

# Borders : Social Interaction and Economic and Political Integration of the East African Community

Constantine Manda \*      Josie Knowles †      John Connors ‡

Stephen Mwombela §

November 23, 2014

## Abstract

We use an original dataset that matches distance to Tanzania’s neighboring countries with Afrobarometer survey respondents’ locations at the ward level to empirically test a social interaction or contact theory of people’s attitudes towards political and economic integration through the proposed federation of East African states. We find suggestive evidence of effects of one’s distance to borders of Tanzania’s East African neighboring countries on respondents’ knowledge and approval of various aspects of the proposed East African federation. We find stronger evidence of effects of one’s distance to borders of Tanzania’s East African neighboring countries on respondents’ thoughts on whether the proposed federation will improve the availability of jobs, markets and trading opportunities, control of corruption, strengthening of democracy, and control of prices of key commodities. We also find suggestive evidence that our effects may not just be specific to proximity to borders of Tanzania’s East African neighbors but also to borders of Tanzania’s southern African neighbors, suggesting that Tanzanians who live closer to these southern African neighbors see the proposed East African federation adversely affecting them. Further research is required to better inform policy makers on how social interaction or contact between nationals of the five member states of the East African Community (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi) helps to shape attitudes of people toward greater political and economic integration.

---

\*Corresponding author. We would like to thank REPOA for providing funding for this work and the Afrobarometer for data used in this paper. All errors remain our own. Experimental Interventions, Twaweza, 127 Mafinga Road, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. E-mail: cmanda@twaweza.org. Telephone: +255 713 762675.

†PhD candidate, School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy, Queens University Belfast. E-Mail: jknowles03@qub.ac.uk

‡PhD candidate, School of Geographical Sciences and Urban Planning, Arizona State University. E-Mail: johnpconnors@asu.edu

§Assistant Researcher, REPOA. E-Mail: smwombela@repoa.or.tz

# 1 Introduction

East Africans continue to enjoy close ties with their respective East African neighbors. The formalization of this shared history through eventual political integration into a single federation is already underway through the East African Community (EAC 1999). In this Community, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda already have a unitary customs union; are moving toward a single currency (the East African shilling); and eventually a single political state. This future Federation of East Africa or United States of East Africa, at 1.82 million square kilometers, will be the third largest African nation (and 17th largest in the world) by area;<sup>1</sup> with 135.4 million people, the second largest African population (and the 10th largest population in the world), behind Nigeria; and finally, at USD 85 billion, the 7th richest African economy, behind Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, among others, but ahead of Ethiopia, the DRC, Mozambique, among many others (EAC 2014). Given that the mandate for political integration of these EAC states rests on its citizens through a referendum, understanding East African citizens' perceptions toward East African integration is very important.

In particular, we focus on explaining Tanzanians' opinions on East African integration because Tanzania is among the original three EAC member states<sup>2</sup>, is the EAC's largest country by area and population (and second largest by economic size), and is the only member state to border all other EAC member states. Recently, Tanzania has also been criticized by the other member states of slowing down the integration process, although the Tanzanian government continues to reaffirm its commitment to that process that will see Tanzanians vote for or against integration through a national referendum (Oginga 2013).

---

<sup>1</sup>Please note that the Democratic Republic of Congo, at 2.3 million square kilometers and Sudan, at 1.9 million square kilometers, are larger. Please note that if South Sudan joins the EAC (Please see (EAC 2013)), the total area of the EAC would be 2.142 million square kilometers, making it the second largest country in the continent, behind the DRC.

<sup>2</sup>The others include Kenya and Uganda who originally made up the EAC before its dissolution in 1977 (EAC 2014).

In trying to explain support or rejection of East African integration by Tanzanians, we propose social interaction as a channel. We situate our analysis within intergroup contact theory and argue that a corollary is that border proximity to an ‘out-group’ should have an effect on perceptions of that group. The theory is agnostic about the direction of the effect as it may lead to more positive perceptions of that group, since contact only occurs in close proximity (Medrano 2003; Kuhn 2012). This implies that more contact or interaction should lead to familiarity and greater feelings of social proximity, and thus positive relationships (Henrikson 2000; Newman 2003; Mirwaldt 2010; Gravelle 2014). This would predict that the closer Tanzanians live (and interact) to their East African neighbors, the more likely they will support East African integration.<sup>3</sup> On the contrary, Blalock (1967) suggests that in some cases, increased contact between groups perpetuates competition for resources, for example, land, employment or natural resources. This would predict that the closer Tanzanians live (and interact) with their East African neighbors, the more likely they will *reject* East African integration. The effect of more or less social interaction, thus, does not unambiguously predict Tanzanians’ support or rejection of East African integration. Social interaction’s effect on Tanzanians’ attitudes toward integration is thus an empirical question.

We use the distance of survey respondents from round 5 of the Afrobarometer survey (2012) to the nearest EAC member border (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda)<sup>4</sup> as an instrument for social interaction and estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS)

---

<sup>3</sup>We also acknowledge that there may be other factors that are correlated with greater interaction besides distance to the border, such as living in urban areas, which is why we control for this, among other factors, in our empirical analysis. Another important factor could be perceptions of greater economic benefits or positive perceptions that are inherent given many ethnicities residing near borders have been split by arbitrary colonial borders that still exist today, this is why we also control for perceptions of neighborly trust, among other variables. Although perceptions do not feature prominently in our main empirical analysis we nevertheless acknowledge that they may also be important, independent of social interaction.

<sup>4</sup>These are Euclidian straight-line distances at the ward level of each respondent, and not road distance. We compiled these distance data using geocodes provided by the National Bureau of Statistics, the same sampling frame that the Afrobarometer uses to sample its respondents, and queried Google for straight-line Euclidean distances to border crossings, whose longitude and latitude coordinates were retrieved from the EAC website.

regression of several outcome variables on the distance to the border. Ideally, we would have used two-stage-least squares, with the first stage being a regression of a variable capturing social interaction on the distance to the border, and the second stage being a regression of these outcome variables on social interaction. Unfortunately, the survey data does not ask respondents whether they have interacted with any EAC citizens and we are thus left to estimate the reduced-form relationship between distance to the border and our outcome variables.

We find that Tanzanians who live closer to other EAC member state borders are 2.2 percentage points and 2.1 percentage points, for every 100 kilometers (km) one lives close to the East African neighboring borders, *more* likely to know about the proposed unitary government and monetary union, respectively. These effects are both statistically significant at the 10 percent level of significance. When asked whether they approve of various aspects of the proposed EAC federation, Tanzanians living near the EAC borders were more likely to approve of various aspects including the free movement of people, goods and services (half of a percentage point more likely per 100 km distance to the borders); monetary union (one-fifth of a percentage point more likely per 100 km distance to the borders); unitary government (1.4 percentage points more likely per 100 km distance to the borders); among others, however only the effect on the approval of the common East African passport (1.7 percentage points more likely per 100 km distance to the border) was statistically significant at the 10 percent level of significance.

When asked whether they think the proposed federation of East African states would make the availability of jobs; availability of markets and trading opportunities; control of corruption; strengthening of democracy; and control of prices of key commodities, Tanzanians who live near the EAC borders were more likely to think that the proposed East African federation would make these latter things better by 3.7 percentage points; 2.8 percentage points; 3.1 percentage points; 4.1 percentage points; and 3.6 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders, respectively. These effects are statistically

between 10 percent and 5 percent levels of significance.

There were no effects on the knowledge of the proposed federation on Tanzanians who live closer to non-EAC member state borders (Congolese, Zambian, Mozambican, and Malawian borders), providing a placebo result to our findings. We find, however, suggestive evidence of an *internationalism* effect on the approval and improvement variables, whereby Tanzanians living near non-EAC borders, specifically those living near Southern African Development Community (SADC) borders are less likely to think things will get better with the introduction of the proposed East African federation.

The contribution of this paper is threefold:

1. The explanation of Tanzanians' opinions toward integration for policy makers to be informed ahead of the future national referendum.
2. The empirical test, through innovative methods, of the social interaction theory as it pertains to positive or negative responses by individuals and finally,
3. The extrapolation of our findings to other contexts such as Europeans' opinions of European integration as mitigated by social interaction.

## 2 Background

A glance through history highlights that the people and countries of East Africa have traditionally been bound by commonalities: colonial heritage, cross-border affinities, common culture and language. Extensive migration and barter trade was a feature of economic and social life that predated colonization (Ogalo 2010; Miguel 2004). A longstanding indigenous pattern of (informal) cross-border trade has continued to thrive in the borderlands of East African nation-states. In today's East African Community (EAC), cross-border trade is 'lauded for expanding economic opportunities that draw from regional advantages' (Khadiagala 2010, p. 275). Nonetheless, East African pub-

lic opinion has importance beyond borderland areas. In particular, it matters for the achievement of the political integration of the East African Community. Renewed interests in East African regional integration arrangements have been heightened over the last decade in response to the global economic climate. The current EAC framework accentuates a move away from elite-driven development (a strategy of previous failed East African integration efforts) towards a process which is ‘people-centered’ (EAC 1999). A referendum mechanism has been highlighted in this regard, to gain citizen consent of political federation: ‘a public referendum in the three partner states would appear the most natural policy choice’ (Wako 2004). While mobilization of a ballot vote is yet to occur, citizens are to be directly consulted to legitimize the EAC’s future political agenda, underlining the importance of an investigation of citizen support.

Even though debate over the EAC is paramount in partner states, literature on attitudes towards East African regional integration is extremely limited. It is commonplace to acknowledge the occurrence of East African migration, cross border trade and personal travel and building on this observation, this paper will consider a borders perspective on understanding attitudes to the EAC. More specifically, an important question this paper seeks to answer is how does the effect of spatial proximity shape attitudes towards the political and economic integration of the EAC?

The paper is organized as follows: in the following section (Section 3) we will first review existing borders literature, highlighting the unique development of East African borderlands. Research hypotheses will be advanced which directly link perceptions of borders with attitudes towards the political federation of the EAC. Next, border proximity will be considered (Section 4). Classic literature in social psychology and international relations generates expectations that proximity to a border influences political behavior. Then the data to be utilized will be introduced, namely the Afrobarometer (Tanzania, 2012) and merged spatial data (Section 5). After that the empirical specifications and results will be presented (Section 6). Penultimately, we will explore heterogeneity and

robustness of our results and also discuss the limitations of our analysis (Section 7). Finally, a conclusion will follow to suggest the impact of our findings for future work (Section 8).

### **3 Borders literature, East African borders and attitudes towards the East African Community**

The study of borders and their contemporary significance has received growing attention in cross-disciplinary research. Borders have traditionally been understood as physical barriers, separating lines between territorial spaces. While this notion remains at the forefront for geographers, there has been a general trend towards understanding borders as a process, rather than borders as a physical and static construct per se (Newman 2003, 2006). Territory and borders have their own internal political dynamics, creating social, economic and political change in their own right, as well as a physical outcome as a result of decision making. This allows for an analysis of an increasingly ‘borderless’ world, where there has been a gradual fluidity and permeability in cross-border relations. The role of trans-boundary regions of the European Union and positive cross-border interactions has been a prominent topic in this regard (Mirwaldt 2010; Kuhn 2012).

The ‘borderless’ world trajectory, however, is only one spatial interpretation upon which borders can be understood. The events of September 11th, 2001 in the United States of America, have brought a paradigm shift of the study of borders: attention has been relocated to the processes through which borders can be more rigidly controlled. To illustrate, the two borders of the United States (US), with Mexico and Canada, have been securitized, making it much more difficult to enter US territory (Gravelle 2014). The construction of borders is also evident for means of security, for example, as with the case of the *separation fence* between Israel and Palestine (Newman 2006).

Thus borders can be understood as a process on two contrasting trajectories, in terms of invisibility, permeability and coexistence between respective groups, or in terms of a barrier of separation and security. But arguably underlying both borders processes is the reality that ‘borders reflect the nature of power relations and the ability of one group to determine the lines of separation or to remove them, contingent on the political environment at any time’ (Newman 2006, p. 147).

The influence of power relations on border processes is particularly prominent in Eastern Africa. Modern borders in Eastern Africa reflect intricate compromises by colonial and post-colonial leaders to moderate populations and achieve growth within specific boundaries. Yet, while post-colonial years saw a gradual acceptance of inherited boundaries as ‘barriers’ of security, East African regional organizations have increasingly been drawn upon to manage border problems and influence border permeability. In this sense, similar to ‘Western-centric’ borders literature, there are two dominating spatial understandings of borders in post-colonial Eastern Africa— borders of security and borders of prosperity (Khadiagala 2010). Each will be explored in turn to suggest implications for understanding attitudes to political federation in East Africa.

Khadiagala (2010, p. 275) suggests that borders in Eastern Africa are perceived as a ‘frontier of insecurity’ in regions inhabited by pastoralists and nomadic groups where state authorities have attempted to maintain law and order ‘on the cheap’. Following the creation of colonial boundaries, cartographers exerted considerable efforts to create cross-border economic programs of resource sharing, yet, borderland areas have been considerably marginalized during the post-colonial period. Borderland areas were linked to political and economic centers by military and security means, ‘to rein in the waywardness of pastoral existence’ (Khadiagala 2010, p. 273). Declining state authority in post-independence years, however, has paralleled increasing inter-ethnic conflicts in periphery regions over particular resources, particularly land. In addition to the ‘new scramble’ for natural resources, cattle rustling, drug trafficking, human trafficking, gun



smuggling and auto theft all feature in the economy of the borderlands (Okumu 2010), underlining that border security has been a central factor of border relations over the years.

Declining state authority in Eastern Africa has also inherently brought regional organizations to the fore to improve regional stability and economic growth. Regional arrangements of governance have been perceived as an ‘automatic’ extension of Eastern Africa’s shared history, geography and landscape. Ironically, among the reasons for a previous failed attempt towards an East African Community (1967-1977), concerns of sovereignty loss in the newly independent nation-states of East Africa were paramount (Mangachi 2011; Kimbugwe et al. 2012). Nonetheless, the reformation of the East African Community in its present form promises borders that are less politically rigid and more permeable to trade and exchange. State authorities (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) have recognized the economic potential underlying a regional approach, progressively committing to market-orientated economic policies (Kimbugwe et al. 2012).

Khadiagala (2010, p. 275) suggests that on the basis of regional integration efforts, ‘borderlands of prosperity are emerging in peripheral regions of intense economic and social interactions that build on cultural and geographic proximities’. It is apparent that progress of the East African Community has certainly been met by challenges— internal political tension in Kenya has stalled economic progress, Tanzanian commitments to an open market are thwarted by lingering socialist ideologies, cross-border tensions in the Great Lakes have affected Uganda’s original enthusiasm towards the EAC and further, the poor maintenance of infrastructure across the region has increased transaction costs substantially. Nonetheless, optimism remains. The East African Business Council (EABC) has been established to promote cross-border trade and investment, the private sector have been actively involved in the generation of regional policy and further, informal cross-border trade remains a major sector of the economy, contribut-

ing an important source of employment and income generation (Kimbugwe et al. 2012; Ogalo 2010).

Thus the East African interpretation of borders as means of security or economic prosperity implicates two hypotheses concerning citizens' attitudes of further East African regional integration:

1. Citizens who think that the EAC will improve matters of cross-national conflict support the political federation of the EAC.
2. Citizens who think that the EAC will improve the availability of jobs, markets and trading opportunities support the political federation of the EAC.

## **4 Border proximity and attitudes towards the East African Community**

This paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to use one's distance to the border as an instrument for socio-economic and political interaction to explain the effect of this on political perceptions. Distance is an oft-used instrument in economics, but seldom used in political science or other social sciences. Peri (2012) uses the distance to the Mexican-American border as an instrument for immigrant flow in identifying and estimating the effect of immigration on labor productivity. Others have used one's distance to the nearest college as an instrument for education in identifying and estimating education's effect on earnings (Card 1993), while others still have used one's distance to slave markets as an instrument for slavery in identifying and estimating the effect of slavery on economic development (Nunn 2008).

Advancing expectations linking perceptions of border processes with attitudes towards East African integration is relatively straight forward; however, generating hypotheses regarding an individual's proximity to an East African border and their stance

on East African regional integration is somewhat more problematic. Nonetheless, a review of European and American social science literatures provides a firm basis to advance expectations. Such analysis makes it evident that proximity to a border is most often utilized in the social sciences (as a proxy measure) to represent different social processes, i.e. economic exchange or cross-cultural interaction (Kuhn 2012; Medrano 2003; Gravelle 2014). Proximity to a border is understood as a contextual and locational indicator in explaining political behavior since depending on where one resides in this regard influences the political information to which they are exposed.

Cross-border interactions between border populations in Europe and America (and thus spatial analyses) have been drawn upon to provide a key reason for improved perceptions of ‘the other’ and good neighborly relations (Henrikson 2000; Newman 2003; Mirwaldt 2010; Gravelle 2014). Socio-psychological ‘contact theory’ is identified to provide reasoning for this. The main contention of the theory highlights that communication enables a means towards tolerance and favorable attitudes between different groups. Allport (1979)’s seminal study on prejudice mainly focused on the psychology of race relations in North America, but his rationale has implications for understanding group relations more generally, including perceptions of groups with different nationalities. If information is postulated as a beneficial influence on people’s perceptions, two groups on either side of a border might differ in culture, language and norms, but interaction enables increased knowledge and resulting positive exchange. A corollary of intergroup contact theory is that border proximity, and proximity to an ‘out-group’ should lead to more positive perceptions of that group, since contact only occurs in close proximity (Medrano 2003; Kuhn 2012).

In an analysis specifying the relationship between cross-border interaction and attitudes towards regional integration, Karl Deutsch’s perspective of international integration is particularly prominent and reinforces intergroup contact theory expectations. Deutsch (1954)’s advanced that international integration generates a ‘security commu-

nity', in which a sense of community and 'we' feeling is key. In his vision of the processes underlying a security community, contact, communication and exchange between respective nationalities are essential. Consequently, as summarized by Gravelle (2014, p. 8), 'personal contact, cross-border mobility and economic linkages are all seen as key to developing a sense of community between political units'. Importantly for this paper, Gravelle (2014) further stresses that the density of social processes are location dependent, diminishing with distance between groups. Therefore, when advancing expectations regarding attitudes towards the East African Community, a sense of 'we' feeling is a likely result of proximity to a border, where there is more extensive positive general group contact, resulting in more pro-EAC perspectives among border-residents.

It would undoubtedly be naïve to attribute positive relations between groups with all types of inter-group contact. An alternative 'intergroup competition' hypothesis has been advanced by Blalock (1967) to account for more negative other-group impressions. Blalock suggests that in some cases, increased contact between groups perpetuates competition for resources, for example, land, employments or natural resources. Owing to the density of cross-border interactions in Eastern Africa, however, which have pre-dated the colonial period, and have overshadowed most areas of ethnic-conflict and competition for resources in the current period, this paper will keep with the rationale of intergroup contact theory. It is plausible to suggest that proximity to the border of an EAC partner state increases the salience of the relationship between EAC partner states, increases the likelihood of interaction with out-groups from the borderlands of other partner states, and thus increases support for further East African integration.

Alternatively, further distance from an EAC border diminishes the salience of ties with other EAC partner states, diminishes the possibility of inter-group contact and suggests support for closer ties with the nation-state rather than the wider regional integration movement. A citizen who resides close to the border of an EAC partner state (relative to their compatriots who live elsewhere) is more likely to support East

African Federation. In addition to a direct relationship between border proximity (more cross-border contact) and positive EAC attitudes, it is likely that border proximity may amplify the effects of existing political sentiments on attitudes towards further regional integration (Gravelle 2014).

Border proximity increases the salience of EAC relations and contributes to positive EAC attitudes, relative to compatriots living elsewhere. When specifically exploring attitudes towards the EAC, border proximity is also likely to increase the effect of other positive predictors. Moreover, citizens who think that the EAC will improve matters of cross-national conflict support the political federation of the EAC, particularly those residing near a border with another EAC partner state. Citizens who think that the EAC will improve the availability of jobs, markets and trading opportunities support the political federation of the EAC, particularly those residing near a border with another EAC partner state.

## **5 Data and Descriptive Statistics**

### **5.1 Data**

The respondent data comes from round 5 of the Afrobarometer survey conducted in Tanzania in 2012. Afrobarometer surveys measure social, political and economic atmosphere of about 33 African countries (Afrobarometer 2012). Afrobarometer is not affiliated with any political party and is an independent research project. The Afrobarometer Tanzania survey is implemented by REPOA, which is a Tanzanian independent research institution which conducts high quality research, provides training, and informs policy for development (REPOA 2014).

The survey employs a rigorous but simple random sampling strategy at each level of sampling. Samples are designed to be nationally representative of the voting age population, so that each adult citizen has an equal chance of being selected for an




Figure 1: Distance from Dodoma to Various Border Crossings

interview. Individuals living in institutionalized settings are usually excluded, such as students in dormitories, patients in hospitals and incarcerated individuals. The dataset that this paper employs has a margin of sampling error of no more than plus or minus 2 percent at the 95 percent confidence level. The data is stratified at the regional level. Districts are then randomly selected, and interviewers then randomly select households and randomly select a respondent within the households. In many ways, Afrobarometer’s sampling strategy allows the data to be viewed largely as self-weighting, however we still used the survey sampling weights to ensure that our results are nationally representative. The data consists of 2,400 randomly selected households across 111 districts, in 26 regions of Tanzania.

The distance to the borders data is an original dataset compiled by the authors through automatically querying Google maps to calculate straight-line Euclidean distances from each ward in Tanzania to the various border crossings in all of Tanzania’s

borders. Geo-coordinates of the border crossings used included those listed in the EAC website. These distances were then matched with the ward names of the Afrobarometer sample using STATA's *soundex* command that creates alpha-numeric variables that correspond to the syllabic signature of each ward name. Figure 1 shows the mapping exercise for a respondent in the central ward in Dodoma Urban district in the country's capital and their corresponding distances to all of Tanzania's border crossings. The two datasets—the Afrobarometer and the distance data— were then merged to provide an 82 percent match of the households within the Afrobarometer data. The remaining 18 percent attrited households do not differ on outcome variables as well as the key explanatory variables.<sup>5</sup> Please note that road-distances would have provided more variation but this data provides for more missing values given the difficulty Google maps experiences when trying to locate every ward in Tanzania. Although, we would have preferred to have used road-distances, given the incompleteness of a road-distance dataset, we are unable to use such data at this time.

## 5.2 Descriptive Statistics

We begin with a few descriptive statistics of the data presented in Tables 9.1-9.2. Table 9.1 presents the mean distances, along with corresponding standard deviations, of the typical respondent in the dataset to each of the different borders. The typical respondent is a little of 615 kilometers from the EAC border, and more than 712 kilometers from the SADC border. The typical respondent is also a little less than 490 kilometers away from the Kenyan border, but as far as 780 kilometers from the Malawian border. Table 9.2 presents the mean and standard deviations of our explanatory variables. The typical respondent is 39 years old and her highest education is having completed primary school. There is an equal percentage of males and females, while a little over 31 percent of respondents reside in urban areas. The typical respondent gets her news from the

---

<sup>5</sup>Results of this exercise not shown but available upon request.




Figure 2: Availability of Jobs

radio about a few times a week; from the T.V. and newspapers less than once a month; and almost never from the internet. The typical respondent also agrees that she is proud to be called a Tanzanian, while she *somewhat* trusts her neighbors.

When respondents were asked whether they thought the federation of East African states would make various aspects of Tanzanian lives better or worse they had differing feelings.

Figure 2 shows that although 42 percent of respondents responded that the proposed East African federation would make the availability of jobs better, another 37 percent thought otherwise. Figure 3, meanwhile, shows that about twice as many respondents thought that the proposed East African federation would improve the availability of markets and trading opportunities. Figure 4, on the other hand, shows that almost 40





Figure 3: Availability of Markets and Trading Opportunities




Figure 4: Control of Corruption

percent of respondents thought that the proposed East African federation would make the control of corruption *worse* outnumbering those that thought otherwise (33 percent). For brevity we do not present all the figures here but we append them to the end of this document for further details.<sup>6</sup>

## 6 Empirical Specifications and Results

### 6.1 Specification

To test whether distance to the border, as a proxy for social interaction, explains variations in self-reported knowledge about, approval of, and perception of improvements of the proposed integration of East Africa, we run OLS regressions of three different sets of outcome variables.

The first set includes what we call our *knowledge* variables. These variables report responses to Afrobarometer’s question, Q80A-TAN, which asks— *How much of the following aspects of the proposed federation of the East African States have you heard about?* The question asks specifically about knowledge on:

1. A1. The formation of a unitary government for Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.
2. A2. The formation of a joint army.
3. A3. The establishment of a joint parliament.
4. A4. Having a single president.
5. A5. A common economic union.

---

<sup>6</sup>Twaweza, through its *Sauti za Wananchi* mobile phone survey has found similar results. They find that most Tanzanians have largely favorable views toward the East African Community (EAC). Although there are parallels with their questioning, it is important to note that most of their questions targeted perceptions on the EAC rather than a proposed East African Federation, and also our analysis looks not just at baseline levels of support but trying to understand the variation of support within Tanzania.

All responses are coded 1 for those who respond that they know *Nothing/Have not heard anything*; 2 for those who respond that they know *Just a little*; 3 for those who respond that they *Somewhat* know; 4 for those who respond that they know *A lot*; 9 for those who *Don't know*. Please note that, unless stated otherwise, all analysis does not include responses of *Don't know* in all outcome as well as explanatory variables. These are coded as missing.<sup>7</sup>

The second set includes what we call our *approval* variables. These variables report responses to Afrobarometer's question, Q80B-TAN, which asks— *The proposed East African Federation has a number of different aspects. Please tell me if you approve or disapprove of each of the following aspects of the proposed integration, or haven't you heard enough to say?*. The question asks specifically about approval on:

1. B1. The free movement of people, goods and services.
2. B2. Customs union, that is, creation of a uniform regime of taxes and rates.
3. B3. Monetary union, that is, formation of a single East African currency.
4. B4. Creation of a common East African passport.
5. B5. Formation of a joint army.
6. B6. Formation of a unitary government, including having one East African parliament and president.

All responses are coded 1 for those who respond that they *Strongly Disapprove*; 2 for those who respond that they *Disapprove*; 3 for those who respond that they *Approve*; 4 for those who respond that they *Strongly Approve*; 9 for those who *Don't know/I Haven't heard enough*. Once again, *Don't know/I Haven't heard enough* responses are coded as missing.

---

<sup>7</sup>Analysis on all outcome variables used in this paper rejects the hypothesis for statistical differences between respondents who respond that they *Don't know* and those that do not. Respondents who report that they *Don't know* are also a negligible percentage of respondents for all variables used.

The third, and final set includes what we call our *improvement* variables. These variables report responses to Afrobarometer’s question, Q80C-TAN, which asks— *In your opinion, do you think the full federation of East African States would make the following things better or worse for Tanzanians?*. The question asks specifically about improvements on:

1. C1. Availability of jobs.
2. C2. Availability of markets and trading opportunities.
3. C3. Management of national and cross-national conflicts.
4. C4. Control of corruption.
5. C5. Strengthening of democracy.
6. C6. Control of prices of key commodities.

All responses are coded 1 for those who respond that they think things will be *Much worse*; 2 for those who respond that they think things will be *Worse*; 3 for those who respond that they think things will be the *Same*; 4 for those who respond that they think things will be *Better*; 5 for those who respond that they think things will be *Much better*; 9 for those who *Don’t know/I Haven’t heard enough*. Once again, *Don’t know/I Haven’t heard enough* responses are coded as missing.

Ideally, we would have used distance to the border as an instrument for *social interaction* as it explains the different outcome variables on EAC integration through a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. The identifying assumption is that distance to the border provides exogenous variation in social interaction among respondents in the Afrobarometer survey. In the absence of a *social interaction* variable, we instead focus on the reduced-form impact of proximity to other EAC citizens on several outcome

variables on EAC integration.<sup>8</sup>

The specification is presented below in equation (1) for the  $i$ th household in the  $r$ th ward in the  $d$ th district controlling for whether one resides in an urban area,  $\gamma_{ird}^u$ , socioeconomic controls,  $\omega_{ird}^s$ , news source controls,  $\tau_{ird}^w$ , and finally, pride and trust controls,  $\alpha_{ird}^p$ .<sup>9</sup> Finally,  $\epsilon_{ird}$  is an idiosyncratic error term.

$$EAC_{ird}^k = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Distance + \gamma_{ird}^u + \sum_{s=1}^S \beta^s \omega_{ird}^s + \sum_{w=1}^W \beta^w \tau_{ird}^w + \sum_{p=1}^P \beta^p \alpha_{ird}^p + \epsilon_{ird} \quad (1)$$

where  $EAC_{ird}^k$  is the outcome for the  $k$ th variable that includes our *knowledge*, *approval*, and *improvement* variables. *Distance* is the average Euclidean straight-line distance of the  $i$ th household to the EAC border crossings.<sup>10</sup>

Recall that the identifying assumption is that distance to the border provides exogenous variation in social interaction among respondents in the Afrobarometer survey and that the reduced-form estimates from equation (1) will identify the impact of proximity to other EAC citizens on several outcome variables on EAC integration. In particular, we are agnostic about specifying the direction of the effect of proximity and instead theorize an ambiguous effect so that  $\beta_1$  can either be positive or negative, but not zero.

---

<sup>8</sup>Miguel (2005) also employs this identification strategy where he does not have access to the endogenous variable and instead focuses on the reduced-form impact of his exogenous variable on the outcome variable.

<sup>9</sup>Urban area control is a dummy variable equal to one if a respondent resides in an urban enumeration area. Socioeconomic controls include the respondent's age, sex, religion, highest education level, employment status, and ethnicity. News source controls include the respondent's source of news, including radio, T.V., newspapers, and internet sources. Pride and trust controls include dummy variables that measure the respondent's national pride (see Q85C in the AB data for further details) and their trust of their neighbors (see Q88B in the AB data for further details).

<sup>10</sup>This variable is calculated first as the mean of the different border crossings from Tanzanian into Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. These are then further averaged into a singular mean distance of each household to what we call the *EAC* borders.

## 6.2 Results

Main results are presented in Tables 9.3-9.5. Table 9.3 presents results of the effect of border proximity on the knowledge of the proposed federation of East African states, while Table 9.4 presents results of the effect of border proximity on the approval of various aspects of the proposed federation of East African states. Finally, Table 9.5 presents results of the effect of border proximity on the opinions of improvement of various aspects of the proposed federation of East African states. All regressions are ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions. Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9) and (11) present a parsimonious version of equation (1) that includes no controls, while columns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10) and (12) include all controls—location, socio-economic, news source, nationalism, and trust controls.

In Table 9.3, the coefficient,  $\beta_1$ , is negative in all columns except columns (5-7). The negative sign implies that as a respondent lives closer to the EAC borders, the more likely they are to know about different aspects of the proposed federation of East African states. In particular, people who live close the EAC borders are more likely to know about the proposed unitary government (2.2 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders), joint army (1.04 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders), and economic union (2.1 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders). The coefficient,  $\beta_1$ , is positive in the parsimonious version in column (7) but negative when all controls are included in column (8). People who live close to the EAC borders are less likely to know about the proposed joint parliament, but coefficients are not statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level of significance. The coefficient,  $\beta_1$ , in all columns is not statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level except in column (2), whose outcome is knowledge on the proposed unitary government, and column (10), whose outcome is knowledge on the proposed economic union.

In Table 9.4, the coefficient,  $\beta_1$ , is negative in all columns except column (10). Once again, the negative sign implies that as a respondent lives closer to the EAC borders,

the more likely they are to approve of different aspects of the proposed federation of East African states. In particular, people who live close to the EAC borders are more likely to approve of the proposed free movement of people, goods, and services (half of a percentage point per 100 km distance to the borders); customs union (half of a percentage point per 100 km distance to the borders); monetary union (one-fifth of a percentage point per 100 km distance to the borders); common East African passport (1.3 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders); joint army (one-fifth of a percentage point per 100 km distance to the borders); and unitary government (four-fifths of a percentage point per 100 km distance to the borders). The coefficient,  $\beta_1$ , is positive, however, in the full version in column (10) on the approval of the joint army, with full controls. The coefficient,  $\beta_1$ , in all columns is not statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level except in column (7), whose outcome is approval on the proposed common East African passport (1.2 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders).

In Table 9.5, the coefficient is negative in all columns. Once again, the negative sign implies that as a respondent lives closer to the EAC borders, the more likely they are to think that different aspects of the proposed federation of East African states will make things better for Tanzanians. In particular, people who live closer to the EAC borders are more likely to think the availability of jobs (3.7 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders); markets and trading opportunities (2.8 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders); management of national and cross-national conflicts (2.1 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders); control of corruption (3.1 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders); strengthening of democracy (4.1 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders); and control of prices of key commodities (3.6 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders) will be better under the proposed East African federation. The coefficient,  $\beta_1$ , is statistically significant in all outcomes except the management of conflicts. These are presented in



columns (1), (2), (4), and (8-12) at the 10 percent level, but as high as the 5 percent level in columns (1-2) and (9-10). A possible explanation for the null result on the management of national and cross-national conflicts is that given Tanzania continues to enjoy peaceful relations with other countries and each other, conflicts are not a salient issue for many Tanzanian respondents. A similar analysis may yield different results for Kenyan respondents, where experience of national and cross-national conflict is more common.

## 7 Heterogeneity, Robustness and Limitations

### 7.1 Heterogeneity

We estimate the main specification from equation (1) using disaggregated distances to the borders of the other member East African states—Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. The following specification is estimated:

$$EAC_{ird}^k = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DistanceKenya + \beta_2 DistanceUganda + \beta_3 DistanceRwanda + \beta_4 DistanceBurundi + \gamma_{ird}^u + \sum_{s=1}^S \beta^s \omega_{ird}^s + \sum_{w=1}^W \beta^w \tau_{ird}^w + \sum_{p=1}^P \beta^p \alpha_{ird}^p + \epsilon_{ird} \quad (2)$$

where, once again,  $EAC_{ird}^k$  is the outcome for the  $k$ th variable that includes our *knowledge*, *approval*, and *improvement* variables. *DistanceCountry* is the average Euclidean straight-line distance of the  $i$ th household to the border of each of the four remaining EAC countries.<sup>11</sup>

Main results are presented in Tables 9.6-9.8. Table 9.6 presents results of the effect of border proximity on the knowledge of the proposed federation of East African states, while Table 9.7 presents results of the effect of border proximity on the approval of

---

<sup>11</sup>These distance variables are the mean of the different border crossings from Tanzania into Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi.

various aspects of the proposed federation of East African states. Finally, Table 9.8 presents results of the effect of border proximity on the opinions of improvement of various aspects of the proposed federation of East African states. All regressions are ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions. Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9) and (11) present a parsimonious version of equation (2) that includes no controls, while columns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10) and (12) include all controls—location, socio-economic, news source, nationalism, and trust controls.

In Table 9.6, the coefficient,  $\beta_1$ , is negative in all columns. Once again, the negative sign implies that as a respondent lives closer to the Kenyan border, the more likely they are to know about different aspects of the proposed federation of East African states. In particular, people who live closer to the Kenyan border are more likely to know about the proposed unitary government (as much as 4.1 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders), joint army (as much as 3.2 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders), joint parliament (as much as 4.5 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders), single presidency (as much as 1.8 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders), and economic union (as much as 5.4 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders). The coefficient,  $\beta_1$ , is statistically significant only for the effect on knowledge about the joint parliament at the 10 percent level of significance (column 5) and knowledge about the proposed economic union at the 5 percent level of significance (columns 9-10). Other significant border effects, besides Kenya, are in columns (9-10). Here the coefficient,  $\beta_2$ , which is the effect of living closer to the Ugandan border on the knowledge of the proposed economic union is statistically significant at the 5 percent level and is positive. The positive sign means that a respondent who lives closer to the Ugandan border is less likely to know (as much as 32.3 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders) about the proposed economic union. Finally, on the same columns (9-10), the coefficient,  $\beta_3$  is negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level of significance. This negative sign means that a respondent who lives

closer to the Rwandan border is more likely to know (as much as 40 percentage points per 100 km distance to the borders) about the proposed economic union.

In Table 9.7, none of the relevant coefficients are statistically significant at 10 percent level of significance. The coefficient,  $\beta_1$ , is positive in all columns except columns (4, 7-8). Once again, the positive sign implies that a respondent who lives closer to the Kenyan border, is less likely to approve of the free movement of people, goods, and services; customs union; monetary union; common East African passport; joint army; and unitary government. The coefficient,  $\beta_2$ , however, is negative in all columns except columns (2-4). This negative sign implies that a respondent who lives close to the Ugandan border, is more likely to approve of the monetary union; common East African passport; joint army; and unitary government. Coefficients on the Rwandan ( $\beta_3$ ) and Burundian ( $\beta_4$ ) borders are mostly negative and positive, respectively.

In Table 9.8, coefficients on the Kenyan border ( $\beta_1$ ) and Burundian border ( $\beta_4$ ) in columns (3-4) are the only ones that are statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level of significance. All are positive, implying that a respondent who lives closer to the Kenyan border or Burundian border thinks the availability of markets and trading opportunities are made worse by the proposed federation of East African states by as much as 7 percentage points per 100 km distance to the border and as much as 21 percentage points per 100 km distance to the border, respectively. The result on the Kenyan border coefficient can largely be interpreted as a *Kenyaphobia*, however the Burundi coefficient is slightly puzzling given there has been no rhetoric on Tanzanians fearing economic competition from Burundi. One way to understand this could be that because the Tanzanian border crossings to Burundi also often double as crossings into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), it could be that Tanzanians who interact and trade with Congolese may see the proposed East African Federation as adversely affecting them. This result, as we shall see, is universal across all Tanzanians who live close to borders of Tanzania's non-EAC countries. Tanzanians who live closer to the Kenyan border also

think the management of national and cross-national conflicts; and control of corruption will become worse under the proposed federation, although these effects are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level of significance. Alternatively, respondents who live closer to the Ugandan border think the availability of jobs; management of conflicts; and strengthening of democracy are made worse by the proposed federation of East African states, although these effects are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level of significance.

## 7.2 Robustness

One possible threat to our identification comes from the fact that Tanzanians who live in urban areas will be more likely to interact with people from Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, independent of their distance to these countries' borders. Alternatively, these urban areas could be correlated with the distance to the borders in ways that can misidentify distance's effects on attitudes of people on the proposed East African federation. To account for this, note that we include a dummy variable that equals one when a respondent resides in an urban enumeration area.

Another possible threat to our identification comes from the idea that other variables that may be correlated with the distance to the borders that may be omitted from our specifications because they are either unobservable or simply omitted by our framework but explain attitudes of people on the various aspects of the proposed East African federation. Note that in all specifications, we include variables for respondents' age, sex, religion, highest education achieved, ethnicity, news sources, national pride and trust on their neighbors. The latter two variables are important to ensure that our distance variables are not simply capturing people's baseline national pride and inherent trust for neighbors. In short, our distance variables capture the effect of social interaction, through the distance to the borders, irrespective of national pride and trust for one's neighbors.

Finally, another possible concern is that it may be that our analysis is simply capturing an *internationalism* effect, rather than any specific East African effect. Specifically, it could be that Tanzanians living next to any border would have had similar effects. In order to explore this *internationalism* effect, we run a placebo test with our main specification from equation (1) only this time we include only distances to borders of non-East African countries—Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, Mozambique, and Malawi.

On the impact of living closer to any of these non-East African borders on our *knowledge* variables, we find no statistically significant effects.<sup>12</sup> Recall that in our main analysis, we find statistically significant effects on respondents' knowledge of the proposed unitary government and economic union.

On the impact of living closer to any of these non-East African borders on our *approval* variables, we find that people who live near the non-East African borders are less likely to approve of the proposed monetary union. This is contrary to the effect we find in our main specification where the only statistically significant result is on the approval of the common passport. There is thus, suggestive, but inconsistent evidence of an internationalism effect on one of our approval variables.

On the impact of living closer to any of these non-East African borders on our *improvement* variables, we find the strongest evidence that people who live near the non-EAC borders are also affected by interacting with foreigners. We find statistically significant effects on respondents' thoughts on whether the proposed East African federation will make availability of jobs; markets and trading opportunities; strengthening of democracy; and control of prices of key commodities better or worse. In particular, contrary to the effect we find with the proximity to EAC borders, proximity to non-EAC borders makes respondents more likely to think that the proposed federation will make availability of jobs; markets and trading opportunities; strengthening of democracy; and

---

<sup>12</sup>Results of these placebo tests are not shown but available upon request.

control of prices of key commodities *worse*. Given that these other non-EAC borders happen to also be a part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), it may be a reflection of people’s concerns that Tanzania strengthening ties to East African neighbors means less ties with its southern (SADC) neighbors. Respondents living closer to these SADC countries see this relative pivot towards East Africa as a zero-sum economic game where people living closer to EAC borders benefit, while those who live near SADC borders lose.

### 7.3 Limitations

Although this paper is the first to use actual distances to the border to measure the effects of social interaction on political and economic attitudes, the lack of a social interaction variable means that our analysis only estimates the reduced-form of the structural equation. Our distance variable also only measures straight-line Euclidean distances, rather than road distances, which would have provided for more variation of one’s probability of interacting with a national from one of the EAC member states. We also could not match all of the Afrobarometer respondents, although there is no evidence of differential attrition with regard to our main outcome variables. Better data collection on the distances would enable future analysis to better match respondents to distances and provide a more comprehensive picture, although all of our analysis includes survey weights so that, in so far as there was no differential attrition, our analysis provides a nationally representative estimate of social interaction’s effects on our main outcome variables.

## 8 Conclusion

Using unique original data on the straight-line Euclidean distance to the borders of Tanzania’s neighbors across its ward locations; matching this data to the most recent

Afrobarometer survey data for Tanzania, we were able to test a social interaction theory of the motivations for political and economic integration by Tanzanians. Our work situates itself within the larger economic and political scientific literature that tries to understand how people's attitudes evolve with more or less interaction with other non-native people.

Our analysis provides suggestive evidence to the idea that social interaction among people of different nations can provide negative or positive motivations to integrate, politically or economically. Our paper informs policy makers across the world who aim to improve positive attitudes towards political integration from the European Union to greater integration of the Latin American states. As global economic and political forces drive states to integrate their polities and economies, our research serves as a rigorous first approximation of the role that social interaction plays in shaping people's attitudes about their international neighbors.

## References

- Afrobarometer (2012). Accessed July 14th, 2014.
- Allport, G. W. (1979). *The nature of prejudice*. Basic books.
- Blalock, H. M. (1967). *Towards a Theory of Minority-Group Relations*. Capricorn Books.
- Bratton, M. (2013). *Voting and democratic citizenship in Africa*.
- Card, D. (1993). Using geographic variation in college proximity to estimate the return to schooling. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Deutsch, K. W. (1954). *Political community at the international level: Problems of definition and measurement*. ECKO House Publishing.
- EAC (1999). Treaty establishing the east african community (teeac). Accessed: June 4th, 2014.
- EAC (2013, October). High level negotiations with south sudan to join the community set for 7-8 november in arusha. Accessed: June 5th, 2014.
- EAC (2014). Eac quick facts. Accessed: June 5th, 2014.
- Gravelle, T. B. (2014). Partisanship, border proximity, and canadian attitudes toward north american integration. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, edu006.
- Henrikson, A. K. (2000). Facing across borders: the diplomacy of bon voisinage. *International Political Science Review* 21(2), 121–147.
- Katera, L. (2009, February). Citizens' views on the east african federation: A tanzanian perspective. *REPOA Briefing Paper* 54.
- Khadiagala, G. M. (2010). Boundaries in eastern africa. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 4(2), 266–278.
- Kimbugwe, K., N. Perdakis, M. Yeung, and W. Kerr (2012). Economic development through regional trade.
- Kuhn, T. (2012). Europa ante portas: Border residence, transnational interaction and euroscepticism in germany and france. *European Union Politics* 13(1), 94–117.
- Lwaitama, A., J. Kasombo, and K. Mkumbo (2013, April). A synthesis research report on the participation of citizens in the east african community integration process. *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES)*.
- Mangachi, M. W. (2011). *Regional Integration in Africa: East African Experience*. Safari Books Limited.



- Markaki, Y. and S. Longhi (2013). What determines attitudes to immigration in european countries? an analysis at the regional level. *Migration Studies* 1(3), 311–337.
- Medrano, J. D. (2003). *Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom*. Princeton University Press.
- Miguel, E. (2004). Tribe or nation? *World Politics* 56, 327–362.
- Miguel, E. (2005). Poverty and witch killing. *The Review of Economic Studies* 72(4), 1153–1172.
- Mirwaldt, K. (2010). Contact, conflict and geography: What factors shape cross-border citizen relations? *Political geography* 29(8), 434–443.
- Newman, D. (2003). On borders and power: A theoretical framework. *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 18(1), 13–25.
- Newman, D. (2006). The lines that continue to separate us: borders in ourborderless' world. *Progress in Human Geography* 30(2), 143–161.
- Nunn, N. (2008). The long-term effects of africa's slave trades. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(1), 139–176.
- Ogalo, V. (2010). Informal cross-border trade in eac: Implications for regional integration and development. *Research Paper: CUTS Geneva Resource Centre*.
- Oginga, B. (2013, November). President jakaya kikwete says tanzania is concerned about land, immigration, employment and acceleration of political federation. Accessed: June 5th, 2014.
- Okumu, W. (2010). Resources and border disputes in eastern africa. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 4(2), 279–297.
- Peri, G. (2012). The effect of immigration on productivity: Evidence from us states. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 94(1), 348–358.
- REPOA (2014). Accessed July 14th, 2014.
- Wako, A. (2004, November). East african community: Report of the committee on fast tracking east african federation. *East African Community Secretariat*.

## 9 Tables

### 9.1 Descriptive Statistics: Distance

Distance to the Border	
Distance to the EAC Borders	615,053 (274,127)
Distance to the SADC Borders	712,305 (137,644)
Distance to the Kenyan Border	489,655 (210,355)
Distance to the Ugandan Border	701,438 (343,658)
Distance to the Rwandan Border	629,561 (335,375)
Distance to the Burundian Border	639,557 (303,878)
Distance to the Congolese Border	653,147 (254,933)
Distance to the Zambian Border	677,485 (202,997)
Distance to the Malawian Border	780,782 (300,964)
Distance to the Mozambican Border	737,807 (244,782)
Observations	1,954

Notes:

1. Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses.
2. Distances are straight-line Euclidean distances in metres.
3. Minimum observations reported.

## 9.2 Descriptive Statistics: Explanatory Variables

Explanatory Variables	
Urban	0.3139 (0.464)
Age	39.4 (30.998)
Male	0.503 (0.50)
Religion	27.2 (404.652)
Highest Education	3.011 (1.383)
Ethnicity	1073.104 (730.675)
News from Radio	2.97 (1.446)
News from TV	1.333 (1.617)
News from Newspaper	0.963 (1.362)
News from Internet	0.295 (0.856)
National Pride	4.313 (1.355)
Trust Neighbors	2.186 (0.769)
Observations	2,292

Notes:

1. Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses.
2. Minimum observations reported.

### 9.3 Results: Knowledge

How much of the following aspects of the proposed federation of the East African States have you heard about?

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Unitary Government	Unitary Government	Joint Army	Joint Army	Joint Parliament	Joint Parliament	Single President	Single President	Economic Union	Economic Union
Distance from EAC Border	-0.00000144 (0.000000125)	-0.00000218* (0.000000123)	-0.00000103 (9.95e-08)	-0.00000104 (0.000000103)	0.000000771 (0.000000119)	0.000000434 (0.000000127)	0.000000806 (0.000000104)	-0.00000103 (0.000000108)	-0.00000172 (0.000000104)	-0.00000210* (0.000000109)
Urban		0.0912 (0.0722)		-0.0592 (0.0684)		0.00119 (0.0825)		0.0204 (0.0747)		0.0522 (0.0812)
Age		0.000438 (0.00106)		-0.000814 (0.000660)		0.000463 (0.00107)		-0.000457 (0.000628)		0.000233 (0.000867)
Male		0.379*** (0.0515)		0.295*** (0.0438)		0.395*** (0.0552)		0.233*** (0.0468)		0.498*** (0.0468)
Religion		0.0000836*** (0.0000108)		0.000127*** (0.0000100)		0.000210*** (0.0000115)		0.000131*** (0.00000970)		0.000121*** (0.00000940)
Highest Education		0.154*** (0.0231)		0.0638*** (0.0238)		0.155*** (0.0247)		0.0931*** (0.0253)		0.148*** (0.0261)
Have Income Job <sup>13</sup>										
Ethnicity		-0.0000126 (0.0000462)		-0.0000449 (0.0000413)		-0.0000937* (0.0000477)		-0.0000234 (0.0000443)		-0.0000927** (0.0000445)
News from Radio		0.0139 (0.0196)		0.0212 (0.0182)		0.0201 (0.0225)		-0.000433 (0.0178)		0.0203 (0.0215)
News from TV		-0.0437* (0.0250)		-0.0156 (0.0286)		-0.0136 (0.0288)		-0.0279 (0.0236)		-0.0000807 (0.0283)
News from Newspaper		0.0503 (0.0313)		0.0601* (0.0327)		0.0297 (0.0330)		0.0767** (0.0332)		-0.0105 (0.0287)
News from Internet		0.0146 (0.0400)		0.00522 (0.0328)		0.0145 (0.0370)		-0.00291 (0.0369)		-0.0000838 (0.0393)
National Pride		-0.0174 (0.0240)		-0.0448** (0.0216)		-0.0495* (0.0254)		-0.0231 (0.0222)		-0.0273 (0.0221)
Trust Neighbors		0.0129 (0.0348)		-0.0270 (0.0372)		0.0627* (0.0370)		-0.00670 (0.0363)		0.0389 (0.0367)
Constant	2.455*** (0.0892)	1.819*** (0.183)	1.817*** (0.0708)	1.731*** (0.165)	2.105*** (0.0856)	1.550*** (0.196)	1.751*** (0.0760)	1.479*** (0.164)	2.258*** (0.0769)	1.641*** (0.185)
Mean of Dependent Variable	2.365848	2.365169	2.365848	2.365169	1.753827	1.762639	2.153228	2.169094	1.701445	1.700952
Observations	1876	1713	1867	1705	1869	1707	1868	1705	1870	1707
R-Squared	0.00131	0.0877	0.000842	0.0563	0.000365	0.0941	0.000530	0.0545	0.00183	0.105
F Statistic	1.327	23.00	1.066	67.17	0.423	149.8	0.597	120.3	2.711	46.96

Notes:

1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
2. \*\*\* 1% level of confidence.
3. \*\* 5% level of confidence.
4. \* 10% level of confidence.
5. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 are OLS regressions with no controls.
6. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 are OLS regressions with location, socio-economic, news source, nationalism, and trust controls.
7. Location controls include urban-rural location of the enumeration area for each respondent.
8. Socio-economic controls include age, gender, religion, education, employment, and ethnicity of the respondent.
9. News source controls include radio, TV, newspaper, and internet as sources of news of the respondent.
10. Nationalism controls include only the level of national pride of respondent.
11. Trust controls include only the trust a respondent has on their neighbors.
12. Column (9) the p-value on Distance from EAC Border, at 0.101, is marginally insignificant at 10 percent level of confidence.
13. *Have Income Job* drops off in all regressions because of collinearity.



## 9.4 Results: Approval

The proposed East African Federation has a number of different aspects.  
Please tell me if you approve or disapprove of each of the following aspects of the proposed integration, or havent you heard enough to say?

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Free Movement	Free Movement	Customs Union	Customs Union	Monetary Union	Monetary Union	Common Passport	Common Passport	Joint Army	Joint Army	Unitary Government	Unitary Government
Distance from EAC Border	-0.000000405 (0.000000102)	-0.000000466 (0.000000107)	-0.000000003 (0.000000105)	-0.000000005 (0.000000112)	-0.000000004 (0.000000104)	-0.000000016 (0.000000104)	-0.000000132 (0.000000101)	-0.000000132 (0.000000101)	-0.000000136 (0.000000119)	-0.000000002 (0.000000115)	-0.000000000 (0.000000115)	-0.000000008 (0.000000114)
Urban	0.0641 (0.0724)	0.0641 (0.0724)	0.0641 (0.0724)	-0.0387 (0.0720)	-0.0387 (0.0720)	-0.117 (0.0731)	-0.0278 (0.0710)	-0.0278 (0.0710)	-0.154* (0.0805)	-0.154* (0.0805)	-0.000000000 (0.000000136)	-0.122 (0.0788)
Age	-0.000211 (0.000271)	-0.000211 (0.000271)	-0.000211 (0.000271)	-0.000899 (0.000756)	-0.000899 (0.000756)	-0.00110 (0.000751)	-0.00149** (0.000636)	-0.00149** (0.000636)	-0.00076** (0.000636)	-0.00076** (0.000636)	-0.000000000 (0.000000136)	-0.00150 (0.00126)
Male	0.224*** (0.0459)	0.224*** (0.0459)	0.224*** (0.0459)	0.134*** (0.0504)	0.134*** (0.0504)	0.117** (0.0516)	0.193*** (0.0463)	0.193*** (0.0463)	0.146*** (0.0554)	0.146*** (0.0554)	0.000000000 (0.000000136)	0.122** (0.0534)
Religion	0.000122*** (0.00000918)	0.000122*** (0.00000918)	0.000122*** (0.00000918)	-0.000154*** (0.0000103)	-0.000154*** (0.0000103)	-0.0000476*** (0.0000065)	-0.000064*** (0.0000073)	-0.000064*** (0.0000073)	-0.000123*** (0.0000115)	-0.000123*** (0.0000115)	0.000000000 (0.000000136)	0.0000147 (0.00000966)
Highest Education	0.0443** (0.0205)	0.0443** (0.0205)	0.0443** (0.0205)	0.0301 (0.0252)	0.0301 (0.0252)	0.0278 (0.0256)	0.0278 (0.0256)	0.0278 (0.0256)	0.00978 (0.0269)	0.00978 (0.0269)	0.000000000 (0.000000136)	0.0349 (0.0266)
Have Income Job <sup>12</sup>												
Ethnicity	0.0000102 (0.0000432)	0.0000102 (0.0000432)	0.0000102 (0.0000432)	-0.0000854** (0.0000387)	-0.0000854** (0.0000387)	-0.0000416 (0.0000383)	-0.0000867* (0.0000461)	-0.0000867* (0.0000461)	-0.0000248 (0.0000390)	-0.0000248 (0.0000390)	0.000000000 (0.000000136)	-0.0000342 (0.0000403)
News from Radio	-0.0188 (0.0230)	-0.0188 (0.0230)	-0.0188 (0.0230)	-0.0235 (0.0199)	-0.0235 (0.0199)	-0.0348* (0.0200)	-0.0255 (0.0219)	-0.0255 (0.0219)	-0.0574** (0.0248)	-0.0574** (0.0248)	0.000000000 (0.000000136)	-0.0533** (0.0254)
News from TV	0.00508 (0.0219)	0.00508 (0.0219)	0.00508 (0.0219)	0.0305 (0.0229)	0.0305 (0.0229)	0.0256 (0.0231)	-0.0120 (0.0231)	-0.0120 (0.0231)	0.00189 (0.0261)	0.00189 (0.0261)	0.000000000 (0.000000136)	0.00973 (0.0260)
News from Newspaper	-0.0429 (0.0291)	-0.0429 (0.0291)	-0.0429 (0.0291)	-0.0470 (0.0289)	-0.0470 (0.0289)	-0.0411 (0.0301)	-0.0525** (0.0292)	-0.0525** (0.0292)	0.0273 (0.0307)	0.0273 (0.0307)	0.000000000 (0.000000136)	-0.0362 (0.0307)
News from Internet	-0.0409 (0.0333)	-0.0409 (0.0333)	-0.0409 (0.0333)	-0.06947 (0.0302)	-0.06947 (0.0302)	-0.0277 (0.0335)	-0.0141 (0.0324)	-0.0141 (0.0324)	-0.0668 (0.0371)	-0.0668 (0.0371)	0.000000000 (0.000000136)	-0.0225 (0.0332)
National Pride	0.0787*** (0.0228)	0.0787*** (0.0228)	0.0787*** (0.0228)	0.00298 (0.0233)	0.00298 (0.0233)	0.0055 (0.0257)	0.0683*** (0.0219)	0.0683*** (0.0219)	-0.00810 (0.0259)	-0.00810 (0.0259)	0.000000000 (0.000000136)	-0.00826 (0.0239)
Trust Neighbors	0.0399 (0.0338)	0.0399 (0.0338)	0.0399 (0.0338)	0.00910 (0.0385)	0.00910 (0.0385)	0.0167 (0.0393)	0.0303 (0.0361)	0.0303 (0.0361)	0.00444 (0.0409)	0.00444 (0.0409)	0.000000000 (0.000000136)	0.0598 (0.0393)
Constant	2.455*** (0.0892)	2.492*** (0.183)	2.729*** (0.0750)	2.765*** (0.194)	2.744*** (0.0806)	2.649*** (0.193)	3.077*** (0.0704)	2.813*** (0.170)	2.566*** (0.0877)	2.509*** (0.196)	2.223*** (0.0825)	2.255*** (0.186)
Mean of Dependent Variable	2.365848	2.365169	2.365848	2.365169	1.753827	1.762639	2.153228	2.169094	1.701445	1.700932	2.151998	2.163844
Observations	1801	1644	1781	1624	1792	1635	1792	1635	1794	1637	1791	1634
R-Squared	0.000145	0.0413	0.0000892	0.0167	0.0000988	0.0174	0.00218	0.0433	0.000167	0.0179	0.00127	0.0216
F Statistic	0.159	62.49	0.105	182.3	0.131	24.89	2.754	51.05	0.191	58.50	1.396	2.434

Notes:

1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
2. \*\*\* 1% level of confidence.
3. \*\* 5% level of confidence.
4. \* 10% level of confidence.
5. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 are OLS regressions with no controls.
6. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 are OLS regressions with location, socio-economic, news source, nationalism, and trust controls.
7. Location controls include urban-rural location of the enumeration area for each respondent.
8. Socio-economic controls include age, gender, religion, education, employment, and ethnicity of the respondent.
9. News source controls include radio, TV, newspaper, and internet as sources of news of the respondent.
10. Nationalism controls include only the level of national pride of respondent.
11. Trust controls include only the trust a respondent has on their neighbors.
12. *Have Income Job* drops off in all regressions because of collinearity.
13. Coefficient on Distance from EAC Border in Column 8 is statistically insignificant with p-value = 0.192.

## 9.5 Results: Improvement

In your opinion, do you think the full federation of East African States would make the following things better or worse for Tanzanians?

	(1) Jobs	(2) Jobs	(3) Markets	(4) Markets	(5) Conflicts	(6) Conflicts	(7) Corruption	(8) Corruption	(9) Democracy	(10) Democracy	(11) Prices	(12) Prices
Distance from EAC Border	-0.00000349** (0.000000164)	-0.00000374** (0.000000172)	-0.00000230 (0.000000145)	-0.00000252* (0.000000152)	-0.00000212 (0.000000172)	-0.00000248 (0.000000155)	-0.00000313* (0.000000163)	-0.00000358** (0.000000147)	-0.00000408** (0.000000160)	-0.00000300* (0.000000176)	-0.00000359* (0.000000186)	
Urban		0.0919 (0.117)	0.146 (0.108)	0.146 (0.108)	0.0938 (0.110)	0.0255 (0.106)	0.0255 (0.106)	0.0255 (0.106)	0.117 (0.109)	0.152 (0.122)	0.152 (0.122)	
Age		-0.00380** (0.00149)	-0.00244*** (0.000746)	-0.00244*** (0.000746)	-0.00335*** (0.00117)	-0.00275** (0.00116)	-0.00275** (0.00116)	-0.00275** (0.00116)	-0.00288** (0.00112)	-0.00293** (0.00119)	-0.00293** (0.00119)	
Male		0.0787 (0.0709)	0.243*** (0.0672)	0.243*** (0.0672)	0.153** (0.0669)	0.199*** (0.0625)	0.199*** (0.0625)	0.199*** (0.0625)	0.207*** (0.0651)	0.216*** (0.0668)	0.216*** (0.0668)	
Religion		-0.0000820*** (0.0000152)	0.000185*** (0.0000151)	0.000185*** (0.0000151)	-0.0000832*** (0.0000147)	0.0000232* (0.0000122)	0.0000232* (0.0000122)	0.0000232* (0.0000122)	0.000106*** (0.0000129)	0.000106*** (0.0000144)	0.000106*** (0.0000144)	
Highest Education		-0.0354 (0.0358)	-0.00142 (0.0298)	-0.00142 (0.0298)	0.0342 (0.0319)	-0.0320 (0.0328)	-0.0320 (0.0328)	-0.0320 (0.0328)	0.0192 (0.0317)	0.0158 (0.0346)	0.0158 (0.0346)	
Have Income Job12												
Ethnicity		-0.0000969* (0.0000564)	-0.0000313 (0.0000591)	-0.0000313 (0.0000591)	-0.0000108 (0.0000598)	-0.0000864 (0.0000577)	-0.0000864 (0.0000577)	-0.0000864 (0.0000577)	-0.0000914* (0.0000550)	-0.000110* (0.0000565)	-0.000110* (0.0000565)	
News from Radio		-0.0392 (0.0363)	-0.0585** (0.0287)	-0.0585** (0.0287)	-0.100*** (0.0285)	-0.0837** (0.0344)	-0.0837** (0.0344)	-0.0837** (0.0344)	-0.120*** (0.0268)	-0.103*** (0.0292)	-0.103*** (0.0292)	
News from TV		-0.0398 (0.0389)	-0.0258 (0.0316)	-0.0258 (0.0316)	-0.0661** (0.0315)	-0.0278 (0.0344)	-0.0278 (0.0344)	-0.0278 (0.0344)	-0.0398 (0.0329)	-0.0471 (0.0335)	-0.0471 (0.0335)	
News from Newspaper		-0.0595 (0.0421)	-0.0622* (0.0358)	-0.0622* (0.0358)	-0.0253 (0.0344)	0.0114 (0.0368)	0.0114 (0.0368)	0.0114 (0.0368)	-0.0190 (0.0383)	-0.0251 (0.0388)	-0.0251 (0.0388)	
News from Internet		-0.0134 (0.0422)	-0.0760* (0.0406)	-0.0760* (0.0406)	-0.0381 (0.0391)	-0.0498 (0.0411)	-0.0498 (0.0411)	-0.0498 (0.0411)	-0.0399 (0.0409)	-0.0262 (0.0428)	-0.0262 (0.0428)	
National Pride		-0.0192 (0.0346)	0.0621** (0.0293)	0.0621** (0.0293)	0.0237 (0.0310)	-0.0554 (0.0347)	-0.0554 (0.0347)	-0.0554 (0.0347)	0.00267 (0.0337)	-0.0119 (0.0335)	-0.0119 (0.0335)	
Trust Neighbors		0.0561 (0.0547)	0.0856* (0.0494)	0.0856* (0.0494)	0.115** (0.0489)	-0.0125 (0.0489)	-0.0125 (0.0489)	-0.0125 (0.0489)	0.0429 (0.0490)	0.0957* (0.0491)	0.0957* (0.0491)	
Constant	3.244*** (0.111)	3.766*** (0.273)	3.666*** (0.0977)	3.511*** (0.225)	3.346*** (0.119)	3.393*** (0.242)	3.003*** (0.103)	3.813*** (0.232)	3.420*** (0.101)	3.378*** (0.245)	3.378*** (0.248)	3.696*** (0.248)
Mean of Dependent Variable	3.028113	3.057219	3.523535	3.547596	3.233279	3.26115	2.849529	2.880511	3.198291	3.227448	3.192326	3.214174
Observations	1793	1639	1794	1638	1735	1588	1781	1625	1790	1633	1792	1636
R-Squared	0.00445	0.0268	0.00243	0.0426	0.00153	0.0451	0.00263	0.0263	0.00561	0.0412	0.00366	0.0369
F Statistic	4.553	26.95	2.517	38.84	1.165	37.97	2.566	4.011	5.950	19.16	2.916	14.13

Notes:

1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
2. \*\*\* 1% level of confidence.
3. \*\* 5% level of confidence.
4. \* 10% level of confidence.
5. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 are OLS regressions with no controls.
6. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 are OLS regressions with location, socio-economic, news source, nationalism, and trust controls.
7. Location controls include urban-rural location of the enumeration area for each respondent.
8. Socio-economic controls include age, gender, religion, education, employment, and ethnicity of the respondent.
9. News source controls include radio, TV, newspaper, and internet as sources of news of the respondent.
10. Nationalism controls include only the level of national pride of respondent.
11. Trust controls include only the trust a respondent has on their neighbors.
12. *Have Income Job* drops off in all regressions because of collinearity.

## 9.6 Heterogeneity: Knowledge

How much of the following aspects of the proposed federation of the East African States have you heard about?

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Unitary Government	Unitary Government	Joint Army	Joint Army	Joint Parliament	Joint Parliament	Single President	Single President	Economic Union	Economic Union
Distance from Kenyan Border	-0.00000409 (0.00000260)	-0.00000374 (0.00000227)	-0.00000332 (0.00000217)	-0.00000211 (0.00000203)	-0.00000447* (0.00000257)	-0.00000376 (0.00000244)	-0.00000176 (0.00000220)	-0.00000042 (0.00000206)	-0.00000538** (0.00000252)	-0.00000513** (0.00000227)
Distance from Ugandan Border	0.00000132 (0.00000177)	0.00000174 (0.00000141)	0.00000322 (0.00000143)	0.00000092 (0.00000141)	0.00000121 (0.00000154)	0.00000876 (0.00000155)	0.00000377 (0.00000140)	0.00000058 (0.00000133)	0.00000323** (0.00000145)	0.00000305** (0.00000125)
Distance from Rwandan Border	-0.00000195 (0.00000248)	-0.00000267 (0.00000208)	0.00000275 (0.00000225)	0.00000553 (0.00000222)	-0.00000127 (0.00000226)	-0.00000091 (0.00000227)	-0.000000193 (0.00000201)	0.00000069 (0.00000201)	-0.00000398* (0.00000210)	-0.00000362* (0.00000187)
Distance from Burundian Border	0.000000748 (0.000000974)	0.000000995 (0.000000899)	-0.000000646 (0.00000102)	-0.000000651 (0.00000101)	0.000000319 (0.00000095)	0.000000232 (0.000000976)	-0.000000219 (0.000000961)	-0.000000250 (0.000000886)	0.000000854 (0.000000919)	0.000000600 (0.000000850)
Urban	0.0857 (0.0713)	0.0857 (0.0679)	-0.00000089 (0.0812)	-0.00000089 (0.0812)	-0.00445 (0.0812)	-0.00445 (0.0812)	0.0227 (0.0807)	0.0227 (0.0807)	0.0523 (0.0807)	0.0523 (0.0807)
Age	0.000411 (0.00102)	0.000411 (0.00102)	-0.000796 (0.000661)	-0.000796 (0.000661)	0.000458 (0.00103)	0.000458 (0.00103)	-0.000452 (0.000623)	-0.000452 (0.000623)	0.000202 (0.000837)	0.000202 (0.000837)
Male	0.378*** (0.0514)	0.378*** (0.0514)	0.295*** (0.0437)	0.295*** (0.0437)	0.396*** (0.0550)	0.396*** (0.0550)	0.233*** (0.0468)	0.233*** (0.0468)	0.497*** (0.0462)	0.497*** (0.0462)
Religion	0.0000766*** (0.00000120)	0.0000766*** (0.00000120)	0.000125*** (0.00000110)	0.000125*** (0.00000110)	0.000201*** (0.0000128)	0.000201*** (0.0000128)	0.000134*** (0.0000108)	0.000134*** (0.0000108)	0.000120*** (0.0000113)	0.000120*** (0.0000113)
Highest Education	0.154*** (0.0230)	0.154*** (0.0230)	0.0628*** (0.0233)	0.0628*** (0.0233)	0.155*** (0.0244)	0.155*** (0.0244)	0.0926*** (0.0252)	0.0926*** (0.0252)	0.147*** (0.0259)	0.147*** (0.0259)
Have Income Job <sup>13</sup>										
Ethnicity	-0.0000162 (0.0000456)	-0.0000162 (0.0000456)	-0.0000456 (0.0000409)	-0.0000456 (0.0000409)	-0.0000985** (0.0000474)	-0.0000985** (0.0000474)	-0.0000217 (0.0000347)	-0.0000217 (0.0000347)	-0.0000919** (0.0000438)	-0.0000919** (0.0000438)
News from Radio	0.0143 (0.0196)	0.0143 (0.0196)	0.0207 (0.0182)	0.0207 (0.0182)	0.0202 (0.0225)	0.0202 (0.0225)	-0.000654 (0.0178)	-0.000654 (0.0178)	0.0205 (0.0217)	0.0205 (0.0217)
News from TV	-0.0436* (0.0252)	-0.0436* (0.0252)	-0.0167 (0.0285)	-0.0167 (0.0285)	-0.0139 (0.0289)	-0.0139 (0.0289)	-0.0284 (0.0235)	-0.0284 (0.0235)	-0.00192 (0.0281)	-0.00192 (0.0281)
News from Newspaper	0.0490 (0.0313)	0.0490 (0.0313)	0.0601* (0.0328)	0.0601* (0.0328)	0.0282 (0.0331)	0.0282 (0.0331)	0.0779** (0.0334)	0.0779** (0.0334)	-0.0104 (0.0282)	-0.0104 (0.0282)
News from Internet	0.0142 (0.0400)	0.0142 (0.0400)	0.00685 (0.0371)	0.00685 (0.0371)	0.0150 (0.0371)	0.0150 (0.0371)	-0.00218 (0.0367)	-0.00218 (0.0367)	0.00181 (0.0391)	0.00181 (0.0391)
National Pride	-0.0173 (0.0238)	-0.0173 (0.0238)	-0.0439** (0.0214)	-0.0439** (0.0214)	-0.0493* (0.0253)	-0.0493* (0.0253)	-0.0225 (0.0244)	-0.0225 (0.0244)	-0.0245 (0.0219)	-0.0245 (0.0219)
Trust Neighbors	2.388*** (0.205)	2.388*** (0.205)	1.924*** (0.180)	1.924*** (0.180)	2.114*** (0.190)	2.114*** (0.190)	1.784*** (0.181)	1.784*** (0.181)	2.110*** (0.228)	2.110*** (0.228)
Constant	1.696*** (0.237)	1.696*** (0.237)	1.828*** (0.224)	1.828*** (0.224)	1.568*** (0.253)	1.568*** (0.253)	1.490*** (0.171)	1.490*** (0.171)	1.509*** (0.171)	1.509*** (0.171)
Mean of Dependent Variable	2.365848	2.365169	1.753827	1.762639	2.153228	2.169094	1.701445	1.700952	2.151998	2.163844
Observations	1876	1713	1867	1705	1869	1707	1868	1705	1870	1707
R-Squared	0.00460	0.0904	0.0029	0.0575	0.00344	0.0963	0.00109	0.0551	0.00655	0.109
F Statistic	1.386	19.65	0.90	56.49	1.179	124.7	0.334	97.55	2.500	38.78

Notes:

1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
2. \*\*\* 1% level of confidence.
3. \*\* 5% level of confidence.
4. \* 10% level of confidence.
5. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 are OLS regressions with no controls.
6. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 are OLS regressions with location, socio-economic, news source, nationalism, and trust controls.
7. Location controls include urban-rural location of the enumeration area for each respondent.
8. Socio-economic controls include age, gender, religion, education, employment, and ethnicity of the respondent.
9. News source controls include radio, TV, newspaper, and internet as sources of news of the respondent.
10. Nationalism controls include only the level of national pride of respondent.
11. Trust controls include only the trust a respondent has on their neighbors.
12. Columns 1, 2, 3, and 6 the Distance from Kenyan Border coefficient is marginally insignificant with p-values of 0.116, 0.101, 0.142, and 0.124, respectively.
13. *Have Income Job* drops off in all regressions because of collinearity.



## 9.7 Heterogeneity: Approval

The proposed East African Federation has a number of different aspects. Please tell me if you approve or disapprove of each of the following aspects of the proposed integration, or haven't you heard enough to say?

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Free Movement	Free Movement	Customs Union	Customs Union	Monetary Union	Monetary Union	Common Passport	Common Passport	Joint Army	Joint Army	Unitary Government	Unitary Government
Distance from Kenyan Border	0.00000214 (0.00000214)	0.00000175 (0.00000227)	0.00000067 (0.00000248)	-0.00000072 (0.00000259)	0.00000271 (0.00000291)	0.00000180 (0.00000300)	-0.000000389 (0.00000227)	-0.00000194 (0.00000237)	0.000000261 (0.00000323)	0.000000245 (0.00000332)	0.000000314 (0.00000286)	0.000000333 (0.00000299)
Distance from Ugandan Border	-0.00000102 (0.00000105)	0.00000033 (0.00000112)	0.00000112 (0.00000141)	0.00000145 (0.00000138)	-0.000000465 (0.00000132)	-0.00000263 (0.00000130)	-0.000000113 (0.00000151)	-0.00000180 (0.00000146)	-0.00000229 (0.00000178)	-0.00000246 (0.00000172)	-0.00000144 (0.00000155)	-0.00000189 (0.00000151)
Distance from Rwandan Border	-0.000000725 (0.00000154)	-0.000000832 (0.00000167)	-0.00000219 (0.00000203)	-0.00000262 (0.00000201)	-0.000000313 (0.00000189)	-0.00000534 (0.00000189)	-0.000000515 (0.00000225)	-0.00000073 (0.00000219)	0.000000258 (0.00000258)	0.000000282 (0.00000219)	0.000000115 (0.00000219)	0.000000208 (0.00000212)
Distance from Burundian Border	0.000000804 (0.00000700)	0.000000798 (0.00000732)	0.00000113 (0.00000836)	0.00000130 (0.00000836)	0.000000752 (0.00000814)	0.000000831 (0.00000826)	0.000000594 (0.00000836)	0.000000275 (0.00000916)	-0.000000415 (0.0000104)	-0.000000415 (0.0000102)	0.000000094 (0.00000896)	-0.000000401 (0.00000869)
Urban	0.0630 (0.0719)	0.0630 (0.0719)	0.0630 (0.0719)	-0.0295 (0.0717)	0.0630 (0.0717)	-0.120 (0.0733)	0.0630 (0.0717)	0.0635 (0.0794)	-0.158** (0.0797)	-0.158** (0.0797)	0.0630 (0.0794)	-0.121 (0.0785)
Age	-0.000212 (0.000276)	-0.000212 (0.000276)	-0.000212 (0.000276)	-0.000936 (0.000763)	-0.000936 (0.000763)	-0.00113 (0.000747)	-0.00149** (0.000656)	-0.000693** (0.000320)	-0.000693** (0.000320)	-0.000693** (0.000320)	-0.000693** (0.000320)	-0.00150 (0.00118)
Male	0.223*** (0.0462)	0.223*** (0.0462)	0.223*** (0.0503)	0.132*** (0.0503)	0.116** (0.0514)	0.116** (0.0514)	0.194*** (0.0462)	0.147*** (0.0514)	0.147*** (0.0514)	0.147*** (0.0514)	0.147*** (0.0514)	0.122** (0.0535)
Religion	0.000122*** (0.0000107)	0.000122*** (0.0000107)	-0.000157*** (0.0000112)	-0.000157*** (0.0000112)	-0.000157*** (0.0000112)	-0.0000492*** (0.0000112)	-0.0000727*** (0.0000112)	-0.0000727*** (0.0000112)	-0.000127*** (0.0000136)	-0.000127*** (0.0000136)	-0.000127*** (0.0000136)	0.0000175 (0.0000122)
Highest Education	0.0452** (0.0204)	0.0452** (0.0204)	0.0308 (0.0252)	0.0308 (0.0252)	0.0308 (0.0252)	0.0290 (0.0255)	0.0290 (0.0255)	0.0329 (0.0255)	0.0112 (0.0266)	0.0112 (0.0266)	0.0112 (0.0266)	0.0355 (0.0265)
Have Income Job12												
Ethnicity	0.0000112 (0.0000434)	0.0000112 (0.0000434)	-0.0000859** (0.0000385)	-0.0000859** (0.0000385)	-0.0000859** (0.0000385)	-0.0000415 (0.0000382)	-0.0000415 (0.0000382)	-0.0000909** (0.0000454)	-0.0000909** (0.0000454)	-0.0000909** (0.0000454)	-0.0000909** (0.0000454)	-0.0000268 (0.0000404)
News from Radio	-0.0189 (0.0230)	-0.0189 (0.0230)	-0.0229 (0.0199)	-0.0229 (0.0199)	-0.0229 (0.0199)	-0.0351* (0.0197)	-0.0351* (0.0197)	-0.0252 (0.0217)	-0.0252 (0.0217)	-0.0252 (0.0217)	-0.0252 (0.0217)	-0.0542** (0.0254)
News from TV	0.00649 (0.0218)	0.00649 (0.0218)	0.0315 (0.0228)	0.0315 (0.0228)	0.0315 (0.0228)	0.0274 (0.0250)	0.0274 (0.0250)	-0.0111 (0.0259)	0.00372 (0.0231)	0.00372 (0.0231)	0.00372 (0.0231)	0.122** (0.0107)
News from Newspaper	-0.0428 (0.0291)	-0.0428 (0.0291)	-0.0476* (0.0288)	-0.0476* (0.0288)	-0.0412 (0.0291)	-0.0412 (0.0291)	-0.0412 (0.0291)	-0.0541** (0.0269)	0.0267 (0.0269)	0.0267 (0.0269)	0.0267 (0.0269)	-0.0352 (0.0309)
News from Internet	-0.0430 (0.0337)	-0.0430 (0.0337)	-0.0111 (0.0303)	-0.0111 (0.0303)	-0.0392 (0.0337)	-0.0392 (0.0337)	-0.0151 (0.0323)	-0.0588 (0.0380)	0.0065 (0.0380)	0.0065 (0.0380)	0.0065 (0.0380)	-0.0239 (0.0337)
National Pride	0.0774*** (0.0226)	0.0774*** (0.0226)	0.0241 (0.0234)	0.0241 (0.0234)	0.0241 (0.0234)	0.0336 (0.0292)	0.0336 (0.0292)	0.0668*** (0.0221)	-0.109 (0.0261)	-0.109 (0.0261)	-0.109 (0.0261)	-0.06958 (0.0269)
Trust Neighbors	0.0364 (0.0340)	0.0364 (0.0340)	0.00663 (0.0391)	0.00663 (0.0391)	0.00663 (0.0391)	0.0132 (0.0400)	0.0132 (0.0400)	0.0310 (0.0364)	0.00326 (0.0409)	0.00326 (0.0409)	0.00326 (0.0409)	0.0577 (0.0398)
Constant	2.952*** (0.137)	2.378*** (0.213)	2.544*** (0.169)	2.581*** (0.237)	2.633*** (0.176)	2.552*** (0.234)	3.017*** (0.172)	2.830*** (0.211)	2.451*** (0.211)	2.451*** (0.211)	2.202*** (0.182)	2.319*** (0.239)
Mean of Dependent Variable	3.055873	3.065684	2.707838	2.717149	2.720817	2.731252	2.975335	2.988967	2.324572	2.335229	2.139096	2.148866
Observations	1801	1644	1781	1624	1792	1635	1792	1635	1794	1637	1791	1634
R-Squared	0.00272	0.0435	0.00168	0.0191	0.00290	0.0202	0.00475	0.0463	0.00342	0.0223	0.00392	0.0238
F Statistic	0.781	54.86	0.564	169.4	0.904	26.38	1.300	44.80	0.795	48.18	1.043	2.164

Notes:

1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
2. \*\*\* 1% level of confidence.
3. \*\* 5% level of confidence.
4. \* 10% level of confidence.
5. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 are OLS regressions with no controls.
6. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 are OLS regressions with location, socio-economic, news source, nationalism, and trust controls.
7. Location controls include urban-rural location of the enumeration area for each respondent.
8. Socio-economic controls include age, gender, religion, education, employment, and ethnicity of the respondent.
9. News source controls include radio, TV, newspaper, and internet as sources of news of the respondent.
10. Nationalism controls include only the level of national pride of respondent.
11. Trust controls include only the trust a respondent has on their neighbors.
12. *Have Income Job* drops off in all regressions because of collinearity.

## 9.8 Heterogeneity: Improvement

In your opinion, do you think the full federation of East African States would make the following things better or worse for Tanzanians?

	(1) Jobs	(2) Jobs	(3) Markets	(4) Markets	(5) Conflicts	(6) Conflicts	(7) Corruption	(8) Corruption	(9) Democracy	(10) Democracy	(11) Prices	(12) Prices
Distance from Kenyan Border	0.00000245 (0.00000349)	-0.000000702 (0.00000364)	0.00000700** (0.00000307)	0.00000532* (0.00000381)	0.00000353 (0.00000378)	0.00000116 (0.00000378)	0.00000241 (0.00000351)	0.00000123 (0.00000341)	-0.000000977 (0.00000311)	-0.00000209 (0.00000322)	0.000000047 (0.00000415)	-0.00000187 (0.00000445)
Distance from Ugandan Border	-0.000000620 (0.00000238)	-0.000000230 (0.00000227)	-0.000000161 (0.00000180)	0.000000177 (0.00000178)	-0.000000668 (0.00000200)	-0.000000714 (0.00000182)	0.00000153 (0.00000247)	0.00000114 (0.00000234)	-0.00000144 (0.00000181)	-0.00000178 (0.00000179)	0.00000104 (0.00000214)	0.000000619 (0.00000221)
Distance from Rwandan Border	-0.000000850 (0.00000342)	-0.000000850 (0.00000335)	-0.000000213 (0.00000265)	-0.000000239 (0.00000266)	-0.000000611 (0.00000281)	-0.000000173 (0.00000259)	-0.000000353 (0.00000352)	-0.00000266 (0.00000341)	0.000000147 (0.00000262)	0.000000214 (0.00000260)	-0.00000283 (0.00000304)	-0.00000185 (0.00000312)
Distance from Burundian Border	0.000000128 (0.00000138)	0.000000125 (0.00000140)	0.00000210* (0.00000114)	0.00000203* (0.00000117)	0.000000116 (0.00000119)	0.000000801 (0.00000115)	0.00000191 (0.00000139)	0.00000136 (0.00000138)	-0.000000273 (0.00000111)	-0.000000642 (0.00000111)	0.00000175 (0.00000128)	0.000000116 (0.00000130)
Urban		0.0836 (0.115)	0.147 (0.107)	0.147 (0.107)	0.0836 (0.110)	0.0891 (0.110)	0.0264 (0.106)	0.0264 (0.106)	0.110 (0.108)	0.110 (0.108)	0.145 (0.122)	0.145 (0.122)
Age		-0.00384** (0.00152)	-0.00252** (0.00152)	-0.00252** (0.00152)	-0.00336** (0.00118)	-0.00336** (0.00118)	-0.00281** (0.00116)	-0.00281** (0.00116)	-0.00286** (0.00113)	-0.00286** (0.00113)	-0.00296** (0.00122)	-0.00296** (0.00122)
Male		0.0792 (0.0713)	0.241*** (0.0679)	0.241*** (0.0679)	0.153** (0.0675)	0.153** (0.0675)	0.197*** (0.0627)	0.197*** (0.0627)	0.209*** (0.0651)	0.209*** (0.0651)	0.215*** (0.0671)	0.215*** (0.0671)
Religion		-0.0000915*** (0.0000173)	0.000191*** (0.0000162)	0.000191*** (0.0000162)	-0.0000877*** (0.0000161)	-0.0000877*** (0.0000161)	0.0000264* (0.0000150)	0.0000264* (0.0000150)	0.0000969*** (0.0000146)	0.0000969*** (0.0000146)	0.0000983*** (0.0000162)	0.0000983*** (0.0000162)
Highest Education		-0.0328 (0.0355)	0.000852 (0.0298)	0.000852 (0.0298)	0.0362 (0.0316)	0.0362 (0.0316)	-0.0310 (0.0327)	-0.0310 (0.0327)	0.0202 (0.0314)	0.0202 (0.0314)	0.0175 (0.0346)	0.0175 (0.0346)
Have Income Job12												
Ethnicity		-0.000100* (0.0000554)	-0.0000260 (0.0000576)	-0.0000260 (0.0000576)	-0.0000127 (0.0000590)	-0.0000127 (0.0000590)	-0.0000835 (0.0000584)	-0.0000835 (0.0000584)	-0.0000969* (0.0000545)	-0.0000969* (0.0000545)	-0.000114** (0.0000557)	-0.000114** (0.0000557)
News from Radio		-0.0391 (0.0356)	-0.0371 (0.0387)	-0.0371 (0.0387)	-0.101*** (0.0288)	-0.101*** (0.0288)	-0.0835** (0.0282)	-0.0835** (0.0282)	-0.120*** (0.0266)	-0.120*** (0.0266)	-0.103*** (0.0293)	-0.103*** (0.0293)
News from TV		0.0525 (0.0548)	0.0525 (0.0548)	0.0525 (0.0548)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0447 (0.0494)	0.0447 (0.0494)	0.0633* (0.0488)	0.0633* (0.0488)
News from Newspaper		0.0525 (0.0548)	0.0525 (0.0548)	0.0525 (0.0548)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0447 (0.0494)	0.0447 (0.0494)	0.0633* (0.0488)	0.0633* (0.0488)
News from Internet		0.0525 (0.0548)	0.0525 (0.0548)	0.0525 (0.0548)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0447 (0.0494)	0.0447 (0.0494)	0.0633* (0.0488)	0.0633* (0.0488)
National Pride		0.0525 (0.0548)	0.0525 (0.0548)	0.0525 (0.0548)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0447 (0.0494)	0.0447 (0.0494)	0.0633* (0.0488)	0.0633* (0.0488)
Trust: Neighbors		0.0525 (0.0548)	0.0525 (0.0548)	0.0525 (0.0548)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0751 (0.0491)	0.0447 (0.0494)	0.0447 (0.0494)	0.0633* (0.0488)	0.0633* (0.0488)
Constant	3.065*** (0.274)	3.649*** (0.363)	3.296*** (0.225)	3.182*** (0.308)	3.174*** (0.248)	3.321*** (0.299)	2.663*** (0.272)	3.572*** (0.321)	3.509*** (0.221)	3.985*** (0.297)	3.125*** (0.259)	3.567*** (0.355)
Mean of Dependent Variable	3.028113	3.057219	3.523535	3.547596	3.233279	3.26115	2.849529	2.880511	3.198291	3.227448	3.192326	3.214174
Observations	1793	1639	1794	1638	1735	1588	1781	1625	1790	1633	1792	1636
R-Squared	0.00863	0.0316	0.0117	0.0499	0.00583	0.0485	0.00572	0.0279	0.00744	0.0437	0.00712	0.0398
F Statistic	2.191	25.01	4.150	34.72	1.012	33.44	1.566	3.253	1.956	16.35	1.674	11.47

Notes:

1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
2. \*\*\* 1% level of confidence.
3. \*\* 5% level of confidence.
4. \* 10% level of confidence.
5. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 are OLS regressions with no controls.
6. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 are OLS regressions with location, socio-economic, news source, nationalism, and trust controls.
7. Location controls include urban-rural location of the enumeration area for each respondent.
8. Socio-economic controls include age, gender, religion, education, employment, and ethnicity of the respondent.
9. News source controls include radio, TV, newspaper, and internet as sources of news of the respondent.
10. Nationalism controls include only the level of national pride of respondent.
11. Trust controls include only the trust a respondent has on their neighbors.
12. *Have Income Job* drops off in all regressions because of collinearity.




Figure 5: Management of National and Cross-National Conflicts




Figure 6: Strengthening of Democracy




Figure 7: Control of Prices of Key Commodities