted reception statutes formally adopting former colonial laws (Boye et al. 1991).

Some women may be able to generate wealth or become actively involved in business, but their assets are never entirely under their control in countries with discriminatory legal systems.³ Even a wealthy businesswoman's economic situation can be precarious because a faltering relationship with male kin or a terminated marriage can lead her to lose all she has accumulated (Jefremovas 1991). By contrast, where women have more equal legal rights, they are more likely to assert control over household resources they helped generate (Kevane 2004). As their household bargaining position improves, and thereby their access to material resources, women become better positioned to negotiate advantageous terms in economic interactions outside the household (Agarwal 1997).⁴ Across African countries, married women's rights to equal property ownership is associated with higher rates of women's participation in formal financial institutions and entrepreneurial activity (Hallward-Driemeier and Hasan 2013, 62).

Coverture Constraints in Africa's Cabinet Tournaments

To examine the impact of coverture constraints on women's ability to secure prestigious cabinet appointments, we could follow the convention of the existing literature, drawn largely from the experience of parliaments in advanced industrialized democracies, and focus on inter-party bargaining. This literature finds that inter-party bargaining leads parties to expect a share of portfolios either in proportion to the legislative seats they contribute to a governing coalition (Gamson 1961; Warwick and Druckman 2006) or in relation to the political salience they attach to specific portfolios (Bäck et al. 2011). In this bargaining model, women's access to prestigious, diverse portfolios is explained largely by their position in the party. As women advance in party

³ Cross-national analyses show that the gender asset gap is widest where women do not have equal legal rights to manage their careers or property (World Bank 2014).

⁴ Legal reforms have a clear impact on women's economic activity. Surveys from Ethiopia, which gradually reformed its family law in the 2000s, reveal a substantial shift in women's participation in occupations outside the home and in securing full-time hours (Hallward and Gajigo 2013).

hierarchies, their position in the cabinet tends to improve (Davis 1997).⁵

Like their counterparts in advanced industrialized democracies, African executives use cabinet appointments to construct governing coalitions that stabilize their rule. Historically, given the lack of democracy in most African countries, the cabinet has served as the undisputed locus of power sharing (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Cabinet appointments have been used by presidents not only to indicate which politicians have been granted access to state patronage, but also which constituencies, whether ethnic or regional, could be rallied in support of the regime (Posner 2005; van de Walle 2007; Arriola 2009; Roessler 2011). A president thus has a strong incentive to appoint cabinet ministers who can maximize support for the regime, offering access to patronage resources in exchange for political allegiance. Francois et al. (2013) have demonstrated empirically that African cabinets are characterized by a high degree of proportionality between the share of cabinet appointments and the size of ethnic groups.⁶

The inter-party bargaining framework, however, is inappropriate for understanding the actual dynamics of cabinet appointments in Africa's clientelistic political systems. Unlike their counterparts in other parts of the world, African presidents are under little threat of losing office if any would-be coalition partner refuses to accept a particular cabinet appointment. Africa's incumbents are routinely able to manufacture their reelection — they won 75% of presidential elections in 1990-2010 — and they do so with an average 65% of the vote. Moreover, in the same time period, they have controlled an average of 75% of seats in their legislatures.⁷ In such a

⁵ In presidential systems, executives who lack a legislative majority have also been found to follow a proportional strategy in allocating ministerial appointments among their coalition partners (Cheibub et al. 2004; Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010).

⁶ The tendency toward proportional allocation of cabinet seats has been shown to persist even in countries with patronage-based politics (Mershon 2001).

⁷ Calculations are from the authors' data.

political context, the relationship between a president and any other politician is so asymmetric that there is little scope for actual bargaining over the terms of a cabinet appointment. African presidents can afford to make cabinet appointments without having to negotiate over portfolio assignments. Although presidents have to be careful not to exclude an entire ethno-regional group from the cabinet (Cederman et al. 2010), there are generally several potential appointees who can deliver the support of a particular group, leaving individual ministers in a weak bargaining position. Potential cabinet appointees, lacking other options for accessing state patronage in the present or the possibility of alternation in the near future, are likely to accept whatever portfolio they are offered by the president.

The problem African presidents face in making cabinet appointments is that their prospective ministers might use their positions to accumulate sufficient influence or resources to mount a political challenge. But the solution to this problem underscores the asymmetry between presidents and their cabinet appointees. To contain the threat of future challenges, African presidents have adopted the practice of changing the composition of their cabinets on nearly an annual basis. Established as a strategy for regime maintenance during the one-party era, cabinet reshuffles have occurred with such frequency and in such an unanticipated manner that they are evidently not preceded by negotiations. Between 1980 and 1990, that is, before the onset of region-wide democratization, the average African cabinet had 38% of its positions reshuffled annually: six ministers were appointed to new portfolios, one new minister was added, and one minister was removed every year. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, then known as Zaire, President Mobutu Sese Seko was said to have a policy of “musical chairs” to manage his cabinet, which had an annual turnover of nearly ten ministers per year from the 1970s through the 1990s (Emizet 2000, 269). Likewise, in Malawi, President Hastings Banda was known for managing

his cabinet by replacing ministers “as casually as people change a toothbrush” (Dickie and Rake 1973, 259).

This cabinet management strategy did not change with the transition to multiparty politics. Between 1995 and 2005, the average African cabinet had 40% of its positions reshuffled annually: seven ministers were appointed to new portfolios, two ministers were added, and one was removed. In Zambia, despite promises to break with the practices of the past, President Frederick Chiluba undertook cabinet reshuffles “reminiscent of political practices of the one-party era” (Rakner 2003, 106). In Kenya, President Daniel arap Moi surprised members of his own government when he made the impromptu announcement that a new vice president was to be appointed in 1999 (Hornsby 2012, 623).

Given the cabinet management strategy of African presidents, we claim that their cabinet appointments should be understood through the logic of tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983; Rosen 1986; DeVaro and Kauhanen 2015). Developed in the field of labor economics, tournament theory has been applied across a range of organizational contexts to explain how firms can structure compensation to elicit greater productive output among employees competing for a promotion. The tournament requires the prize attached to a promotion, as either monetary or non-monetary compensation, to be large enough to induce employees to invest greater levels of effort in producing more output. The employee who demonstrates the best relative performance in terms of output typically wins the promotion. Moreover, because the promotion is based on relative, rather than absolute, output, the firm is able to maximize performance among employees without having to undertake costly monitoring of their individual effort during the production process.

Tournament theory suggests that a president can structure the contest for cabinet

appointments by offering a ministerial prize sufficiently large to induce politicians to put forth the effort required to generate support for the president's government. Indeed, cabinet appointments in Africa offer significantly more direct compensation through income and power and indirect compensation through access to rents than other political positions. The difference between being a cabinet minister and merely a member of parliament is large enough in most African countries that politicians will readily invest in mobilizing voters, as well as other elites, to secure a president's reelection if this will help them secure a position in the president's cabinet.⁸

To determine who is promoted in the cabinet tournament, African presidents evaluate politicians according to observable metrics such as their vote share, their endorsements by local notables, or the level of voter turnout in their region. By using the relative performance of politicians in mobilizing voters as a proxy for their personal effort, a president can select the best performers without having to collect costly, less observable information about their individual skills or talents. This selection mechanism enables a president to assign ministerial portfolios according to the relative performance of competing politicians, reserving the most powerful or influential posts for those who demonstrate the best relative performance.⁹

As the tournament framework makes clear, cabinet appointments are conditioned by the relative performance of politicians in mobilizing voters. In this context, the problem for women politicians is that voter mobilization and electoral competition are resource-intensive endeavors in countries with clientelistic political systems. In most African countries, there are no public funds for parties and campaigns for office must be self-financed. Moreover, voters assess the

⁸ For examples of the indirect compensation that cabinet ministers can receive in African countries, see Wrong (2009) on Kenya and Tangri and Mwenda (2013) on Uganda.

⁹ Francois et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence consistent with this expectation in finding that even the most powerful ministerial portfolios like defense and finance are allocated across ethnic cleavages rather than simply reserved for a president's co-ethnics.

leadership potential of competing politicians by their demonstrated largesse: the overt distribution of money, food, or gifts is interpreted as a signal of a politician's ability to act as a patron (Banégas 1998; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Wantchekon 2003). As a result, politicians who seek to become patrons require considerable resources even in the periods between elections. To sustain or extend their clienteles, they need to be able to continuously channel resources to their supporters, regardless of whether they are in or out of office (Nugent 2001; van de Walle 2007). With the rise of competitive elections in Ghana, for example, parliamentary candidates have been obliged to triple their campaign spending not only to compete with opponents but also to offer personalized patronage to individual voters (Lindberg 2003, 131-132). In Kenya, where politicians understand that "bestowing material favours and rewards remains a necessary, if not sufficient, requirement for political survival" (Transparency International-Kenya 2003, 7), parliamentary candidates estimate that they spend nearly half of their campaign budget on vote buying (Coalition for Accountable Political Finance, 2008).

Coverture constraints prevent women politicians in many African countries from having the economic wherewithal needed to independently build and sustain the political following required to compete in cabinet tournaments. Politically active women traditionally have had to rely on husbands or male sponsors to secure their access to resources (Bauer 2011; Beck 2003; Geisler 2004; Goetz 2002; Tripp 2000, 2001). More recently, in countries like Malawi, donor-supported civil society organizations committed to increasing the presence of women in politics have given women politicians approximately \$200 in campaign funds (Kayuni and Muriaas 2014). However, these alternative mechanisms are insufficient to make up for the structural disadvantages women must confront when competing against men in countries where the legal system has institutionalized gender-based economic discrimination. As Kamau (2010) notes in

the case of Kenya, “not many women can compete materially with the men, given the patriarchal structures in operation... Generally, very few women are able to raise the roughly US\$60,000 (as a minimum) needed to run a successful campaign.”


Because success in cabinet tournaments requires that women engage in the costly process of sustaining clientelistic followings, coverture constraints pose a significant challenge to women’s political advancement. Coverture constraints effectively undermine the ability of women politicians to compete for diverse and prestigious portfolios in cabinet appointments by limiting their economic options. Discriminatory economic laws handicap women seeking more powerful positions in government because they are, by definition, less efficient than men in transforming economic resources into political capital. By limiting the ability of women to directly control resources — or without explicit consent of husbands — gendered economic laws constrain women’s opportunities to accumulate campaign finance, forge alliances through campaign donations, or participate in political networks at the same rate as men. Women are therefore more likely to struggle in their efforts to accumulate the political capital required to compete with their male counterparts for influential positions in government. Conversely, where the law ensures that women can acquire and control resources on an equal basis with men, women should be better positioned to compete for more influential and powerful cabinet positions.

The political impact of coverture constraints can be readily illustrated. In many African countries, for example, head-of-household laws define the relative legal position of individual family members, including the right to control assets, enter into contracts, and even their freedom of association and mobility (Gautier 2005). Figure 1 illustrates the hypothesized link between women’s legal economic rights and political influence. As a placebo test, Figure 1 first

shows that head-of-household rights have virtually no impact on the likelihood of male ministers being appointed to social welfare portfolios, which are widely viewed as less prestigious ministerial posts in government. The proportion of men in such portfolios remains comparable regardless of whether head-of-household laws discriminate against women: 19% in countries with equal rights versus 23% in countries with unequal rights. By contrast, Figure 1 shows that countries with gendered head-of-household laws are associated with a greater concentration of women in social welfare portfolios. The mean proportion of social welfare portfolios jumps from 46% when women can serve as head of household to 71% when they are prohibited from doing so.

[FIGURE 1]

Figure 1. Gendered Head-of-Household Laws and Social Welfare Portfolio Appointments



Note: A country is classified as having unequal household head rights when it legally prohibits married women from acting as head of household. They are classified as equal when there are no such legal restrictions. Country classifications are drawn from the World Bank’s *Women, Business and the Law* database.

Data and Methods

To assess the relationship between women's coverage constraints and their access to diversified, prestigious cabinet appointments, we use cross-sectional time-series data on the portfolio appointments received by women and men in African ministerial cabinets. The data cover all cabinet ministers listed in annual volumes of *Africa South of the Sahara*, which includes approximately 6,500 individual ministers who held nearly 17,000 portfolios in 38 African countries between 1980 and 2005. The gender of cabinet ministers was coded using multiple sources, including electronic and print biographic guides, newspaper articles, and country case studies.

Dependent Variables

We operationalize four dependent variables to examine distinct manifestations of gendered portfolio appointments in African countries.

The first dependent variable is *women's portfolio concentration*. This measure is an index of portfolio concentration across five policy domains: economic policy, foreign affairs & national defense, government operations, law & order, and social welfare.¹⁰ Modeled after the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, the portfolio concentration index is calculated for every country by squaring the proportion of portfolios that fall in each policy area and then summing those numbers. Because it is constrained to five categories by design, the portfolio concentration index approaches a value of 0.2 when all portfolios are equally distributed. Higher values on the index reflect greater disparity in portfolio allocation across policy areas. The index approaches a maximum value of 1 as more portfolio appointments are made in a single policy domain. For the purposes of this analysis, the portfolio concentration index is constructed for every country at

¹⁰ Appendix A shows cabinet portfolios classified by policy area.

five-year intervals between 1980 and 2005. Given the relatively low number of women in most African cabinets, this five-year aggregation ensures that the values of the index are more meaningful by including a larger number of portfolios in its calculation.

The second dependent variable is *women's social welfare portfolio concentration*. This measure is calculated as the number of portfolio assignments made in the area of social welfare as a share of all cabinet portfolios held by women. As shown in Table 1, these portfolios represent the most common assignment for women cabinet ministers. These portfolios are widely perceived as less influential within government as well as being part of a more “feminine” policy domain. Ministries responsible for social welfare typically manage programs and services aimed at enhancing the wellbeing of citizens. Portfolios related to social welfare include examples such as culture, education, health, women's affairs, and youth.¹¹ This measure is also constructed for every country at five-year intervals between 1980 and 2005 due to the relatively small number of women cabinet ministers across time.

The third dependent variable is *women's appointment to high prestige cabinet portfolios*. It is coded dichotomously as 1 if a woman is assigned to a high prestige portfolio in a country-year; 0 if no such assignment is made. To code the prestige associated with individual portfolios, we rely on the consensus that has emerged in the literature on women's cabinet representation around prestige rankings offered first by White (1998) and later adapted by Studlar and Moncrief (1999) and Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005; 2009).¹² Our coding of portfolio prestige draws primarily from Krook and O'Brien's (2012) ranking system.¹³ High prestige portfolios enjoy the closest contact with the president or prime minister and attract significant

¹¹ Appendix A shows cabinet portfolios classified by policy area.

¹² Studlar and Moncrief (1999) note at least four ways of measuring portfolio prestige: size of the budget, number of personnel, seniority of ministers, and degree of media attention. However, these metrics are unavailable for most African ministries.

¹³ Appendix B shows cabinet portfolios classified by prestige level.

respect and status in government. These include such ministries as defense, finance, and foreign affairs.¹⁴ Medium prestige portfolios have significant budgets, personnel, or socioeconomic impact. Examples include ministries of education and public works. Low prestige portfolios have small budgets, few personnel, and relatively narrow constituencies. Examples include ministries of culture and youth.

The fourth dependent variable is *women's appointments to economic policy portfolios*. This variable is used to examine the factors influencing the appointment of women specifically to economic portfolios. Economic portfolios are of particular interest because not only are they generally perceived to be more influential than those in social welfare, but they also represent the policy area outside social welfare where women have experienced the most growth in cabinet appointments. This variable is coded dichotomously as 1 if at least one woman in a cabinet is assigned to an economic portfolio in a country-year; 0 if no woman is assigned to such a portfolio.

Independent Variable

We argue that women's portfolio assignments are systematically influenced by the extent to which gendered economic rights have been legally institutionalized in African countries, which can diminish women's ability to accumulate the resources needed to pursue political office as well as transform those resources into political capital. Our main independent variable of interest is therefore intended to reflect whether a country's codified laws explicitly

¹⁴ We have added to the high prestige list any ministerial position in the president or prime minister's office, as it necessarily implies superior access to the chief executive. We have also included petroleum in the high prestige list because of its importance in Africa's oil exporting countries.

discriminate against women in their access to economic resources. We draw such variables from the *Women, Business and the Law* database at the World Bank.¹⁵

We create a *coverture index* that reflects the extent to which a country's laws recognize gender-based discrimination in access to resources or property rights. This unweighted additive index aggregates dichotomous scores in seven areas: unmarried women's property rights, married women's property rights, married women's right to act as head of household, married women's ability to pursue work outside the home, married women's ability to open a bank account, married women's ability to sign a contract, and married women's ability to initiate legal proceedings. Each is coded as 1 if there is a statute that recognizes gender-based differences or requires married women to be subject to male authority. Each is coded as 0 if there are no explicit restrictions in the legal treatment of women versus men. The coverture index is then produced by adding the scores and dividing their sum by seven. Cronbach's alpha for the coverture index is 0.79, meeting conventional levels for scale reliability and indicating that the seven laws are meaningfully tapping into a single underlying construct. Given the logic outlined in previous sections, we expect countries with higher values on the coverture index to have higher levels of women's portfolio concentration as well as women's social welfare portfolio concentration. Women should also receive relatively fewer appointments to high prestige portfolios or economic portfolios in such countries.

Control Variables

We control for a number of legal, political, and social factors that might impinge on the ability of women to secure more influential cabinet portfolios. To assess the impact of socio-cultural sources of gender discrimination, we use the measure developed by Alesina et al. (2013)

¹⁵ The data can be accessed at <http://wbl.worldbank.org/>.

to reflect the extent to which a country's population traditionally practiced plough agriculture. Corroborating Boserup's (1970) hypothesis linking contemporary gender roles to the pre-industrial adoption of plough cultivation, which advantages men over women, Alesina et al. find a positive relationship between historical plough use and unequal gender roles across countries as well as ethnic groups.¹⁶ If countries with extensive traditional plough use in the pre-industrial period are associated with greater social bias against women today, then we expect such countries to have higher levels of women's portfolio concentration. We also expect them to have a lower likelihood of high prestige or economic portfolio appointments for women.

We include a dichotomous variable indicating whether customary law can discriminate on the basis of gender. Coded from the World Bank's *Women, Business and the Law* database, this measure is coded as 1 when customary law is recognized as a source of law under a country's constitution and it can take precedence over constitutional nondiscrimination provisions; it is coded 0 otherwise. In countries where customary law can discriminate on the basis of gender, we expect both measures of women's portfolio concentration to be higher and a lower likelihood of appointments to high prestige and economic portfolios.

We control for the number of years since the adoption of a legislative quota for women (Tripp and Kang 2008).¹⁷ Because such quotas help to ensure that more women can enter national politics, thereby ensuring a larger supply of potential female cabinet ministers, we expect both women's portfolio concentration indices to be lower — and a greater likelihood of high prestige and economic portfolio appointments — in countries with a legislative gender quota.

¹⁶ There is no relationship between plough adoption and the coverture index ($r = -0.036$). Additionally, there is no apparent relationship between the number of pre-colonial political hierarchies, the other measure employed by Alesina et al. (2013), and the coverture index ($r = 0.034$).

¹⁷ Data on legislative quotas are from the Quota Project's Global Database of Quotas for Women (www.quotaproject.org).

To assess the role of international influences, we employ a dichotomous variable to indicate whether a country has ratified the 1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).¹⁸ We expect women's portfolio concentration indices to be lower and the likelihood of high prestige and economic portfolio appointments to be higher in countries that have ratified CEDAW.

Women's participation in national politics might be affected the supply of qualified candidates for different cabinet portfolios (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Krook and O'Brien 2012; Reynolds 1999). We therefore include variables for the number of women already serving in the cabinet as well as the percent of the legislature made up by women. The data on women in the legislature are from Paxton et al. (2008). As the supply of potential women ministers increases, we expect women's portfolio concentration to be lower. We also expect that a larger number of women in national politics should be associated with a greater likelihood of appointments to high prestige and economic portfolios.

The effect of democratization is captured through the aggregate Polity index from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers 2010). The Polity index is a 21-point scale that ranges from -10 (fully autocratic) to 10 (fully democratic). Executives in more democratic regimes might be more likely to diversify the portfolio assignments of women ministers and appoint them to more prestigious positions if their governments are driven by policy rather than patronage concerns. Additionally, we control for a country's socialist history, since prior research suggests that leftists governments are more likely to appoint women to more prestigious positions (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005). A count variable indicates the number of years a country is governed by a ruling party or constitution that explicitly espouses a commitment to socialism.

¹⁸ Data on CEDAW ratification are from the United Nations (treaties.un.org).

Previous research suggests that women's cabinet appointments are negatively affected by coalition politics (Arriola and Johnson 2014; Krook and O'Brien 2012; Studlar et al. 1997). We assess the impact of coalition dynamics in the African context through two variables. The first is the percentage of seats held by the government in the legislature. These data are from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). The second is a count of politically relevant ethnic groups drawn from Cederman et al.'s Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset. The EPR measure includes only politicized ethnic groups rather than all ethnic groups in a country. Executives who are obliged to use cabinet appointments to accommodate demands from larger coalitions, measured either in legislative or ethnic terms, should be expected to have higher women's portfolio concentration levels. Women in such cases should also be expected to be relatively less likely to receive appointments to high prestige or economic portfolios.

To consider the possibility that religious norms might affect the portfolio appointments received by women, we add two dichotomous variables to indicate whether a country has either a Muslim majority or no religious majority. Christian majority countries serve as a reference category. The data on religious adherents are from the Association of Religion Data Archives.¹⁹ Since previous research suggests that women are less likely to be included in the executive in Muslim majority countries (Reynolds 1999), women's portfolio concentration might also be expected to be higher in such countries. Women in Muslim majority countries might also be expected to be relatively less likely to receive appointments to high prestige or economic portfolios.

¹⁹ The data can be accessed at thearda.com.

Level of development is controlled through per capita income at purchasing power parity (PPP).²⁰ We expect higher values to be associated with lower women's portfolio concentration as well as a greater likelihood of appointments to high prestige and economic portfolios.

Estimation

The first two dependent variables — women's portfolio concentration index and women's social welfare portfolio concentration — are estimated using random effects linear regression. The second set of dependent variables — the appointment of women to high prestige portfolios and the appointment of women to economic policy portfolios — is estimated using random effects logistic regression. All covariates are entered with one-year lags.

We opt for the random-effects estimator to analyze our panel of African countries for several reasons. Although fixed effects are often employed when examining time-series cross-sectional data because they produce unbiased coefficient estimates, employing this approach would be inappropriate given the nature of our data. Random effects estimation is preferred because the most relevant source of variation in our analysis lies in the cross-section of the data. National legal codes, once put in place, tend to persist over time and are rarely reversed. The standard deviation in the principal independent variable of interest, the coverture index, is approximately 40% greater across rather than within the countries in our sample. The index exhibits little within-country variation. The correlation between measures of the index taken at two points in time, at independence in the 1960s and again in 1980, is 0.93.²¹ Relatedly, the use

²⁰ The GDP per capita data are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (<http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>).

²¹ The fixed-effects estimator is also inappropriate when the panel contains few observations per unit, which is the case for the first two dependent variables: women's portfolio concentration index and women's social welfare portfolio concentration. Because these indices are constructed for every country at five-year intervals, there are only 3 to 4 observations per country.

of fixed-effects would have required dropping from the analysis important competing explanatory variables recommended by theory, including customary law and ethnic diversity, because they do not vary over time for most countries.

Our estimation approach is corroborated by the results of the Hausman (1978) test conducted for each of the dependent variables. The tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that there are no systematic differences in parameter estimates between random-effects and fixed-effects specifications.²² Robustness checks presented in appendices confirm these results. Both fixed and random effects models produce consistent results that do not differ meaningfully in either the statistical or substantive significance of the coverture index. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient for the coverture index only increases with the addition of country and year fixed effects.

Empirical Analysis

We begin the empirical analysis by first demonstrating that the coverture index is tapping into the economic discrimination faced by women across many African countries. The results presented in Table 2 underscore how coverture constraints can influence women's insertion into the national economy.²³ Consistent with our theoretical framework, women are found to be systematically less likely to participate in the labor force of African countries with higher coverture constraints. This result is statistically significant at the 0.01 level and holds across countries and within countries over time, as indicated by the model using country fixed effects. The size of the coefficient on economic discrimination is practically unchanged when moving

²² For example, the chi-squared test is not statistically significant for the women's portfolio concentration index ($\text{Chi}2(8) = 4.69$; $\text{Prob}>\text{Chi}2=0.79$) or the appointment of women to high prestige portfolios ($\text{Chi}2(8) = 9.11$; $\text{Prob}>\text{Chi}2=0.33$).

²³ The data on female labor force participation, fertility, and female life expectancy are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (<http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>).

from the random effects to the fixed effects specification. A one standard deviation increase in the coverture index (0.3) would be associated, on average, with a full percentage-point decrease in female labor force participation, all else equal.

[TABLE 2]

Table 2. Women's Socioeconomic Status

	Female Labor Force Participation		Female Fertility		Female Life Expectancy	
Coverture index	-3.504*** (1.058)	-3.468*** (0.646)	0.835*** (0.205)	0.926*** (0.144)	0.849 (1.792)	0.604 (0.855)
Traditional plough use			-1.608 (2.152)		4.506 (4.340)	
Muslim majority		-20.657** (8.440)	0.259 (0.314)		2.778 (2.817)	
GDP per capita	-0.100 (0.149)	-0.060 (0.199)	-0.034 (0.064)	0.073 (0.055)	0.637 (0.509)	0.316 (0.327)
Constant	70.379*** (2.902)	66.953*** (1.415)	5.999*** (0.462)	5.239*** (0.395)	46.466*** (4.230)	49.277*** (2.341)
R ²	0.064	0.063	0.057	0.064	0.002	0.002
Number of observations	651	651	454	454	651	651
Number of countries	29	29	29	29	29	29
Fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: Independent variables are lagged. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

The impact of coverture constraints is robust to the inclusion of the traditional plough measure employed by Alesina et al. (2013) to account for long-standing cultural attitudes regarding the role of women in society. However, in this instance, the pre-industrial adoption of plough agriculture is not associated with lower levels of female labor force participation, as the coefficient on this variable fails to attain conventional levels of statistical significance. The estimated coefficient for Muslim majority countries indicates that women are significantly less likely to actively participate in the formal economy of those countries.

The results in Table 2 show that women facing legal obstacles may be induced to divert their productive energy from economic activities outside the home into greater domesticity. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on coverture constraints in the model of female fertility indicates that women, on average, have nearly one additional child when living in countries at the maximum level of economic discrimination versus those who live in countries with no such discrimination. This result remains consistent when controlling for socio-cultural and income variables in the random effects model as well as income in the fixed effects model.

The impact of coverture constraints appears to be largely limited to the productive sphere of women's lives. There is no evidence that gendered economic laws affect or amplify sociocultural norms that might otherwise affect investment in women. The model of female life expectancy in Table 2 shows that the number of years a newborn infant girl is expected to live has no statistically significant relationship with the level of economic discrimination in her country. Supplementary analyses reported in appendices show no systematic relationship between the level of economic discrimination and indicators of women's status, i.e., contraception prevalence, maternal mortality, or acceptance of wife beating.²⁴ Taken together, this set of results suggests that coverture constraints may shape the economic opportunities

²⁴ See Appendix F.

available to women in African countries, but they do not necessarily affect a broader set of gendered outcomes more likely to be influenced by norms tied to custom or religion.

The empirical results presented in Tables 3 through 6 are broadly consistent with this paper's main theoretical expectations: women ministers in countries with greater coverture constraints are systematically relegated to less powerful positions in government when compared to their counterparts in countries with fewer gender-based restrictions on economic rights. Women ministers in countries with greater coverture constraints are more likely to be concentrated in social welfare portfolios, and they are less likely to receive appointment to high prestige or economic portfolios.

Table 3 reports the random effects linear regression analysis of women's portfolio concentration across five policy areas: economic policy, foreign affairs & national defense, government operations, law & order, and social welfare. The coefficient for the coverture index attains its expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better in two-tailed tests across most model specifications. The portfolio concentration index rises — meaning that portfolio assignments are clustered into a smaller number of policy areas — in tandem with coverture constraints. The estimated coefficient in Model 1 indicates that each 0.1 increase in the coverture index is associated with a 0.03 increase in the women's portfolio concentration index, all else equal. The impact of this result is substantively large. Moving from the minimum to the maximum levels of the coverture index would entail nearly a 30% increase in portfolio concentration, that is, an increase of 0.3 on an index that runs from 0 to 1.

[TABLE 3]

Table 3. Women's Cabinet Portfolio Concentration

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Coverture index	0.294** (0.123)	0.274** (0.122)	0.286* (0.151)	0.273** (0.122)	0.276** (0.125)
Traditional plough use		0.310*** (0.081)			
Customary law			-0.010 (0.092)		
Legislative gender quota				-0.026** (0.012)	
CEDAW					-0.063 (0.075)
Number of women in cabinet	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.065*** (0.020)	-0.055*** (0.021)	-0.047** (0.020)	-0.049** (0.020)
Women's share of legislature	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.006)
Level of democracy	0.003 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	0.003 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)	0.003 (0.005)
Government share of legislature	0.004** (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)
Socialist regime duration	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Politicized ethnic groups	0.011 (0.009)	0.007 (0.009)	0.012 (0.010)	0.010 (0.010)	0.011 (0.009)
Muslim majority	0.067 (0.099)	0.104 (0.096)	0.066 (0.100)	0.060 (0.100)	0.053 (0.100)
No religious majority	0.071 (0.099)	0.083 (0.095)	0.073 (0.100)	0.054 (0.096)	0.063 (0.098)
GDP per capita	0.036 (0.035)	0.040 (0.033)	0.037 (0.036)	0.025 (0.034)	0.030 (0.032)
Constant	0.119 (0.328)	0.153 (0.322)	0.104 (0.332)	0.203 (0.328)	0.241 (0.321)
R ²	0.359	0.385	0.358	0.389	0.367
Number of observations	75	75	75	75	75
Number of countries	27	27	27	27	27

Note: Random effects linear regression. Dependent variable is women's portfolio concentration index. Independent variables are lagged. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

The results in Table 4 indicate that women ministers are systematically assigned to social welfare portfolios in countries with higher levels of legal economic discrimination. The estimated coefficient on the coverture index is statistically significant at the 0.01 level in all model specifications. The size of the coefficient remains stable around 0.4, regardless of which other variables are included. Additional analyses presented in appendices further show that the number of women relegated to social welfare portfolios shapes much of the variance in the portfolio concentration index for women. By contrast, the placebo test for male cabinet appointments shows that the number of men in social welfare portfolios has no relationship to the portfolio concentration index for men.²⁵

[TABLE 4]

²⁵ See Appendix D.

Table 4. Women's Social Welfare Portfolio Concentration

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Coverture index	0.438*** (0.132)	0.423*** (0.131)	0.384** (0.173)	0.419*** (0.135)	0.412*** (0.126)
Traditional plough use		0.221** (0.111)			
Customary law			-0.071 (0.096)		
Legislative gender quota				-0.020 (0.016)	
CEDAW					-0.077 (0.083)
Number of women in cabinet	-0.007 (0.026)	-0.012 (0.027)	-0.011 (0.030)	0.002 (0.026)	0.001 (0.030)
Women's share of legislature	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)
Level of democracy	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
Government share of legislature	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)
Socialist regime duration	0.000 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	0.004 (0.007)	0.000 (0.004)
Politicized ethnic groups	0.020** (0.009)	0.018* (0.009)	0.023** (0.010)	0.020** (0.009)	0.020** (0.009)
Muslim majority	0.036 (0.134)	0.059 (0.138)	0.038 (0.134)	0.027 (0.133)	0.016 (0.139)
No religious majority	0.098 (0.083)	0.109 (0.083)	0.105 (0.086)	0.087 (0.077)	0.090 (0.084)
GDP per capita	-0.081*** (0.029)	-0.077*** (0.029)	-0.071** (0.034)	-0.088*** (0.025)	-0.087*** (0.031)
Constant	1.008*** (0.285)	1.019*** (0.283)	0.950*** (0.320)	1.061*** (0.263)	1.152*** (0.338)
R ²	0.394	0.405	0.398	0.407	0.397
Number of observations	75	75	75	75	75
Number of countries	27	27	27	27	27

Note: Random effects linear regression. Dependent variable is the proportion of social welfare portfolios among all portfolios held by women cabinet ministers. Independent variables are lagged. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 5 presents the random effects logistic regression analysis of women's appointments to high prestige portfolios. The results are shown in log-odds units. The log odds on the coverture index are negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level in all model specifications. Model 11 indicates that the odds of a woman receiving a high prestige portfolio fall by nearly 95%, on average, when moving from the minimum to the maximum level on the coverture index. The magnitude of the index's estimated effects remain relatively constant despite the addition of other institutional and socio-cultural variables. Note, for example, that when controlling for discrimination by customary law in Model 13, the odds of a woman being appointed to a high prestige appointment are still 94% lower, on average, in a country at the maximum versus the minimum level on the coverture index. The size of this effect remains the same in models controlling for traditional plough use, legislative gender quotas, and CEDAW ratification.

[TABLE 5]

Table 5. Women's High Prestige Cabinet Appointments

	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
Coverture index	-2.925*** (0.920)	-2.883*** (0.938)	-3.656*** (0.991)	-2.767*** (0.905)	-3.554*** (0.949)
Traditional plough use		-0.476 (1.920)			
Customary law			-1.228** (0.592)		
Legislative gender quota				0.146* (0.088)	
CEDAW					-1.522*** (0.470)
Number of women in cabinet	0.474*** (0.130)	0.477*** (0.130)	0.408*** (0.132)	0.414*** (0.134)	0.609*** (0.142)
Women's share of legislature	0.039 (0.029)	0.039 (0.029)	0.036 (0.028)	0.030 (0.030)	0.056* (0.030)
Level of democracy	0.034 (0.041)	0.037 (0.043)	0.054 (0.040)	0.039 (0.041)	0.030 (0.045)
Government share of legislature	-0.016* (0.009)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.009)	-0.025** (0.010)
Socialist regime duration	-0.004 (0.029)	-0.004 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.028)	-0.046 (0.039)	-0.000 (0.029)
Politicized ethnic groups	-0.120 (0.078)	-0.115 (0.081)	-0.137* (0.074)	-0.121 (0.077)	-0.108 (0.074)
Muslim majority	-1.089 (0.714)	-1.122 (0.729)	-1.290* (0.674)	-0.931 (0.705)	-1.107 (0.696)
No religious majority	0.052 (0.537)	0.035 (0.545)	-0.053 (0.506)	0.172 (0.534)	0.000 (0.526)
GDP per capita	0.339 (0.207)	0.337 (0.208)	0.413** (0.207)	0.389* (0.215)	0.267 (0.211)
Constant	-3.022* (1.678)	-3.063* (1.693)	-3.028* (1.642)	-3.310* (1.711)	-1.060 (1.766)
Log likelihood	-171.937	-171.906	-169.633	-170.453	-162.891
Number of observations	493	493	492	493	476
Number of countries	29	29	29	29	29

Note: Random effects logistic regression. Dependent variable is woman's appointment to high prestige cabinet post. Independent variables are lagged. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 6 presents the random effects logistic regression analysis of women's appointment to economic policy portfolios. The results are shown in log-odds units. The log odds on the coverture index are again negative and statistically significant at conventional levels. According to Model 16, the odds of a woman being appointed to an economic portfolio are nearly 88% lower in countries with maximum versus minimum scores on the coverture index. In Model 18, after controlling for gender discrimination permitted by customary law, the odds of a woman being appointed to an economic portfolio remain 83% lower in countries with maximum versus minimum levels on the coverture index.

[TABLE 6]

Table 6. Women's Economic Policy Portfolio Appointments

	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20
Coverture index	-2.098** (0.996)	-1.976** (0.977)	-1.784* (1.014)	-1.928** (0.972)	-1.943** (0.988)
Traditional plough use		-3.160 (2.924)			
Customary law			1.013 (0.884)		
Legislative gender quota				0.360** (0.182)	
CEDAW					0.958* (0.528)
Number of women in cabinet	0.798*** (0.166)	0.801*** (0.166)	0.827*** (0.169)	0.772*** (0.167)	0.684*** (0.169)
Women's share of legislature	0.143*** (0.038)	0.143*** (0.038)	0.148*** (0.038)	0.123*** (0.038)	0.132*** (0.039)
Level of democracy	0.182*** (0.053)	0.192*** (0.054)	0.171*** (0.053)	0.178*** (0.053)	0.176*** (0.054)
Government share of legislature	0.004 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.002 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)
Socialist regime duration	0.011 (0.045)	0.010 (0.045)	0.017 (0.044)	-0.048 (0.055)	0.004 (0.045)
Politicized ethnic groups	0.073 (0.115)	0.096 (0.115)	0.056 (0.111)	0.084 (0.112)	0.072 (0.117)
Muslim majority	-0.616 (1.024)	-0.806 (1.025)	-0.529 (0.983)	-0.462 (1.001)	-0.560 (1.040)
No religious majority	0.134 (0.821)	0.013 (0.818)	0.226 (0.801)	0.286 (0.811)	0.238 (0.833)
GDP per capita	-0.154 (0.260)	-0.166 (0.262)	-0.172 (0.267)	-0.106 (0.242)	-0.076 (0.259)
Constant	-2.858 (2.167)	-2.874 (2.170)	-2.944 (2.198)	-3.363 (2.072)	-4.023* (2.276)
Log likelihood	-168.889	-168.241	-168.243	-166.475	-164.623
Number of observations	493	493	492	493	476
Number of countries	29	29	29	29	29

Note: Random effects logistic regression. Dependent variable is woman's appointment to economic portfolio. Independent variables are lagged. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

While economic discrimination is systematically associated with gendered patterns of portfolio appointments, the results presented in Tables 3 through 6 are less consistent with regard to the impact of socio-cultural factors that conventionally would be expected to influence women's cabinet appointments. For example, traditional plough use attains statistical significance only in relation to select outcomes. As a proxy for conservative social attitudes toward gender relations, this variable attains statistical significance in the case of women's portfolio concentration and social welfare concentration. The size of the estimated coefficient on traditional plough use is comparable to the coverture index with regards to portfolio concentration in Table 3, but reaches only half the size when examining social welfare concentration in Table 4. Moreover, the variable fails to attain statistical significance for either women's high prestige or economic policy portfolio appointments.


The variable indicating that customary law can discriminate on this basis of gender attains statistical significance only in the context of high prestige appointments in Table 5. According to the log odds reported in Model 13, the odds of a woman being appointed to a high prestige post are about 70% lower in a country where customary law can discriminate on the basis of gender. But customary law has no such effects with regards to the overall concentration of women's cabinet portfolios or social welfare portfolios, as shown in Tables 3 and 4, or in the particular instance of economic portfolios, as shown in Table 6.

The supply of potential ministers is a critical factor in portfolio diversification among women. African countries that include more women in government appear to be more likely to assign subsequent appointees to policy portfolios outside the social welfare domain. The results in Tables 3 through 6 show that the presence of more women in the cabinet is systematically associated with a greater likelihood of appointments in policy domains outside social welfare. In

Model 11 of Table 5, the odds of a woman being appointed to a high prestige post is estimated to be 60% higher if the cabinet already includes a woman. However, as illustrated in Figure 2, the potential influence of more women in the cabinet on successive portfolio appointments very much depends on the extent of gendered economic discrimination. Figure 2 shows that the positive effect of having more women in the cabinet on high prestige appointments is effectively neutralized in a country where they face the maximum levels of coverture constraints. A larger number of women in the cabinet only seems to have a positive impact on the likelihood of a high prestige appointment when women face no legal constraints on their economic rights.

[FIGURE 2]

Figure 2. Economic Discrimination Reduces Likelihood of High Prestige Appointments



Note: The maximum level of the coverture index is 1; the minimum is 0. Vertical lines around point estimates are 95% confidence intervals.

Although the number of women in the cabinet is a consistent predictor of portfolio diversification for subsequent women appointees, the percentage of women in the legislature is less so. The presence of women legislators is found to have little to no impact on portfolio diversification in Tables 3 and 4 or on the likelihood of high prestige appointments in Table 5. However, the statistically significant log odds on this variable in Table 6 suggest that women are more likely to receive cabinet appointments in economic policy when there are more women in the legislature. The overall influence of this variable on women's portfolio assignments may be attenuated because its main effect is already being channeled through the number of women in the cabinet. Previous research has shown that women are more likely to enter the cabinet in the first place as women enter the legislature in larger numbers (Krook and O'Brien 2012; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005). Consistent with this expectation, Table 3 shows that women's portfolio assignments become increasingly diverse the longer legislative quotas are in place: each additional year is associated with nearly a 0.03 decrease in the portfolio concentration index. Legislative quotas are also associated with a greater likelihood of women receiving high prestige appointments, as shown in Table 5. A one-year increase in the duration of a legislative quota results in a 16% increase in the odds of a woman being appointed to a high prestige portfolio. Relatedly, in Table 6, a one-year increase in quota duration increases the odds of a woman being appointed to an economic portfolio by 43%.

Enhancing domestic efforts to increase the role of women in government, the ratification of CEDAW should be expected to both increase the diversity of women's policy portfolios and their appointment to high prestige posts. Neither appears to be the case. The CEDAW variable fails to attain statistical significance when estimating women's portfolio concentration generally or women's social welfare portfolio concentration specifically. Unexpectedly, Table 5 further

shows that the estimated log odds on CEDAW ratification are negative and statistically significant: the odds of a woman being appointed to a high prestige post are 78% lower in a country which has ratified the international convention. It may be the case that CEDAW encourages the appointment of more women into the cabinet, but not necessarily to powerful positions. Instead, Table 6 shows the expected result: CEDAW signatories are about 2.6 times more likely to appoint women to economic portfolios.

The level of democracy exhibits inconsistent effects on portfolio assignments among women cabinet ministers. This variable has no systematic relationship with portfolio diversification in Tables 3 and 4 or on high prestige appointments in Table 5. In Table 6, the level of democracy is significantly associated with a greater likelihood of women being appointed to economic policy portfolios. These results are not limited to the Polity IV measure used for the level of democracy. Alternate measures, such as the Freedom House indices for political rights and civil liberties, produce comparable results. Additionally, a country's experience with socialism appears to have had no lasting influence on women's portfolio diversification. This variable never attains statistical significance.

Coalition politics are not associated with any consistent patterns in women's portfolio assignments. The size of the ruling coalition, as measured by the share of government seats in the legislature, rarely attains statistical significance at conventional levels in most model specifications. Similarly, the number of politicized ethnic groups does not consistently attain statistical significance across models. The one exception is in Table 4, where the positive coefficient on politicized ethnic groups suggests that women are more likely to be concentrated in social welfare posts in countries with a larger number of ethnic cleavages.

A country's dominant religious tradition appears to have no impact on women's portfolio assignments. The variables used to indicate whether a country has a Muslim majority or no religious majority do not attain statistical significance in any model specification. This may be partly due to the fact that religion-specific norms for gender roles are already integrated into the legal codes of countries. Muslim majority countries in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, tend to legally recognize a married woman's right to property, but do not accord her legal recognition as a head of household. The exclusion of these variables from alternate model specifications — substituting Christian majority for Muslim majority or excluding all religion variables — do not change the main results.

The level of development, measured through per capita income, is generally not associated with patterns of women's portfolio assignments. The one exception concerns the concentration of social welfare appointments. In Table 4, countries with higher average levels of income appear to have a lower concentration of social welfare posts among their women cabinet ministers. Alternate measures for prevailing economic conditions, as measured by dependence on foreign aid, or the relative position of women, as gauged by the legality of polygamy, are statistically indistinguishable from zero in all model specifications.

The findings presented in Tables 3 through 6 indicate that the policy influence of women remains limited in African countries where they are subjected to legal economic discrimination. Given the considerable resource disadvantage faced by women politicians in positioning themselves for cabinet appointments in Africa's clientelistic systems, this outcome is unlikely to change with the simple inclusion of more women in government. The problem can be seen in the supplementary analyses concerning the appointment of men to low prestige portfolios presented in Table 7. The log odds on the coverture index are negative and statistically significant at the

0.05 level or better across all models, indicating that men are less likely to be appointed to low prestige jobs when women face greater legal discrimination in accessing economic resources.

[TABLE 7]

Table 7. Men's Low Prestige Cabinet Appointments

	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20
Coverture index	-4.743*** (1.828)	-4.688** (1.840)	-5.214*** (1.937)	-4.600** (1.868)	-5.520*** (1.984)
Traditional plough use		-1.287 (5.330)			
Customary law			-3.387* (2.008)		
Legislative gender quota				-0.427** (0.189)	
CEDAW					-0.100* (0.056)
Number of women in cabinet	-0.358* (0.184)	-0.357* (0.184)	-0.370** (0.185)	-0.217 (0.199)	-0.214 (0.202)
Women's share of legislature	-0.017 (0.041)	-0.017 (0.041)	-0.025 (0.041)	0.004 (0.042)	-0.008 (0.042)
Level of democracy	0.036 (0.066)	0.037 (0.067)	0.041 (0.067)	0.035 (0.066)	0.073 (0.075)
Government share of legislature	-0.038** (0.017)	-0.038** (0.017)	-0.036** (0.017)	-0.035** (0.017)	-0.043** (0.018)
Socialist regime duration	-0.049 (0.058)	-0.049 (0.059)	-0.050 (0.058)	-0.024 (0.060)	-0.051 (0.059)
Politicized ethnic groups	0.181 (0.242)	0.190 (0.246)	0.253 (0.242)	0.167 (0.236)	0.214 (0.250)
Muslim majority	2.439 (2.245)	2.293 (2.316)	2.641 (2.210)	2.041 (2.200)	2.488 (2.280)
No religious majority	3.934* (2.081)	3.838* (2.127)	3.681* (1.978)	3.530* (2.070)	4.221** (2.147)
GDP per capita	0.330 (0.808)	0.319 (0.808)	0.495 (0.819)	0.425 (0.813)	0.198 (0.770)
Constant	3.686 (6.233)	3.796 (6.235)	2.868 (6.287)	2.537 (6.282)	5.479 (6.112)
Log likelihood	-152.897	-152.878	-151.712	-149.330	-147.254
Number of observations	493	493	492	493	476
Number of countries	29	29	29	29	29

Note: Random effects logistic regression. Dependent variable is men's appointment to low prestige portfolio. Independent variables are lagged. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

The results in Table 7 are consistent with the expectations of the cabinet tournament. In countries with greater coverage constraints on women, men have a structural advantage in being able to convert economic resources into political capital. As a result, they are less likely to be appointed to low prestige portfolios in the cabinet. Even when more women are entering politics, they will continue to be less efficient than their male counterparts in mobilizing support for the regime as long as they must compete for political influence under gendered economic rights. Note, for example, the negative and statistically significant log odds on the legislative quota variable. While such institutional measures may help to increase the number of women in the cabinet, those women are relegated to less influential positions as their male counterparts are promoted to better portfolios. Indeed, these particular results help to make sense of the unexpected negative relationship found between CEDAW ratification and high prestige cabinet appointments in Table 5. The log odds on the CEDAW measure are again negative in Table 7. In this case, however, they indicate that men are less likely to be appointed to low prestige cabinet positions in a country that has ratified the international convention. Countries may seek to comply with CEDAW by appointing more women to cabinet positions, but it seems that those positions will most likely be the least influential in government.

Conclusion

Our findings suggest that egalitarian economic laws may be a crucial condition for women's effective political empowerment. Political institutions like quotas can help expand the number of women present in national legislatures and cabinets, but they cannot ensure that women have access to the resources needed to exercise greater influence in politics and policymaking. Previous studies have emphasized that women's legal status influences their

economic opportunities as well as their sense of personal autonomy (World Bank 2014; Hallward-Driemeier and Ousmane Gajigo 2013; Matembe and Dorsey 2002). Ours is one of the first, however, to demonstrate empirically that women's economic rights are also a condition for political empowerment.

Equal economic rights will not necessarily result in political parity for women and men, but the persistence of legal discrimination in many countries virtually guarantees that women will never have the opportunity to make political parity a possibility. The findings presented here thus suggest that policymakers and scholars should broaden the lens with which they examine women's rights. The United Nations' Millennium Development Goals, for example, explicitly prioritize women's economic and political equality, but that equality is measured in terms of girl's enrollment in primary and secondary education, women's share of the non-agricultural labor force participation, and women's proportion of parliamentary seats. These are important indicators of women's position in society, but they offer little insight into the legal economic rights that shape women's access to political power. Such rights typically do not command the attention of international development agencies. However, if they are not addressed, women politicians may not be able to rise to the positions of influence from which they could help advance the issues that disproportionately affect women, particularly in developing countries.

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Appendix A. Classification of Cabinet Portfolios by Policy Domain

Economic	<p>Agriculture (Coffee, Fisheries, Food Security, Livestock, Rural Economy or Development)</p> <p>Construction (Equipment, Public Works, Reconstruction)</p> <p>Development (Rural, Communal) and Planning</p> <p>Energy (Power)</p> <p>Environment (National Parks, Natural Resources, Natural Disasters Reforestation, Resource Development, Water)</p> <p>Economy (Budgeting, Central Bank, Economic Sphere or Planning, Finance, Revenue, Treasury)</p> <p>Handicrafts (Crafts)</p> <p>Housing (Urban Affairs)</p>	<p>Industry (Commerce, Enterprise, Private Sector Development, Privatization, Productive Sphere, Small and Medium Business)</p> <p>Mining (Geology)</p> <p>Lands and Territorial Management</p> <p>Parastatals (State Corporations, Public Enterprises, Production Brigade)</p> <p>Petroleum (Hydrocarbons)</p> <p>Posts</p> <p>Poverty Alleviation</p> <p>Regional Planning, Development</p> <p>Statistics</p> <p>Tourism</p> <p>Trade</p> <p>Transportation (Civil Aviation, Maritime Affairs, Merchant Marine)</p> <p>Tourism</p> <p>Housing (Urban, City Affairs)</p>
Foreign Affairs & National Defense	<p>Defense (Armed Forces, Army, National/Territorial Security, Navy)</p>	<p>Foreign Affairs (External Relations, International Cooperation, NEPAD, Regional or African Cooperation and Integration)</p>
Government Operations	<p>Administrative Affairs and Management (Auditor, Capacity Building, Decentralization, Good Governance, Government Operations or Management, Inspection and Control, Modernization Policy Implementation, Reform, Special Commission on Government, State Protocol, Supply)</p> <p>Africanization (Nationalization)</p> <p>Chieftaincy Affairs</p> <p>Civil Service (Public Service, Human Resources)</p> <p>Cooperation</p> <p>Communication (Information, Ideology, Propaganda, Press, Marketing)</p> <p>Internal Affairs</p> <p>National Affairs</p>	<p>Parliamentary Affairs (Constitutional Affairs,, Relations with State Organs)</p> <p>Party, Cabinet, or Government Leadership (Cabinet Secretariat, Chairman, Party Secretary, National or Political Affairs)</p> <p>Political Affairs</p> <p>Prime Minister (Deputy Prime Minister, Prime Minister's Office with no specific portfolio)</p> <p>President's Office (with no specific portfolio, Vice President)</p> <p>Regional Affairs (Regional Coordination, Local Affairs, National Integration, Territorial/Provincial Administration or Development, Federal Affairs)</p>

Law & Order	Home Affairs Interior (Gendarmerie, Intelligence, Internal Affairs, Prisons, Public or State Security, State or Social Control)	Justice (Keeper of the Seals/Law) Drug Control
Social Welfare	Civil Society (Civic Affairs, Community, Community Services, Communal Development) Culture (Arts, National Heritage) Education (Literacy) Empowerment Family (Children) Health (AIDS, Prevention) Human (Citizen) Rights and Liberties Immigration Employment (Labor, Manpower) ²⁶ Minority (Indian) Affairs Nationals Abroad (Expatriates, Immigration, Institute of Nationalities, Expatriates) National Recovery (Guidance, Orientation, Organization, Integration, Solidarity, Peace Process)	Rural Affairs (Peasant Affairs, Rural Life) Population Poverty Alleviation Refugees (Displaced Persons, Relocation, Resettlement, Relief) Rehabilitation Religious Affairs Science and Technology ²⁷ Social Welfare (Social Affairs, Assistance, Protection, Reintegration, Services, Equipment) Sports Veterans Women Youth

²⁶ Although labor and employment are related to economic policy, they are often combined with social affairs and welfare because of their link to pension systems; therefore we have chosen to keep them in the same functional category.

²⁷ Because science and technology are often included in the education portfolio, we have kept them in the same functional category despite their connection to economic policy.

Appendix B. Classification of Cabinet Portfolios by Prestige²⁸

High	Defense (Armed Forces, Army, National/Territorial Security, Navy) Economy (Budgeting, Central Bank, Economic Sphere or Planning, Finance, Revenue, Treasury) Foreign Affairs (External Relations, International Cooperation, NEPAD, Regional/African Cooperation and Integration) Home Affairs	Interior (Gendarmerie, Intelligence, Internal Affairs, Prisons, Public Security, State or Social Control) Party, Cabinet, or Government Leadership (Cabinet Secretariat, Chairman, Party Secretary, National or Political Affairs) Petroleum (Hydrocarbons) President or Prime Minister's Office
Medium	Administrative Affairs and Management (Auditor, Capacity Building, Decentralization, Good Governance, Government Operations or Management, Inspection and Control, Modernization Policy Implementation, Reform, Special Commission on Government, State Protocol, Supply) Africanization (Nationalization) Agriculture (Coffee, Fisheries, Food Security, Livestock, Rural Economy or Development) Civil Service Civil Society (Civic Affairs, Community, Communal Development) Communication (Information, Ideology, Propaganda, Press) Parliamentary Affairs (Constitutional Affairs,, Relations with State Organs) Construction (Equipment, Public Works, Reconstruction) Cooperation ²⁹	Health (AIDS, Prevention) Housing (Urban Affairs) Immigration Industry (Commerce, Enterprise, Private Sector Development, Privatization, Productive Sphere, Small and Medium Business) Justice (Keeper of the Seals, Law) Lands and Territorial Management Mining (Geology) National Recovery (Guidance, Orientation, Organization, Integration, Solidarity, Peace Process) Nationals Abroad (Expatriates) National Service Parastatals (State Corporations, Public Enterprises, Production Brigade) Posts Regional Affairs (Regional Coordination, Local Affairs, Territorial/Provincial Administration or Development, Federal Affairs, National Integration) ³⁰ Religious Affairs

²⁸ Prestige rankings are based on Krook and O'Brien (2012). When ministries were not included in their rankings, we assigned a prestige level based on similarity of tasks and responsibilities.

²⁹ The title cooperation does not specify whether a minister is responsible for international or domestic affairs. If the area of focus is not specified, cooperation is ranked as a medium prestige portfolio related to government operations.

³⁰ Specific regions were also ranked as medium prestige and categorized as government operations.

Development and Planning
Drug Control
Education (Literacy)
Employment (Labor, Manpower)
Energy (Power)
Environment (National Parks, Natural
Resources, Natural Disasters,
Reforestation, Resource
Development, Water)

Rural Affairs (Chieftaincy Affairs,
Peasant Affairs, Rural Life)
Social Welfare (Social Affairs,
Assistance, Reintegration,
Protection, Services, Equipment)
Trade
Transportation (Civil Aviation,
Maritime Affairs, Merchant
Marine)
Vice President's Office


Low Community Services
Culture (Arts, National Heritage)
Empowerment
Family (Children)
Fleet of Cars and Motorcycles
Handicrafts (Crafts)
Human (Citizen) Rights and Liberties
Institute of Nationalities
Minority (Indian) Affairs
Refugees (Displaced Persons,
Relocation, Resettlement, Relief)

Population
Poverty Alleviation
Special Missions or Affairs
Sports
Statistics
Science and Technology
Tourism
Veterans
Women's Affairs
Youth

Appendix C. Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Coverture index	0.232	0.255	0	1	493
Traditional plough use	0.043	0.140	0	0.735	493
Customary law	0.213	0.410	0	1	492
Legislative gender quota	0.657	2.699	0	19	493
CEDAW	0.698	0.460	0	1	493
Number of women in cabinet	1.907	1.673	0	12	493
Women's share of legislature	9.660	6.839	0	48.80	456
Level of democracy	-1.574	5.774	-9	9	493
Government share of legislature	82.30	20.09	0	100	487
Socialist regime duration	2.207	6.585	0	40	493
Politicized ethnic groups	4.744	3.029	0	13	493
Muslim majority	0.128	0.334	0	1	493
No religious majority	0.241	0.428	0	1	493
GDP per capita PPP, log	7.185	0.936	0.771	9.767	493
Former British colony	0.430	0.496	0	1	493
Constitutional nondiscrimination clause	0.437	0.497	0	1	492
Polygamy legal	0.669	0.471	0	1	493
Foreign aid	11.79	11.06	-0.198	94.92	492

Appendix D. Social Welfare Portfolio Appointments among Men and Women



Note: The scatterplot markers show country-level values aggregated at five-year periods.

Appendix E. Random vs. Fixed Effects Estimation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Coverture index	-3.334*** (0.943)	-2.977** (1.305)	-4.189*** (1.572)
Legislative gender quota	0.155* (0.093)	0.209* (0.117)	0.396*** (0.130)
CEDAW	-1.471*** (0.472)	-1.562*** (0.534)	-1.063 (0.779)
Number of women in cabinet	0.561*** (0.142)	0.599*** (0.160)	0.879*** (0.204)
Women's share of legislature	0.033 (0.030)	-0.021 (0.037)	0.049 (0.050)
Level of democracy	0.048 (0.045)	0.118* (0.062)	0.261*** (0.082)
Government share of legislature	-0.024** (0.010)	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.037** (0.016)
Socialist regime duration	-0.026 (0.040)	-0.009 (0.069)	-0.047 (0.079)
GDP per capita	0.245 (0.215)	0.145 (0.311)	0.098 (0.358)
Constant	(1.714) -1.413		
Country fixed effects	NO	YES	YES
Year fixed effects	NO	NO	YES
Log likelihood	-168.321	-111.951	-91.948
Number of observations	480	362	362
Number of countries	29	22	22

Note: Dependent variable is woman's appointment to high prestige cabinet post. Independent variables are lagged. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Appendix F. Women's Socioeconomic Status

	Contraceptive Prevalence	Maternal Mortality	Wife Beating Acceptable
Coverture index	-2.750 (11.852)	58.629 (165.681)	26.538 (15.962)
Traditional plough use	8.968 (15.141)	-91.396 (211.657)	32.182 (24.434)
Muslim majority	-16.469** (7.075)	103.793 (98.902)	22.177** (9.452)
GDP per capita	7.039** (2.610)	-97.086** (36.491)	-6.546 (4.483)
Constant	-23.591 (19.156)	1,132.569*** (267.774)	89.184** (31.868)
R ²	0.389	0.291	0.375
Number of observations	29	29	26

Note: Contraceptive prevalence refers to the use of contraception regardless of method (Demographic and Health Surveys (2001-2010)). Maternal mortality is the annual number of female deaths related to or aggravated by pregnancy per 100,000 live births (United Nations 2010). Wife beating is the percentage of girls and women 15–49 years old who consider a husband to be justified in beating his wife for burning the food, arguing with him, going out without telling him, neglecting the children or refusing sexual relations (DHS/MICS 2007-2012). Independent variables are lagged. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Appendix G. Women's Cabinet Portfolio Concentration

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Coverture index	0.290** (0.145)	0.283** (0.128)	0.295** (0.128)	0.295** (0.124)	0.297** (0.127)
Former British colony	-0.005 (0.094)				
Polygamy legal		-0.036 (0.079)			
Constitutional nondiscrimination			0.009 (0.073)		
Foreign aid				0.002 (0.001)	
Postconflict years					0.002 (0.008)
Number of women in cabinet	-0.054*** (0.019)	-0.054*** (0.020)	-0.055*** (0.020)	-0.052*** (0.018)	-0.054*** (0.020)
Women's share of legislature	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.010* (0.006)	-0.010 (0.006)
Level of democracy	0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)
Government share of legislature	0.004** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)
Socialist regime duration	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)
Politicized ethnic groups	0.012 (0.012)	0.012 (0.010)	0.011 (0.009)	0.013 (0.010)	0.011 (0.010)
Muslim majority	0.064 (0.099)	0.078 (0.100)	0.068 (0.100)	0.070 (0.099)	0.069 (0.102)
No religious majority	0.071 (0.099)	0.077 (0.114)	0.072 (0.099)	0.075 (0.103)	0.069 (0.103)
GDP per capita	0.036 (0.036)	0.043 (0.041)	0.037 (0.037)	0.051 (0.042)	0.037 (0.035)
Constant	0.109 (0.341)	0.087 (0.358)	0.104 (0.354)	-0.006 (0.374)	0.088 (0.328)
R ²	0.358	0.361	0.359	0.363	0.359
Number of observations	75	75	75	75	75
Number of countries	27	27	27	27	27

Note: Random effects linear regression. Dependent variable is women's portfolio concentration index. Independent variables are lagged. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Appendix H. Women's Social Welfare Portfolio Concentration

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Coverture index	0.438*** (0.154)	0.435*** (0.135)	0.431*** (0.136)	0.433*** (0.135)	0.438*** (0.138)
Former British colony	0.011 (0.096)				
Polygamy legal		0.009 (0.081)			
Constitutional nondiscrimination			-0.013 (0.078)		
Foreign aid				0.002 (0.002)	
Postconflict years					0.002 (0.006)
Number of women in cabinet	-0.006 (0.028)	-0.006 (0.027)	-0.006 (0.027)	-0.004 (0.026)	-0.007 (0.027)
Women's share of legislature	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)
Level of democracy	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.005)
Government share of legislature	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Socialist regime duration	0.000 (0.005)	0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)
Politicized ethnic groups	0.020* (0.012)	0.020** (0.009)	0.021** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.020** (0.009)
Muslim majority	0.036 (0.130)	0.031 (0.141)	0.032 (0.133)	0.038 (0.133)	0.039 (0.137)
No religious majority	0.102 (0.079)	0.098 (0.085)	0.098 (0.085)	0.103 (0.087)	0.095 (0.084)
GDP per capita	-0.081** (0.033)	-0.082** (0.037)	-0.083** (0.037)	-0.064* (0.034)	-0.079** (0.031)
Constant	1.001*** (0.304)	1.007*** (0.309)	1.019*** (0.344)	0.870*** (0.306)	0.977*** (0.321)
R ²	0.393	0.393	0.393	0.399	0.395
Number of observations	75	75	75	75	75
Number of countries	27	27	27	27	27

Note: Random effects linear regression. Dependent variable is the proportion of social welfare portfolios among all portfolios held by women cabinet ministers. Independent variables are lagged. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Appendix I. Women's High Prestige Cabinet Appointments

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Coverture index	-3.133*** (0.991)	-3.240*** (0.979)	-2.657*** (0.954)	-2.851*** (0.930)	-2.975*** (0.918)
Former British colony	-0.374 (0.550)				
Polygamy legal		-0.659 (0.472)			
Constitutional nondiscrimination			1.068** (0.537)		
Foreign aid				-0.001 (0.018)	
Postconflict years					-0.033 (0.037)
Number of women in cabinet	0.470*** (0.130)	0.482*** (0.129)	0.485*** (0.135)	0.486*** (0.132)	0.464*** (0.129)
Women's share of legislature	0.039 (0.029)	0.034 (0.029)	0.012 (0.033)	0.035 (0.030)	0.043 (0.029)
Level of democracy	0.043 (0.043)	0.042 (0.042)	0.019 (0.045)	0.032 (0.042)	0.034 (0.041)
Government share of legislature	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.016* (0.009)	-0.017* (0.010)
Socialist regime duration	0.001 (0.030)	0.001 (0.029)	0.000 (0.032)	-0.004 (0.030)	-0.008 (0.029)
Politicized ethnic groups	-0.098 (0.084)	-0.109 (0.076)	-0.138 (0.087)	-0.129 (0.080)	-0.123 (0.076)
Muslim majority	-1.257* (0.757)	-0.957 (0.709)	-0.739 (0.806)	-1.108 (0.717)	-1.117 (0.691)
No religious majority	-0.028 (0.552)	0.227 (0.542)	0.123 (0.621)	0.027 (0.539)	0.126 (0.524)
GDP per capita	0.343* (0.208)	0.438* (0.229)	0.450* (0.259)	0.320 (0.223)	0.333* (0.200)
Constant	-2.972* (1.684)	-3.432* (1.768)	-4.278** (2.076)	-2.830 (1.882)	-2.804* (1.640)
Log likelihood	-171.705	-170.939	-169.380	-171.009	-171.532
Number of observations	493	493	492	492	493
Number of countries	29	29	29	29	29

Note: Random effects logistic regression. Dependent variable is woman's appointment to high prestige cabinet post. Independent variables are lagged. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Appendix J. Women's Economic Policy Portfolio Appointments

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Coverture index	-1.896*	-1.942*	-2.106**	-2.056**	-2.152**
	(1.021)	(1.002)	(1.001)	(1.006)	(0.994)
Former British colony	0.711				
	(0.805)				
Polygamy legal		0.859			
		(0.745)			
Constitutional nondiscrimination			-0.070		
			(0.607)		
Foreign aid				-0.025	
				(0.022)	
Postconflict years					0.044
					(0.045)
Number of women in cabinet	0.804***	0.797***	0.797***	0.799***	0.799***
	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.167)	(0.165)
Women's share of legislature	0.144***	0.150***	0.145***	0.143***	0.142***
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Level of democracy	0.174***	0.173***	0.183***	0.188***	0.178***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Government share of legislature	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.005	0.005
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Socialist regime duration	0.005	0.008	0.011	0.008	0.013
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Politicized ethnic groups	0.036	0.064	0.075	0.053	0.068
	(0.121)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.113)
Muslim majority	-0.347	-0.693	-0.627	-0.644	-0.519
	(1.050)	(1.013)	(1.029)	(1.016)	(1.014)
No religious majority	0.311	0.032	0.126	0.134	0.080
	(0.842)	(0.820)	(0.824)	(0.816)	(0.811)
GDP per capita	-0.165	-0.215	-0.158	-0.243	-0.140
	(0.265)	(0.287)	(0.263)	(0.305)	(0.253)
Constant	-2.988	-2.924	-2.808	-1.946	-3.149
	(2.194)	(2.292)	(2.211)	(2.510)	(2.145)
Log likelihood	-168.496	-168.206	-168.878	-167.916	-168.412
Number of observations	493	493	492	492	493
Number of countries	29	29	29	29	29

Note: Random effects logistic regression. Dependent variable is woman's appointment to economic portfolio. Independent variables are lagged. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.