

Better Together:  
Inclusive Power Sharing and Mutidimensional Conflicts

Chelsea Johnson

Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science

University of California, Berkeley

DRAFT: 12 DECEMBER 2014

PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE

**Abstract:** Theories that focus on signaling and commitment credibility, as well as those on institutional design, suggest that all-inclusive power-sharing settlements are more likely to breakdown where the armed opposition is fractionalized. In contrast, I argue that inclusivity reduces the capacity for insurgents to defect from their commitments to sharing power. The implementation of any power-sharing bargain is likely to generate winners and losers *within* groups, contributing to splintering, and disgruntled elites are more likely to have access to the resources necessary to return to the battlefield where other active insurgencies have been excluded from the peace process. I illustrate this mechanism with an in-depth analysis of two dyadic peace processes in Uganda, both of which resulted in rebel splintering and continued violence. Finally, a cross-national analysis of 238 settlement dyads supports the expectation that inclusive power-sharing settlements are significantly more likely to result in conflict termination.

Recent reports indicate that the number of active militias is proliferating in South Sudan, where conflict in the region has reemerged, and even intensified, despite its recent independence.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is attempting to broker a peace bargain between President Kiir's government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO). While politically expedient, IGAD's decision to focus its mediation on the primary threat to the nascent South Sudanese government—to the exclusion of two dozen other armed groups—has the potential to be counter-productive.

Despite the large variation in the number of belligerent groups fighting in war-afflicted countries, the literature on negotiated settlements generally analyzes peace processes in terms of dyadic bargaining between two groups: the government and a single rebel force (Mason and Fett 1996; Walter 2002; Dal Bo and Powell 2009). The consensus is that a negotiated settlement will emerge when the costs of continued fighting are outweighed by the potential payoffs of a bargain for both parties.<sup>2</sup> However, when more than two warring parties exist, negotiated settlements are less likely to be concluded due to the increased difficulty of reaching consensus on the terms of peace (Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999, 252; Bekoe 2005; Cunningham 2006). Moreover, theories about "spoilers" and "outbidding" suggest that insurgents in multidimensional peace processes use violence strategically in order to increase bargaining power vis-à-vis other groups (Stedman 1997; Kydd and Walter 2006). Despite this growing literature, previous bargaining models have little to say about the behavior of signatory parties in multidimensional conflicts *after* a

---


<sup>1</sup> "Looming Military Offensive in South Sudan," 2014, (International Crisis Group Conflict Alerts, 29 October, [http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/alerts/2014/conflict-alert-looming-military-offensives-in-south-sudan.aspx?utm\\_source=south-sudan-alert&utm\\_medium=view-online&utm\\_campaign=mremail](http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/alerts/2014/conflict-alert-looming-military-offensives-in-south-sudan.aspx?utm_source=south-sudan-alert&utm_medium=view-online&utm_campaign=mremail).)

<sup>2</sup> See also Zartman (1993) on the concept of a "mutually hurting stalemate."

bargain has been reached. In what ways does a fractionalized opposition affect various groups' incentives to comply with the terms of a negotiated settlement? Where multiple insurgencies exist, should we expect inclusive settlements to be more or less stable than dyadic settlements?

Although the average settlement is signed in a conflict with four active armed groups, there is no agreement about the effects of inclusive versus non-inclusive settlements. Walter's (2002) seminal study requires that *all* belligerent groups sign a settlement in order to consider it a "signed bargain,"<sup>3</sup> arguing that the exclusion of active insurgent groups should not be considered a "genuine move toward peace." On the other hand, Nillion (2008) argues that dyadic settlements may be successful in achieving "partial peace," since the parties to a settlement have already taken into account the likelihood that excluded groups will continue to foment violence. Perhaps this helps to explain why governments facing multiple insurgencies often choose to pursue separate bargains with each insurgency rather negotiating inclusive settlements with multiple insurgent groups.

**Figure 4.1. Relationship between the number of negotiated settlements signed and the number of active non-state armed groups in six country cases.**



<sup>3</sup> Otherwise, she argues, the settlement is not considered a genuine move towards peace (p. 52).

Figure 4.1 focuses on country cases in which multiple rounds of dyadic settlements were signed. The trend lines indicate that the number of non-state armed groups tends to increase following the signing of dyadic settlements, a pattern which appears to intensify over multiple rounds of dyadic bargaining.<sup>4</sup> This not only brings into question the “partial peace” argument for dyadic settlements, but it lends support to the argument that power-sharing bargains create perverse incentives that encourage “spoiler” groups to mobilize violence in the pursuit of power (Tull and Mehler 2005; Spears 2000).

This chapter examines why and how inclusive settlements are more likely than dyadic settlements to effectively secure conflict termination. My central argument emphasizes differences in the strategic cost of compliance with a power-sharing settlement between government and rebel parties. I argue that the costs of unilateral compliance are especially high for rebels, which generates incentives for preemptive defection during the implementation period. These incentives are likely to be affected by whether all groups with the capacity to mobilize violence are included in the settlement. Disgruntled elites who are not appeased by the terms of the settlement are more likely to find resources to support their return to fighting when other ongoing insurgencies have been excluded from the settlement. Moreover, where the armed opposition is fractionalized, the geographic and ideological overlap between various rebel groups is likely to facilitate such transfers.

Drawing on two dyadic peace processes in Uganda—with the Ugandan National Rescue Front (UNRF) and the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA)—I show that the “losers”

---

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Toft’s (2006) study of Colombia. Multiple failed bargains with FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) led to a proliferation of armed groups in Colombia due to neglecting security sector reform in the implementation period. The integration of ex-combatants, and their subsequent neglect, led to the emergence of multiple “militias” ready to follow any political opportunist who could provide resources and “sustain their vision of how to win” (35-6).

within both groups were able to continue violent activities precisely because active insurgencies in their respective regions provided the necessary weapons and recruits.

In this chapter, I first develop a hypothesis about inclusive power sharing in multidimensional conflicts. While inclusive settlements may be more difficult to reach, I expect that—once signed—they are more stable and more likely to result in conflict termination among signatories. Next, I present an in-depth case study of the Ugandan experience, which illustrates the mechanism underpinning the theory. I then undertake a cross-national analysis of 238 settlement dyads—pairings of government and rebel signatories to a peace agreement—between 1975 and 2005. The dataset employs a novel measurement of the number of active non-state armed groups and of settlement inclusivity, discussed in section IV. The results confirm that, although a high number of insurgencies makes conflict termination less likely, the inclusion of all active groups in a settlement increases the likelihood of peace by more than 250 percent. I conclude with a discussion of the problems with existing data on insurgent groups and, in particular, with the overwhelming tendency to view parties to a peace process as static and cohesive.

## **II. Power-Sharing and Insurgent Fractionalization**

Although there is a burgeoning literature on the topic of power sharing as a method of conflict resolution, there has been relatively little work focused on the ways in which the multidimensional nature of a conflict affects the stability of power-sharing settlements. I present here a theoretical framework for understanding the conditions in which inclusive power-sharing bargains might reduce the incentives for rebels to defect from a settlement. First, I draw on two theoretical schools—on militant groups and that on power-sharing

democracy—in order to show that power-sharing solutions are more tenuous in highly fractionalized conflicts. Next, I develop a hypothesis about inclusivity, which suggests that inclusive power-sharing settlements may help to overcome some of the problems of a fractionalized opposition, stabilize a post-conflict transition, and generate peace. Finally, I discuss the potential mechanisms for this argument.

There is a general consensus in relevant literature that a high degree of fractionalization has a negative effect on bargaining and on conflict resolution. Although more diverse societies might be less prone to the *onset* of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2000), ethnic fractionalization appears to make conflicts more recalcitrant and intense once violence breaks out (Fearon and Laitin 2003). In the pursuit of a solution to conflict, specifically, the relevant interests to appease are not those among the multitude of societal cleavages, but those groups with the capacity and demonstrated willingness to mobilize violence against the state: the “veto players” (Cunningham 2006).

The relevant literature on bargaining for peace tends to agree that negotiated settlements are significantly more difficult to achieve in conflicts with multiple veto players. According to Downs and Stedman (2002), where more than two warring parties exist, “strategies become less predictable, balances of power become more tenuous, and alliances become more fluid” (55). Moreover, a greater number of armed groups increases the number of demands that require solutions, making it more difficult to reach consensus on the terms of peace (Mason et al. 1999; Bekoe 2005; Cunningham 2006).

Since not all insurgent groups in a given country-conflict possess equal strength in numbers, resources, or organizational capacity, a peace bargain is likely to benefit some groups more than others. Thus, the peace process itself is often argued to increase

incentives for armed groups to engage in “outbidding” in order to increase their perceived strengths vis-à-vis rival groups (Kydd and Walter 2009). If group leaders perceive themselves as disadvantaged or marginalized during the post-settlement transition—particularly given the context of heightened uncertainty that characterized multidimensional peace processes—a subsequent decision by one group to defect has the potential to destabilize the transition by setting off a domino effect (Werner 1999; Spears 2000; Cunningham 2006).

Similarly, power-sharing institutions appear to be less durable and effective at resolving conflict in the context of heightened fractionalization (Lijphart 2008). Where the number of groups seeking access to the state is especially high, smaller groups are more likely to feel underrepresented and marginalized at the national level. Wilkinson (2000) has argued that power sharing in such contexts creates incentives for peripheral groups to mobilize and agitate for separate forms of inclusion, rather than form broad-based coalitions. At the same time, diffusive forms of power sharing—such as federalism—are more difficult to realize in more diverse polities due to the geographic intermingling of groups (Bolte 2007). In sum, a high degree of fractionalization among the armed opposition appears to make peace processes more fragile and volatile, particularly during the bargaining period.

On the other hand, the literature on elite bargaining suggests that a “fusion of elites” is associated with a number of positive political outcomes (Bayart 1981; Lonsdale 1981; Boone 1994). As Lindemann (2010) argues, where exclusionary bargains fail to accommodate contending social segments, the elites of excluded groups have an incentive to mobilize their constituents in either conventional or unconventional forms of political

dissent. States that fail to achieve a “fusion of elites” are expected to be more prone to the onset of political protests, riots and civil war. Recent work from Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2010) shows that unconventional forms of dissent—specifically, violent rebellion—is most likely where those groups that are excluded from the elite bargain have a high capacity to mobilize violence and have engaged in violent conflict in the past. Thus, where inclusive elite bargains manage to extend access to state power across relevant cleavages—specifically, across the cleavages of conflict—the recurrence of violence is less likely.

In sum, the extant literature suggests that multidimensional conflicts are particularly resistant to a negotiated settlement. However, while numerous studies have shown that bargaining processes that include multiple belligerent parties are more prone to defection, it is yet to be determined whether resulting settlements are more or less stable once they are signed. Moreover, although there is a growing consensus that exclusionary bargains contribute to the onset and continuation of violence among omitted “spoiler” groups (Stedman 1997; Tull and Mehler 2005; Rothchild 2005; Jarstad 2006; Scheneckener 2002; Kydd and Walter 2006), there are few theories about the incentives for group defection among the signatory parties that are included in a settlement. One notable exception is a recent cross-national analysis by Nillson (2008), which argues that dyadic peace is possible despite the behavior of excluded spoilers. In contrast, I expect that exclusive power-sharing settlements are less likely to be associated with conflict termination between signatories, especially where the armed opposition is highly fractionalized. In line with previous studies of group behavior in peace negotiations, the existence of a large number of contending interest groups is likely to generate winners and losers during the implementation period, which heightens the likelihood that dissatisfied



parties will defect and destabilize the transition toward peace. At the same time, however, if the number of insurgent parties is manageable, inclusive bargains that manage to achieve a “fusion of elites” across all relevant groups have the potential to reduce uncertainty and incentives for defection.

*H<sub>1</sub>: All else equal, inclusive power-sharing settlements are positively associated with conflict termination among signatories.*

My theory refutes the tendency in the extant literature to view groups as static players with perfectly symmetric preferences (Walter 2002). During the multiple stages of settlement implementation, insurgents must continuously make decisions about whether to continue to demobilize and disarm, which are based on perceptions about the likelihood that they will benefit more from this strategy than from returning to the battlefield. Most significantly, the cost of unilateral compliance is significantly higher for incumbents than for the government, since disarmament eliminates rebels’ leverage in order to ensure that the incumbent fulfills its commitments. This generates heightened incentives for insurgents to defect given any indication that the government party intends to renege. On the other hand, the dominant strategy for the incumbent is to implement as few concessions as possible; despite the terms of the settlement, the government should implement just enough in order to convince rebels to disarm until they no longer pose a credible threat, but not more than absolutely necessary.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, this “game” often results in a partially implemented settlement, which generates winners and losers *within* the rebel party. Although the top echelon may have

---

<sup>5</sup> This is supported by Cunningham’s (2006) finding that internally divided insurgencies tend to receive concessions at a higher rate than unified rebellions. To the government, cohesive insurgencies require less cooptation in order to eliminate potential threats.

been adequately coopted and convinced the troops to disarm, disgruntled mid-level elites may perceive themselves as neglected from the bargain, enhancing their incentives to unilaterally defect.<sup>6</sup> This is similar to the incentives highlighted in the literature on rebel “outbidding” (Kydd and Walter 2009), but it emphasizes the dynamics within groups that contribute to splintering.

On the other hand, the *capacity* of disgruntled elites to return to the battlefield is intrinsically tied to their access to weapons, recruits and other resources of violent conflict (Weinstein 2005). Where multiple rebel groups exist, alliances between groups are more fluid and there is likely to be geographic, ethnic, and ideological overlap among them (Downs and Stedman 2002). In this light, I argue that the exclusion of certain armed groups increases the likelihood of splintering by improving the capacity of disgruntled elements within signatory parties to continue violent strategies.<sup>7</sup>

In sum, existing theories about inclusivity and power-sharing settlements suggest that multidimensional conflicts are prone to unstable settlements while, at the same time, exclusionary bargains are vulnerable to spoilers. In contrast, my argument suggests that inclusive bargains have the potential to be the most stable and effective strategy by preventing the emergence of spoilers *within* signatory parties. If the number of insurgencies is manageable, the inclusion of all active armed groups reduces the pool of available resources to disgruntled meso-elites who perceive themselves as neglected by a power-sharing arrangement. Thus, in the context of a fractionalized opposition, attention

---

<sup>6</sup> Kingma (1996) provides a discussion of the psychology of ex-combatants in terms of the prospects for peace. He argues that the reintegration process often forces insurgents to reconsider their personal ambitions, expectations and social status, which can be a challenging and traumatic adjustment and lead many to feel neglected

<sup>7</sup> Recruits may also come from within their own ranks, if the rank-and-file failed to be reintegrated into the state military or to receive adequate resources for social reintegration (Mazarire and Rupiya 2000, 23).

to within-group dynamics and the fluidity of group boundaries is necessary to understand the prospects for peace. In order to illustrate my argument, the following section presents a micro-analysis of two peace processes in Uganda.

### **III. Fractionalization and Dyadic Bargaining in Uganda**


Since the end of the Bush War, Uganda has experienced one of the most fractionalized armed oppositions of any country in the world. In January 1986, current President Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) succeeded in overthrowing the ruling Military Council, which represented an amalgamation of the various insurgent forces that had fought against the second regime of Milton Obote between 1981 and 1985 (Kiplagat 2002). Citing an ideology of anti-sectarianism and broad-based government, Museveni actively coopted a number of these groups into a single-party government under his National Resistance Movement (NRM).<sup>8</sup>

Despite Uganda's status as the original model of consociational-style governance (Apter 1961), however, many parties that retained the capacity to mobilize violence were excluded from the elite bargain (Tripp 2010, 48). Many of these groups returned to the bush—while others emerged for the first time—to fight against the NRM regime amid perceptions that certain regions, particularly the North, were being marginalized. This period witnessed the genesis of armed groups such as the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the Ugandan People's Democratic Army (UPDA), and many others.

---

<sup>8</sup> Not only were various armed groups coopted into the new regime, but the ideology of national unity and representativeness extended to a range of political forces: Protestant and Catholic clergy, supporters of the Buganda monarchy, former Amin loyalists from the West Nile region, and members of the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) that had lost the 1980 elections to Milton Obote (Tripp 2010, 48; Oloka-Onyango 1997).

**Figure 4.2. Diagram of the emergence, incorporation and fractionalization of major non-state armed groups in Uganda, 1980-2010. (Refer to Appendix (x) for definition of acronyms).**



- (1) = Nairobi Agreement (1985), between the ruling Military Council and the National Resistance Army (NRA).
- (2) = A verbal power-sharing agreement resulted in the incorporation of Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) leadership into the NRM government .
- (3) = Pece Agreement (1988), between the NRM government and the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA).
- (4) = Addis Accord (1990), between the NRM government and the Uganda People’s Democratic Movement (UPDM).
- (5) = Yumbe Agreement (2002), between the NRM government and the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRFII)

Figure 4.2 provides an illustration of the emergence, termination, and fragmentation of the major insurgent groups that have been active in contemporary Uganda (Lewis 2012, 54; Nyeko and Lucima 2002). Since Museveni took power by force, at least 15 non-state groups have emerged in violent resistance to the government.<sup>9</sup> Yet relatively few of these groups have entered into peace negotiations with the NRM, and only four groups eventually signed negotiated power-sharing settlements.<sup>10</sup>

In Uganda, peace processes have always taken place on a dyadic basis: between the NRM and one insurgent group. This makes it an ideal case to examine the observable implications of my theory about group splintering and the continuation of violent conflict, given a proliferation of excluded armed groups. It also controls for the potential effects of a number of cross-national factors that have previously been argued to affect the stability of a settlement: the relative strength of the state, the duration and intensity of conflict, and the presence of third-party enforcers, to name a few. Moreover, the study reveals that neither commitment theory nor arguments resting on the behavior of excluded spoiler groups provide adequate explanations for the continuation of violent conflict in the context of multiple active insurgencies. There is little evidence that armed groups that were excluded from the peace processes in Uganda strategically ratcheted up violent activities with the goal of being included in the power-sharing bargains. In fact, when the UNRFII ultimately reached a power-sharing settlement with the NRM in 2002, a large number of members of other insurgent groups—such as the LRA and the West Nile Bank Front

---

<sup>9</sup> Others, such as Bond and Vincent (2002), put this figure as high as 27 groups in just the late-1980s. However, most of these rebellions were not sustainable and never became viable threats to the NRM (See Lewis 2010).

<sup>10</sup> In Figure 4.4, a negotiated settlement is indicated by a numbered circle. Settlement (1) indicates the Nairobi Agreement signed between the ruling Military Council and the National Resistance Army (NRA) in 1985, approximately one month prior to the military coup that brought the NRA into power. All settlements thereafter were signed between the NRM government and various insurgent groups.

(WNBF)—were voluntarily disarming in order to take advantage of the government’s Amnesty Act without any promise of reintegration or political appointments.

Most significantly, the argument that dyadic bargaining produces dyadic peace (Nillson 2008) fails to hold up in the Ugandan case. The Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) appeared to disband following the verbal power-sharing agreement it reached with the NRM shortly after the coup in 1986. Yet elements within the UNRF leadership regrouped and emerged again a decade later as the Uganda National Rescue Front II (Ondoga 1998). Similarly, the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) was largely incorporated into the National Resistance Army (NRA) in 1988, although the political wing of the movement—the UPDM—continued to agitate for a power-sharing bargain until 1990, while many disaffected members of the military wing returned to the bush and joined the ranks of the LRA (See Figure 4.4). In the discussion that follows, I show that the existence of excluded insurgencies made it possible for disgruntled elements within the UNRF and the UPDA to unilaterally defect from the power-sharing settlements and continue to pursue violent strategies

***Uganda National Rescue Front I and II.*** Based out of Uganda’s West Nile region, the UNRF originally emerged in the early-1980s following the overthrow of the Idi Amin regime. Under Amin, ethnic groups from West Nile—particularly the Kakwa (Amin’s group), Nubians, and Muslims—had been overrepresented in state military and police institutions at the highest levels (Lindemann 2010, 21). Amin’s consolidation of power included systemic centralization, whereby local councils were replaced by appointed provincial governors and, later District Commissioners (DCs), most of whom were military officers and West Nile Muslims (Golooba-Mutebi 1999; Sathyamurthy 1982). The eventual leader

of the UNRF—Brigadier Moses Ali—served as Minister of Finance under Amin, as well as on his Defense Council, which increasingly became the center of power and decision-making throughout the 1970s.<sup>11</sup>

Following the Tanzanian-led military coup and democratic elections that returned Milton Obote to the Presidency in 1980, Amin loyalists and West Nilers were stripped of their advantageous positions in the military and government (Omara-Otunnu 1987). In their place, the scales of disproportionate ethnic representation were tipped toward Northerners, such as the Acholi and Langi groups. Amidst claims that the election had been rigged in favor of Obote's party, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), approximately half a dozen insurgent groups emerged to resist the Obote II regime in what became known as Uganda's Second Bush War.<sup>12</sup> Under the leadership of Moses Ali, many former elements of Amin's military took up arms as the UNRF.<sup>13</sup> Ultimately, in 1985, Obote was overthrown by elements within his own military, the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA). At this time, Ali and the UNRF joined the ruling Military Council, a coalition formed between the UNLA and all insurgent groups that remained active at the time of the coup,<sup>14</sup> with the exception of Museveni's NRA.

With the NRA's overthrow of the Military Council in January 1986, Museveni quickly moved to pass an amnesty law extending to all ex-combatants and to incorporate elements

---

<sup>11</sup> See the Africa Contemporary Record (ACR) 1973/197: B292 and 1977/1978: B447.

<sup>12</sup> This included Yoweri Museveni's Front for National Salvation (FRONASA)—later to be renamed the National Resistance Army—which had been launched from Tanzania and had the largest role in the military overthrow of Idi Amin, alongside the Tanzanian army. Museveni's removal from his position as Minister of Defense led him to return to the bush with his ranks, largely comprising co-ethnic Ankoles and Kigezis.

<sup>13</sup> Others formed the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA), which was also active in the West Nile region, but remained a smaller and less viable threat to the government throughout this period.

<sup>14</sup> This included the Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMU), the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), the Uganda National Democratic Army (UNDA), and the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) (Kiplagat 2002, 24).

of various former insurgencies into his state military (Tripp 2010). Many of these groups—such as the Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMU), the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), and the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA)—had been members of the deposed Military Council. At the same time, however, those elements of Ugandan society that had been overrepresented in the previous regimes of Milton Obote (Northerners) and Idi Amin (West Nilers) were excluded from the emerging NRM coalition. The state military—which would later be named the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF)—was purged of soldiers from West Nile, particularly in the officer corps, while Muslims and Amin loyalists were also removed from political posts and excluded from the initial coalition (Tripp 2010, 48). In response, the UNRF expressed its intention to return to West Nile and renew insurgent activities, this time targeting Museveni’s NRM government.

Roughly six months after taking power, Museveni reached a verbal power-sharing agreement with Brig. Moses Ali. According to a press release from the State House in Entebbe on 27 July, the bargain included the incorporation of UNRF combatants into the NRA military, guaranteed Cabinet appointments, and the Vice Presidency for Ali. By the end of the year, Ali had been appointed Minister of Tourism and Wildlife, while other UNRF officers received various posts: Amin Onzi, Eric Adriko and Agardi Didi as Ministers, Emilio Mondo and Lt. Col. Ona as Ambassadors, and Bruhan Abiriga as the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) of Arua in West Nile (See Table 4.1). Moreover, thousands of rank-and-file UNRF combatants were integrated into the NRA military, while others were offered resettlement packages and state-funded education scholarships.



**Table 4.1. Political appointments granted to former Uganda National Rescue Front officers, 1986-7.<sup>15</sup>**

<b>Name</b>	<b>UNRF Rank</b>	<b>Positions Held</b>
Moses Ali	Brigadier (Commander)	Minister of Tourism and Wildlife (1986-1990) Deputy Prime Minister (1996-2006)
Amin Onzi		Minister
Agardi Didi		Minister
Eric Adriko		Minister
Emilio Mondo	Major General	Ambassador Chairman, Uganda Veterans Assistance Board
John Ona	Lieutenant Colonel	Ambassador
Bruhan Abiriga	Major	Battalion Commander, Arua district Resident District Commissioner, Arua
Obiga Kania		Manager TUMPECO Director, Movement Secretariat

Despite these positive developments, the consensus in the literature on Ugandan military history stresses that military power remained concentrated among NRA loyalists, particularly the “historicals,” or the small cadre of officers who had fought alongside Museveni since the beginning of his rebellion against Obote (Tripp 2010, 52; Lindemann 2010). Although the NRM represents the political wing of the single-party government, the High Command of the NRA-UPDF has consistently been viewed as the center of Museveni’s power structure, and the dominance of Westerners and co-ethnics at the top levels of this structure has persisted since the late-1980s. According to former UNRF Brigadier Nasur Ezaga, the integration of UNRF ex-combatants in the late-1980s was restricted to soldiers with the rank of Captain and below, leaving no room for those UNRF officers who were not politically coopted into the NRM government (Mwesigye 2010, 80). Moreover, despite Museveni’s guarantee that UNRF soldiers would retain their ranks, the record indicates

<sup>15</sup> Data collected through interviews with Moses Ali (1 May 2014), (Retired) NRA Colonel Fred Mwesigye (5 April 2013), and NRA Commander Elly Tumwine (10 March 2013). See also Mwesigye 2010, p. 57-59.

that integrated ex-combatants were, in fact, demoted to the lowest ranks of the UPDF (Lomo and Hovil 2004, 11). According to survey research conducted by retired UPDF Colonel Fred Mwesigye (2010), approximately 20.3 percent of UNRF respondents suggested that the NRA failed to adequately integrate ex-combatants, while a further 17.5 percent claimed that the promised ministerial and ambassadorial positions were never filled (57). Even Moses Ali was denied his appointment as Vice President, a central stipulation of the 1986 agreement (Lindemann 2010, 51).

The combination of incomplete integration, military demotions, and the government's failure to appoint many of the ministerial and ambassadorial posts as promised, led to perceptions of marginalization and of a lack of government sincerity in its commitments among the UNRF. Amid fears that the UNRF would defect from the settlement, Museveni's administration launched a campaign to arrest numerous ex-UNRF officers on accusations of a coup attempt, many of whom were ultimately charged with treason in the High Court of Uganda (Meredith 2006; Mwesigye 2010, 80). Arrested UNRF officers included Lieutenant Colonel Isa, Lieutenant Colonel Tabu, Major General John Onah, Major Alidriga, Major Nooh, Musa Kyabo, and Major General Rajab Rembe.<sup>16</sup> Onah, Tabu, Alidriga and Rembe had all been promised positions in the NRM government, according to the 1986 agreement. Moreover, Moses Ali was himself arrested on charges of treason and held in prison for two years, before being released and reinstated in the NRM Cabinet.<sup>17</sup>

As it became clear in the late 1980s that many among the former UNRF leadership would be excluded from the expanding political coalition, as well as the influential power

---

<sup>16</sup> Interview with Brigadier Nasur Ezaga (cited in Mwesigye 2010, p. 80).

<sup>17</sup> "UNRFII Rebels Face Government With Huge Demands," (*New Vision*, 23 October 2002).

structure of the UPDF, several top-ranking officers—specifically, General Ali Bamuze, General Juma Iga, and Brigadier Nasur Exaga—returned to the bush to regroup and continue their resistance against Museveni’s government (Lindemann 2010, 52; Lomo and Hovil 2004, 11). For nearly a decade, the group remained small and dormant in the West Nile region while it gathered arms and recruits.

This process was aided by several developments in the early-1990s. First, the lack of upward mobility for non-NRA soldiers who had been integrated into the UPDF led many ex-combatants to desert the state military and return to their home regions (Lomo and Hovil 2004, 11). Second, the government’s failure to pay thousands of promised resettlement packages, to provide scholarship and retraining programs, and to find jobs for ex-combatants who were not integrated into the UPDF resulted in a high degree of unemployment among former rebels, including as many as 6,000 ex-UNRF soldiers (Mwesigye 2010, 58). In addition, according to Museveni (1997, 179) himself, approximately 50,000 UPDF soldiers were laid off in the period from 1992 to 1995 due to budget constraints, and in the context of particularly high unemployment rates.

As a result, the availability of well-trained, unemployed potential recruits was particularly high in the West Nile region in the early 1990s. Many of the disaffected rank-and-file among the ex-UNRF had initially joined up with an armed group led by Juma Oris, the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), which first emerged in 1988 (Lewis 2010, 54; Lindemann 2010, 52). However, when Bamuze and other members of the UNRF leadership reemerged in West Nile in order to renew their rebellion, thousands of soldiers absconded from the WNBF and joined the ranks of the newly formed Uganda National Rescue Front II

(See Figure 4.4). The UNRFII began launching violent attacks in 1996, and by 1998 it had become a viable threat to Museveni's government.

When the UNRFII initiated peace negotiations with the NRM in 2002, it quickly became clear that the central issues at stake were guarantees of powerful positions in the UPDF military for top-ranking officers and the payment of resettlement packages for the remaining rank-and-file.<sup>18</sup> Lacking a political faction within the movement, the ex-UNLA military leadership of the UNRFII was primarily motivated by the sense that President Museveni had breached the terms of the 1986 agreement in his failure to promote UNRF officers to the top levels of the UPDF High Command, as well as feelings that they had been betrayed by Moses Ali in his bid to secure a powerful ministerial position (Lomo and Hovil 2004; Lindemann 2010; Suuza 2013). In fact, when Ali made a "good will" visit to Yumbe in order to oversee and mediate the negotiations, Bamuze and the UNRFII leadership rejected his role in the peace process. According to John Bosco Suuza, legal advisor to the peace process:

"The senior group of UNRFII, they were part of the UNRFI, but they claim that when Moses Ali was offered a position in government he forgot about them. So there was a nexus in between the going into government by Moses Ali and the launch of the second rebellion. It was a really a matter of saying 'what about us?' And during the [2002] peace talks the UNRFII did not want to meet with Moses Ali. He came there, I remember he came, as a leader from West Nile, but they never wanted to talk to him. They never wanted anything to do with him, because they thought he had betrayed them."

President Museveni sent his own brother and Reserve Force Commander, Salim Saleh, to negotiate the peace settlement in Arua. In addition to promising 4.2 billion Ugandan shillings (approximately US\$1.5 million) in resettlement packages, the Yumbe Agreement again guaranteed that ex-UNRFII officers and soldiers would retain their ranks

---

<sup>18</sup> Interview with John Bosco Suuza, Uganda Ministry of Justice, 25 November 2013.

upon integration into the UPDF.<sup>19</sup> Although thousands of UNRFII ex-combatants were eventually integrated into the UPDF, many among the officer corps continued to claim that the government refused to honor its commitment to sharing military power. In 2006, a number of aggrieved UNRFII officers issued a joint statement claiming that they had “been at Bombo [army base] for the last three years and regarded as cadet officers without permanent ranks or positions” (Miti and Ssenkibirwa 2006).<sup>20</sup>

When it became clear that the majority of the UNRFII leadership beyond General Bamuze would, again, be excluded from powerful military or political appointments, many of these officers defected from Bombo and disappeared. At this time, renegade UPDF officers—Colonel Sam Mende and Colonel Anthony Kkyakabale—were actively recruiting former rebels into their newly formed People’s Resistance Army (PRA) and offering safe haven across the border in northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo.<sup>21</sup> Army Spokesman Major Shaban Bantariza acknowledged a “connection” between the PRA and the UNRFII, leading many to speculate that the disgruntled officers from the UNRFII eventually joined the ranks of the PRA until its demobilization in 2007.

***Uganda People’s Democratic Army/Movement.*** Unlike most other insurgent movements that have operated in Uganda since the 1970s, the UPDA/M developed a bicameral command structure with distinct military and political wings: the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) and the Uganda People’s Democratic Movement (UPDM), respectively. The military wing was largely composed of elements of former President

---

<sup>19</sup> Article IV.3, “Yumbe Agreement,” 2002, (<http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/Uga%2020021224.pdf>).

<sup>20</sup> Named officers included Colonel Yusufu Lubega, Lieutenant Colonel Ismail Andi Mawa, Lieutenant Colonel Noah Allahai Avoriga, Major Swaib Sege Abasi, Lieutenant Harun Rajab Ayiga and Mohamad Abiriga Azubu.

<sup>21</sup> “West Nile tension building,” 2002, (*New Vision*, 6 December).

Milton Obote's state military, the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA), which launched the mutiny overthrowing Obote in 1985. The political wing was led by Obote's former Prime Minister, Otema Allimadi. Allimadi had supported the insurrection and helped to build the Military Council in 1985, which was led by former UNLA Commander Tito Okello. Following the NRA coup that brought Museveni to power in January 1986, these elements were intentionally and publically excluded from the newly formed NRM coalition (Tripp 2010, 48). As Northerners were actively purged from the state military, and amid accusations of NRA brutality against ethnic Acholis, the movement found thousands of willing recruits and quickly became a viable threat to Museveni's military in the North.

In March 1988, the UPDA/M entered into peace talks with the NRM government. At the time, the high command of the UPDA expressed unified support of its military leader, ex-UNLA Brigadier Odong Latek, in his negotiations with the NRM: "We are officers loyal to Odong Latek, we are the pillars," they said in a public statement.<sup>22</sup> However, several weeks later, Otema Allimadi released his own public statement denouncing the ongoing negotiations (Ibid). By May, it had become clear that there was dissension among the ranks of the UPDA/M regarding the terms of the agreement. In a vote taken among the UPDA high command at its military headquarters in Agung, six of the eight commanders voted in favor of accepting the terms of the peace settlement offered by the government.<sup>23</sup> Allimadi and Latek rejected the government's offer, claiming that it did not go far enough to guarantee that Northerners would be represented in leadership positions in the NRM government and the UPDF military.

---

<sup>22</sup> "Ugandan President to meet rebel delegation," (*Xinhua General Overseas News Service*, 11 April 1988).

<sup>23</sup> "UPDA ousts military, political leaders," (*Xinhua General Overseas News Service*, 10 May 1988).

Latek and Allimadi were immediately ousted from their positions as military and political leaders of the UPDA/M. The high command accused Latek of demanding too much from the NRM delegation and of playing a dangerous game of “cat and mouse” that might derail the peace process (Ibid). He was replaced with Lieutenant Colonel John Angelo Okello, and the movement was restructured such that all affairs and decisions of the UPDA/M would be taken by its military command, essentially sidelining the political wing from the peace negotiations. As a result, the agreement signed by Okello in Pece in 1988 focused almost exclusively on military forms of power sharing (Lamwaka 2002, 32). It stipulated that UPDA officers and soldiers be integrated into the NRA and participate “at all levels of the Army.”<sup>24</sup> The settlement also included a provision for a Military Implementation Committee comprised of representatives of both the UPDA and NRA in order to oversee the integration process.<sup>25</sup>

In terms of political guarantees, the UPDM was “accorded appropriate representation in the National Resistance Council...and also in the Government Executive.”<sup>26</sup> However, both of these institutions were elements of an interim government intended to dissolve after the drafting of a new national constitution. It had become clear that the NRM—which dominated the National Resistance Council with at least 75 percent of its representatives (Kabwegyere 2000, 165)—viewed the direction of the Ugandan political system as a centralized, one-party state. This left the UPDM with little expectation of being electorally competitive at the national level, or even of receiving local political

---

<sup>24</sup> Section B.3, Pece Agreement, 1988, (<http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/pece-agreement.php>)

<sup>25</sup> Section B.10, Pece Agreement, 1988, (<http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/pece-agreement.php>)

<sup>26</sup> Section A.1, Pece Agreement, 1988, (<http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/pece-agreement.php>)

appointments in the North. Moreover, the settlement fell short of guaranteeing specific government positions to the UPDM, reaffirming instead that “the appointment of Cabinet Ministers and their Deputies remains the prerogative of the President.”<sup>27</sup> Although a few UPDM leaders, such as Charles Alai (Kabwegyere 2000, 166), eventually took up positions on the National Resistance Council, the majority of the UPDA/M political wing remained loyal to Allimadi and disassociated itself with the Pece Agreement.<sup>28</sup>

Meanwhile, by the end of 1988, as many as 10,000 UPDA soldiers had surrendered to the government for integration into the NRA-UPDF. Despite this, many UPDA officers felt betrayed by the settlement and remained loyal to Latek. Aided by resources provided by Allimadi and the exiled UPDM leadership in London, hundreds of ex-UPDA combatants retrenched themselves in Northern Uganda (Lamwaka 2002, 32).

Less than two years later, the UPDM again entered into peace negotiations with the NRM government. In a settlement signed in Addis Ababa, Allimadi was guaranteed amnesty and safe return to Uganda, as well as a top-level appointment in the NRM Cabinet. However, the other members of the UPDM Central Executive Committee claimed that Allimadi lacked the authority to negotiate on their behalf and that he never consulted with the various political and military forces of the remaining UPDA/M prior to signing the settlement (Nyeko and Lucima 2002, 22). The military command of the UPDA—such as Colonel Owiny—publically rejected the Addis Accord, emphasizing that it failed to benefit any elements of the movement beyond Allimadi himself.<sup>29</sup> Soon after, many remaining

---

<sup>27</sup> Section A.5, Pece Agreement, 1988, (<http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/pece-agreement.php>)

<sup>28</sup> “Over 2,000 anti-government rebels surrender,” (IPS *Inter Press Service*, 29 August 1988)

<sup>29</sup> “Uganda government facing growing rebel activities in Soroti district,” 1990, (*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 31 July).



members of the UPDM political leadership resigned from their positions, and disgruntled UPDA soldiers were accused of destroying Allimadi's Ugandan residence.<sup>30</sup>

Despite the NRM's cooptation of Allimadi, the remaining military commanders of the UPDA pledged to continue their insurgent activities, sending a signal to the government that the political wing of the movement was no longer in control of its military forces (Nyeko and Lucima 2002). Amid accusations that remnants of the UPDA were regrouping in a bid to topple Museveni, the government began targeting and arresting ex-UPDA officers. In February 1990, Major Mike Kilama—a popular ex-UPDA officer who had signed the 1988 Pece Agreement and been integrated into the UPDF—was killed at the hands of UPDF border troops (Lamwaka 2002; Barnes and Lucima 2002). This event triggered outrage in Acholiland; UPDA officers claimed that they had been betrayed by the NRM government and abandoned by Allimadi after the signing of the Addis Accord. Many officers, such as Captain Majid Atiku and Major Walter Odoch, fled across the border to Sudan.

At the same time, the leader of the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM)—Alice Lakwena—had recently been defeated on the battlefield and fled into exile in Kenya. Hundreds of UPDA combatants joined forces with the remnants of the HSM, with whom the UPDA had exchanged resources, intelligence and personnel since 1986. They were quickly absorbed into the newly formed Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony, which would pose the longest and most viable threat to the NRM government over the next two decades (Barnes and Lucima 2002; Nyeko and Lucima 2002).

---

<sup>30</sup> "Uganda: Peace process in jeopardy," 1990, (London: *IPS-Inter Press Service*, 21 August).

As these two examples make clear, the implementation period following the signing of a negotiated settlement has the potential to create winners and losers within the insurgent party. While many of the elites at the top of the rebel hierarchy may be adequately coopted, the incumbent has little incentive to continue offering concessions once the groups has sufficiently disarmed. Mid-level elites who are left out of the bargain have an incentive to return to violent strategies in pursuit of access to power, and their capacity to do so is ultimately determined by the existence of active insurgent groups who have been excluded from the peace process. Particularly where these groups inhabit the same space or share an ethnic identity or political ideology with the disaffected opportunists, they are more likely to share in the resources of violence—especially weapons and troops. The following section provides a cross-national test of my argument about inclusivity in order to determine whether the Ugandan story is applicable to a broader set of cases.

#### **IV. Data and Methods**

The central hypothesis of this chapter suggests that conflict termination should be more likely where a negotiated settlement is inclusive of all active insurgencies, controlling for the degree to which the armed opposition is fractionalized. In order to test this expectation, I employ a binomial logistical regression analysis of the determinants of conflict termination on a signatory dyad with robust standard errors clustered by settlement.

The dependent variable, *conflict termination*, is a dummy variable: 1 if armed conflict has ceased within six months of the signing of a settlement and does not reemerge

for at least five years; 0 otherwise.<sup>31</sup> Eighty-eight settlement dyads, or 37 percent, achieve conflict termination. Of the central independent variables included in the analysis, *power-sharing settlement* and *inclusive settlement* are also coded as dummy variables based on my reading of the settlement text.<sup>32</sup>

My original dataset of negotiated settlements complements existing studies by accounting for conflict resolution processes that are both dyadic and multidimensional. The dataset includes 238 government-and-rebel signatory dyads between 1975 and 2005, from 132 negotiated settlements signed in 48 countries. It provides several contributions in measurement that merit a re-examination of the variation in conflict termination across settlements.

First, my coding of *power-sharing settlements* requires that the text includes some provisions for sharing power beyond a transitional period.<sup>33</sup> The distinction between permanent and transitional power sharing is essential in order to test my argument: that groups' perceptions about the benefits they are likely to receive after the implementation period have an effect on their decisions to comply with the settlement. Second, I include a measure for the *number of non-state armed groups* active at the time the settlement was signed. To a large extent, this variable was coded by a simple count of armed groups by conflict-year provided in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). However, as an instrument of the current research question, this data was prone to a

---

<sup>31</sup> Conflict dates were derived from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002) combined with my updated coding of armed group active years. Because the research question of the current analysis focuses on conflict termination at the systemic level, rather than on conflict dyads, conflict start and end dates are coded by combining all conflict dyads within a country.

<sup>32</sup> Where the text was not available, I relied on summaries made available by the UCDP/PRIO Peace Agreement projects, as well as news sources.

<sup>33</sup> The importance of the distinction between permanent and transitional power-sharing institutions was discussed in the preceding chapter.

number of limitations. For example, according to the coding criteria employed by UCDP, one party in the conflict dyad must be a state military. As a result, in country-years where no clear sovereign existed—such as Liberia in the mid-1990s—years of conflict and relevant insurgent groups were suppressed from the data.

Moreover, the UCDP coding requires that any identified group causes a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths in order to be included for any conflict year, which calls for an updated measurement whenever possible.<sup>34</sup> A broad literature has suggested that levels of violence may not be perfectly correlated with military capacity (Kalyvas 2006; Lacina 2006; Weinstein 2007); armed groups may temporarily go dormant due to changes in leadership, territory, discipline, or even bargaining power. The current focus of this study is on fractionalization among the armed opposition, particularly in terms of its impact on stability given the changes in incentives that may be generated by a power-sharing settlement. As such, a valid measure of the *number of non-state armed groups* should include all groups with the capacity to mobilize violence. For this reason, I employed a closer reading of the UCDP/PRIO dataset—looking for brief temporal gaps in the identification of armed groups—as well as case studies of the relevant conflict in order to make the most accurate coding in each case.<sup>35</sup>

Finally, my dataset also measures whether the relevant settlement is *inclusive* of all existing armed groups at the time of its signing. Although the UCDP/PRIO Peace Agreement Dataset includes a dummy variable for whether an agreement is “inclusive” or

---

<sup>34</sup> Janet Lewis (2012, 20-25) provides an apt discussion of the shortcomings of datasets that rely on strict thresholds for conflict-related events and actors. Among these, the most commonly used data—namely, the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset—has been replicated for a myriad of other cross-national analyses of conflict, with little attention to whether coding decisions in the original data might impact the validity of findings when applied to varied research questions.

<sup>35</sup> Most notably, I relied on the Conciliation Resources’ Accord publications. These, and any other scholarly studies used for specific country-conflict cases, are cited in the dataset for reference.

not, the samples employed in the two datasets diverge slightly due to differing definitions of the unit of analysis.<sup>36</sup> More significantly, my revised coding of the number of non-state armed groups called for an updated measurement of inclusivity as well.<sup>37</sup>

I include several additional indicators in order to control for variables that might impact the likelihood of conflict termination, but that are not related to the central hypothesis. The controls included are measures of *GDP per capita* (as purchasing power parity),<sup>38</sup> *ethnic fractionalization* (Fearon 2003), *conflict duration* and *intensity* (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themner and Wallensteen 2006), and dummy variables that identify whether the settlement in question includes provisions for international *peacekeepers* (Walter 2002; Fortna 2006) or for *arbitration mechanisms* that are inclusive of all signatories (Schneckener 2002). In the current analysis, we might expect that arbitration mechanisms would be particularly effective at stabilizing a post-conflict power-sharing transition where settlements are inclusive of multiple warring parties. The measures for these variables are based on my reading of the original documents of the 132 negotiated settlements in the dataset.

Summary statistics for all variables used in the cross-national analysis are provided in Table 4.2. Of the 238 signatory dyads included in the sample, 24.8 percent—or 59 dyads—signed on to inclusive settlements, while more than half agreed to permanent power-sharing provisions.

---

<sup>36</sup> Chapter 2 provides a detailed discussion of the differences between my definition of a *negotiated settlement* and the varied types of “peace agreements” included in the UCDP/PRIO Peace Agreement Dataset.

<sup>37</sup> As a robustness check, all regressions have also been tested using the UCDP coding of armed groups, and the results are unchanged. These regression models are included in the Appendix.

<sup>38</sup> From World Bank Development Indicators (2014).

**Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics (N=238).**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Conflict terminates?	238	0.37	0.483	0	1
Power-sharing settlement?	238	0.517	0.501	0	1
Inclusive Settlement?	238	0.248	0.433	0	1
Number of armed groups	238	6.588	4.788	1	24
GDP per capita (PPP)	178	2664.35	4269.5	140.1	26098.4
Ethnic fractionalization	234	0.699	0.222	0.061	1
Conflict duration (months)	230	93.309	110.34	1	616
Conflict intensity	196	1.312	0.422	0.88	2
Provisions for peacekeepers?	238	0.29	0.455	0	1
Provisions for arbitration mechanism?	238	0.227	0.42	0	1

It is important to note that testing the impact of all-inclusive settlements on the likelihood of conflict termination raises the potential for a selection bias. Specifically, if the likelihood of reaching an all-inclusive bargain is endogenous to other, antecedent conditions, then any statistical effect of inclusivity would be merely spurious. The existing literature suggests that inclusive settlements might more difficult to reach where state capacity is particularly weak (Fearon and Laitin 2003), where conflicts are more protracted and intense (Doyle and Sambanis 2000), where third-party enforcers are absent (Walter 2002; Fortna 2006), and where a greater number of belligerent parties exists (Bekoe 2005; Cunningham 2006).<sup>39</sup> Each of these variables is also likely to impact the prospects for post-settlement peace.

<sup>39</sup> See especially Fortna (2008, 18-46) for a thorough discussion of that factors that make peace particularly tenuous and difficult to realize.

**Table 4.3. Comparison of mean value of explanatory variables.**

Variable	Mean when inclusive	Mean when non-inclusive
Power-sharing settlement	0.678	0.464
Number of armed groups	1.92	8.13
GDP per capita (PPP)	1925.45	2994.75
Log mountainous range	1.95	2.32
Ethnic fractionalization	0.593	0.734
Conflict duration (months)	59.34	105.03
Conflict intensity	1.25	1.34
Peacekeeping provisions?	0.475	0.229

Table 4.3 illustrates differences in the mean values of other explanatory variables included in the analysis, depending on whether the settlement signed is inclusive or not. The differences in measures of state capacity—income levels and mountainous terrain—are negligible, which suggests that the state’s ability to defeat rebels on the battlefield is not associated with its ability or willingness to negotiate an inclusive bargain. Similarly, the intensity of conflict does not appear noticeably different depending on whether settlements are inclusive and not, and although conflict duration looks at first glance to be twice as high where settlements are not inclusive, the difference between the mean duration within the subset of non-inclusive settlements (105 months) is not substantially different from the mean in the broader sample (93 months). Ethnic diversity also appears to be higher among the subset of non-inclusive settlements, but this variable is likely to be correlated with the number of active armed groups, which I address in the next section.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Scholars of political violence and civil war are divided about the effect of ethnic fractionalization on conflict tendencies. While some claim that diversity is a significant predictor of conflict onset (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1996), especially ethnic conflict (Sambanis 2001), others argue that high levels of diversity require the formation of coalitions and cleavages that cut across ethnic lines (Collier and Hoeffler 2001), thereby reducing the propensity for violence. However, among the subset of cases in which armed conflict has already broken out, it is likely that armed groups would, over time, map relatively well onto existing ethnic cleavages, since groups have a perceived incentive to mobilize violence in the protection of their survival against the state and against groups with rival interests.

The number of active insurgencies at the time a settlement is signed is the only variable that appears to be considerably different among the subset of inclusive settlements. Although the average number of insurgencies in the full sample is approximately six or seven, the mean falls below two groups among the subset of inclusive settlements, suggesting that the majority of inclusive bargains are reached where only one insurgency exists. This supports the consensus in existing literature that inclusive settlements are more difficult to reach where there are a greater number of warring parties with competing interests and mutual suspicions (Bekoe 2005; Cunningham 2006).

On the other hand, the question remains whether all-inclusive bargains are more or less stable if there are a greater number of insurgencies included. Does the counter-productive nature of dyadic bargaining, as demonstrated in Uganda, apply to other cases? Would an all-inclusive power-sharing settlement have been a more effective strategy, given the degree of fractionalization among the armed opposition? The literature to date has not explored this question, which is the focus of the next section.

## **V. Empirical Analysis**

Table 4.4 reports the results of the binomial logistic regression analysis of conflict termination with robust standard errors clustered by settlement. As expected, power-sharing settlements appear significantly more likely to result in peace between government and rebel dyads when they are *inclusive*. The positive effect of *inclusivity* on the likelihood of conflict termination attains statistical significance at conventional levels in all models. Setting all other variables in model 4 to their mean values, the predicted probability of conflict termination among signatories to a non-inclusive settlement is 31.2 percent. The



likelihood of dyadic peace increases almost threefold—to 85.1 percent—if the settlement is inclusive.

**Table 4.4. Logistic regression analysis of conflict termination (N=238).**

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Power-sharing settlement?	0.96** (-0.467)	0.61* (-0.467)	1.16** (-0.472)	0.62* (-0.497)	1.36*** (-0.465)	0.5* (-0.37)
Inclusive settlement?		2.76*** (-0.529)		2.71*** (-0.622)	1.87*** (-0.519)	2.71*** (-0.492)
Number of armed groups			-0.28*** (-0.087)	-0.01 -0.101	-0.09 (-0.054)	-0.02 (-0.046)
Provisions for:						
Peacekeepers	0.19 (-0.543)	-0.31 (-0.642)	-0.17 (-0.564)	-0.31 (-0.62)	-0.47 (-0.503)	-0.14 (-0.455)
Arbitration commission	0.24 (-0.618)	0.35 (-0.662)	0.01 (-0.605)	0.33 (-0.657)	-0.02 (-0.491)	
GDP per capita (PPP, logged)	0.51* (-0.296)	0.38 (-0.266)	0.4 (-0.257)	0.38 (-0.275)		
Log mountainous range					0.12 (-0.146)	
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.41 (-1.097)	0.04 (-0.978)				
Conflict duration (months)	-0.01*** (-0.003)	-0.01** (-0.003)	-0.01*** (-0.003)	-0.01** (-0.003)	-0.01** (-0.002)	-0.01* (-0.002)
Conflict intensity	-0.35 (-0.645)	-0.5 (-0.784)	-0.47 (-0.621)	-0.49 (-0.739)	-0.23 (-0.556)	
Constant	-2.11 (-2.543)	-2.96 (-2.167)	-0.86 (-2.203)	-2.85 (-2.477)	-0.88 (-1.001)	-1.07* (-0.551)
Observations	151	151	151	151	171	230
ll	-86.07	-67.97	-78.16	-67.96	-77.73	-109.1
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.164	0.34	0.241	0.34	0.271	0.274


Robust standard errors, clustered by settlement, in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

In line with the extant literature, the number of active insurgencies has a significant, negative effect on the likelihood of conflict termination (Model 3). However, when controlling for inclusivity (Models 4-6), the impact of a fractionalized armed opposition is reduced, even negated. Therefore, while the data suggests that inclusive peace agreements might be more difficult to realize where there is a greater number of active insurgencies (see Table 4.3), these results indicate that all-inclusive peace agreements, once signed,

might not be especially prone to instability and defection where the number of signatory parties is high. This challenges Nillson's (2008) argument that dyadic peace agreements can result in dyadic peace despite the exclusion of active insurgencies, and instead lends support to arguments that excluded groups can act as "spoilers" and destabilize a peace process (Stedman 1997). When I increase the number of armed groups by one standard deviation, holding all other variables in model 4 at their means, the predicted probability of conflict termination with an inclusive settlement is still 82.7 percent.

Because the number of distinct armed groups is highly correlated with the degree of ethnic diversity in a polity (see Figure 4.3), I exclude the ethnic fractionalization variable from models that include a count of insurgencies. Moreover, although the number of armed groups is a significant predictor of settlement failure in model 3, ethnic fractionalization does not appear to have a significant effect on the likelihood of conflict termination. This supports one of the central assertions of this paper: contrary to the tendency for studies of civil war to include measures of ethnic fractionalization, it is not the degree of diversity but the proliferation of groups with the capacity to mobilize violence that directly affects the prospects for conflict resolution.


**Figure 4.3. Ethnic Diversity and Armed Groups in 48 Countries**

Other explanatory variables for the likelihood of conflict resolution do not appear to have a consistent, significant effect. The positive effect of income levels—as a proxy for state capacity to avoid insurgency—is only marginally significant in model 1, before the addition of measures of inclusivity and the number of armed groups. A secondary measure of state capacity, log of mountainous range in a country (Fearon and Laitin 2003), also has little effect (Model 4). Similarly, as signals of belligerents' commitments to peace, including provisions for peacekeepers and inclusive commissions for arbitration and oversight does not have a significant effect on the probability of peace.

Finally, although the intensity of conflict does not seem to impact a peace process, the conflict's duration does have a consistently significant, negative effect on the likelihood of conflict termination in all models. This supports the argument that longer conflicts contribute to mutual suspicions between warring parties, increasing the likelihood of

preemptive defection, even after a bargain is reached (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). However, the impact of *inclusivity* remains significant, even when controlling for conflict duration. Figure 4.4 illustrates the effect of inclusivity on the predicted probability of peace as conflict duration varies. In both cases, the likelihood of conflict termination declines as the pre-settlement duration of conflict increases. Despite this, the likelihood of post-settlement peace remains consistently and substantially higher when the resulting settlement is inclusive of all active armed groups. Specifically, when I hold all variables in model 4 at their mean values and increase the duration of conflict by one standard deviation, the predicted probability of dyadic peace after a non-inclusive settlement is 19.9 percent. All else held constant, the probability increases to 74.9 percent with an inclusive settlement.

**Figure 4.4. Effect of Inclusivity on the Predicted Probability of Conflict Termination among Settlement Dyads.**



In support of the central hypothesis of this chapter, I conclude that power-sharing settlements are more often associated with conflict termination where all active groups are included in the settlement reached, all else equal. Moreover, although inclusive settlements seem to be *more difficult to reach* when there is a particularly high number of armed groups (Mason et al. 1999; Bekoe 2005; Cunningham 2006), they do not necessarily appear more prone to defections and conflict recurrence. Finally, when comparing the base regression model to the model that incorporates the effect of both *inclusive settlements* and the *number of non-state armed groups*, I note that the pseudo  $R^2$  more than doubles: from 0.164 in Model 1 to 0.34 in Model 4. In light of this result, I conclude that the predictive power of any explanation for post-settlement peace between settlement dyads is significantly improved by emphasizing both the inclusivity of settlements and the degree of fractionalization among the armed opposition, both factors that have been largely overlooked in the extant literature.

## **VI. Conclusion**

Where societies are characterized by conflicting segments, power-sharing solutions have been proposed as a mechanism to overcome suspicions, to avoid exclusionary politics, to accommodate interests, to protect minorities, and to rectify the security dilemma that generates violent conflict. Post-conflict transitions that emphasize creating or strengthening power-sharing institutions are assumed to represent a “fusion of elites,” which extends access to state power across societal cleavages (Bayart 1981; Lonsdale 1981; Boone 1994). These inclusive elite bargains, it is argued, give group leaders an

incentive to comply with the settlement, rather than return to the battlefield and pursue violent strategies to access power (Wimmer et al. 2010).

At the same time, as Roessler (2011) has argued, rulers often have an incentive to employ a strategy of group exclusion. Instead of including those elites that pose the highest risk of effectively executing a coup d'état, state leaders often prefer to exclude these groups and run the smaller, more long-term risk that they might mobilize a future rebellion. In the Ugandan case, when Museveni assumed the leadership in 1986 the groups he chose to risk excluding were those that had been overrepresented in the state military of the two preceding regimes. These groups had both the motivation and capacity to mobilize violence against the NRM regime: they had recently lost their advantageous access to power, and they had already engaged in violent activities for more than a decade, both inside and outside of government (Wimmer et al. 2010). Thus, it is little surprise that these groups would go on to launch rebellions, nor that they would eventually pose enough of a viable threat to the government that attempts would be made to include them in the elite coalition of the NRM.

Most strikingly, the Ugandan case illustrates the fragile nature of elite coalitions in the context of a highly fractionalized armed opposition. Arguments for all-inclusive power-sharing solutions are often made by analysts who emphasize the activities of "spoilers" (Stedman 1997) and the fragile and uncertain balance of power that characterizes a multidimensional conflict (Spears 2000). Dr. James Rwanyarare, Chairman for the Presidential Policy Commission of the opposition Uganda People's Congress (UPC), criticized Museveni's strategy of dyadic bargaining in a public statement in 2003:

"The only solution to Uganda's problems is a national conference involving all political parties to decide on the way forward. Piecemeal deals or bribes to some

dissidents like what happened in the now collapsing peace agreement with UNRF II of West Nile or the use of amnesty will not help either. What is needed is a convention where all stakeholders will freely be invited and consensus reached.”<sup>41</sup>

Dyadic bargaining has, in fact, proved a counter-productive strategy in many cases—such as Colombia, Chad, and Sudan (see Figure 4.1)—where two-party power-sharing deals have led to a proliferation in the number of groups using violence to access the elite bargain. However, upon closer examination, the termination of incorporated groups and the emergence of “new” insurgencies is not always as clear as it seems in the data. As a specific example, the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset codes the UNRF as an entirely separate group from the UNRFII (Gleditsch et al. 2010). In fact, the only major difference between the two groups was in their leadership: Moses Ali’s cooptation into the NRM in 1986 led Ali Bamuze, a UNRF General close to Ali, to assume the leadership and reform the UNRFII.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, the dataset provides no information about the amalgamation of groups, such as the defection of large segments of the UPDA/M from the 1988 and 1990 settlements and their subsequent absorption by the LRA.

A similar story applies to a number of countries facing multidimensional conflicts. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as many as five separate factions of the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) emerged over a three year period of peace negotiations, during which four separate power-sharing settlements were signed. Internal loyalties, international alliances, and access to domestic resources gave certain elements within the RCD the capacity to splinter and form new factions. By the time the “Final Act” of the Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations was signed in 2003, the power-sharing bargain divided the

---

<sup>41</sup> “Parties want talks,” (*New Vision*, 20 February 2003).

<sup>42</sup> The same treatment does not occur when changes in leadership have occurred in insurgent groups that maintain the same title, such as with the 2002 death of Jonas Savimbi, leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

state between seven belligerent parties, while one element of the RCD<sup>43</sup> continued to reject the deal and agitate for a separate bargain. Each of these groups is coded separately in relevant datasets on armed conflict and actors (Gleditsch et al. 2010), which glosses over the true nature of the fluidity, uncertainty and shifting alliances that exist in multidimensional conflicts.<sup>44</sup>

The literature on power-sharing democracy suggests that consociational institutions may be less stable in highly diverse polities, where cleavages between societal segments are less clear, groups are geographically intermingled, and there are more interests at stake (Lijphart 2008; Wilkinson 2000). I apply a similar argument to the tenuous nature of power-sharing settlements in multidimensional conflicts. A micro-analysis of conflicts where the armed opposition is highly fractionalized reveals that insurgencies often share resources and recruits and that alliances between groups may be more fluid than previously assumed. When power-sharing bargains neglect certain elements within a group, causing internal rivalries among group elites, these dynamics increase the capacity of disenchanted rebels to form new factions or to merge with existing groups. Thus, it is not necessarily the exclusionary nature of power-sharing bargains on the group level, but the fluctuating nature of alliances and internal group dynamics that results in the continuation of intra-state conflict.

In conclusion, I posit that the existing data on relevant actors in intra-state conflicts—while necessary for cross-national analyses of variation in civil war outcomes—suffers from a problem of internal validity. Conflict datasets gloss over the true nature of

---

<sup>43</sup> The RCD-Congo led by Kin-Kiey Mulumba, which fractured from the RCD-Goma in 2002.

<sup>44</sup> As a robustness check, the same regression models were tested using the UCDP/PRIO coding for the number of insurgencies. The results hold, although the level of significance for the number of armed groups is reduced, likely due to a reduction in the number of observations.



divisions, amalgamations, and transformations of armed groups over time. As a result, the tendency within the literature on conflict resolution to view groups as distinct units in a bargaining process is misleading, and the conclusions drawn from such assumptions have resulted in misguided policy prescriptions in multidimensional cases of intra-state conflict. Moreover, the current pessimism about the application of consociational formulas in war-to-democracy transitions is misguided. Power sharing can prove an effective solution, particularly if an all-inclusive settlement mitigates the potential for rebel splintering.

## References

- Africa Contemporary Record (ACR). Various Years. Annual Survey and Documents. New York: Holmes & Meier.
- Amaza, Ondoga Ori. 1998. *Museveni's Long March from Guerilla to Statesman*. Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Publishers.
- Bekoe, Dorina A. 2005. "Mutual Vulnerability and the Implementation of Peace Agreements: Examples from Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia." *International Journal of Peace Studies* 10(2): 43–68.
- Bond, G.C. and J. Vincent. 2002. "The Moving Frontier of AIDS in Uganda: Contexts, Texts and Concepts." In *Contested Terrains and Constructed Categories: Contemporary Africa in Focus*, Eds. G.C. Bond and N.C. Gibson. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Söderbom. 2008. "Post-Conflict Risks." *Journal of Peace Research* 45(4): 461–478.
- Dal Bó, Ernesto and Robert Powell. 2009. "A Model of Spoils Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(1): 207–222.
- Downs, George and Stephen J. Stedman. 2002. "Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation." In *Ending Civil Wars: The implementation of peace agreements* (pp. 43–70). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
- Epelu-Opio, Justin. 2009. *Teso War 1986-1992: Causes and Consequences*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
- Fearon, James D. 2003. "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country." *Journal of Economic Growth* 8(2): 195–222.
- Gleditsch, Nils Peter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Havard Strand. 2002. "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615–637.
- Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick. 1999. "Decentralisation, Democracy, and Development Administration in Uganda, 1986-1996: Limits to Popular Participation." Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London.
- Hartzell, Catherine A. and Matthew Hoddie. 2007. *Crafting peace: power-sharing institutions and the negotiated settlement of civil wars*. Penn State Press.
- Kabwegyere, Tarsis Bazana. 2000. *People's Choice, People's Power: Challenges and prospects of democracy in Uganda*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

- Kingma, Kees. 1997. "Demobilization of combatants after civil wars in Africa and their reintegration into civilian life." *Policy Studies* 30(3): 151-165.
- Licklider, Roy. 1995. "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993." *The American Political Science Review* 89(3): 681-690.
- Lindemann, Stefan. 2010. "Exclusionary Elite Bargains and Civil War Onset: The Case of Uganda." Working Paper No. 76, *Development as State-Making* (August). London: Crisis States Research Centre.
- Lindemann, Stefan. 2011. "Just another change of guard? Broad-based politics and civil war in Museveni's Uganda." *African Affairs* 110(440): 387-416.
- Lomo, Zachary and Hovil, Lucy. 2004. "Negotiating Peace: Resolution of Conflicts in Uganda's West Nile Region." Refugee Law Project, Working Paper 12. Kampala: Refugee Law Project.
- Mason, T. David and Patrick J. Fett. 1996. "How Civil Wars End." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(4): 546-568.
- Mason, T. David, Joseph P. Weingarten, and Patrick J. Fett. 1999. "Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars." *Political Research Quarterly* 52(2): 239-268.
- Matanock, Aila. 2012. *International Insurance: Why Militant Groups and Governments Compete with Ballots Instead of Bullets*. Dissertation submitted to the Stanford University Department of Political Science.
- Mazarire, G. and Rupiya, M. 2000. "Two wrongs do not make a right: A critical assessment of Zimbabwe's demobilization and reintegration programs, 1980 - 2000." *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies* (March).
- Meredith, Martin. 2006. *The State of Africa: A history of fifty years of independence*. London: Free Press.
- Miti, Joseph and Al-Mahdi Ssenkibirwa. 2006. "Uganda: Ex-UNRFII Rebels Demand Recognition." *The Monitor*, 30 December.
- Mwesigye, Fred. 2010. "Reintegration of Ex-combatants and Peace Building in Uganda: A case study of the Uganda National Rescue Front I (1981-2008)." Dissertation, M.A. in Peace and Conflict Studies, Makerere University (July).
- Nilsson, Desiree. 2008. "Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War Settlements." *Journal of Peace Research* 45(4): 479-495.
- Nyeko, Balam and Okello Lucima. 2002. "Protracted conflict, elusive peace: Initiatives to end the violence in Northern Uganda." *Conciliation Resources: ACCORD*.

- <http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/profiles-parties-conflict-2002> (Accessed 31 January 2014).
- Oloka-Onyango, Joe. 1997. "Uganda's 'Benevolent' Dictatorship." *Current History* 9(6): 212-216.
- Omara-Otunnu, Amii. 1987. *Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985*. London: Macmillan Press.
- "Over 2,000 anti-government rebels surrender." 1988. *IPS Inter Press Service*, 29 August.
- "Parties want talks." 2003. *New Vision*, 20 February.
- Pece Agreement. 1988. Available online at Conciliation Resources: ACCORD, <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/pece-agreement.php> (Accessed 5 February 2014).
- Sathyamurthy, Tennalur V. 1982. "Central-Local Relations: The Case of Uganda." Manchester, Manchester Papers on Development (5): Department of Administrative Studies, University of Manchester.
- Schneckener, Ulrich. 2002. "Making Power-sharing Work: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation." *Journal of Peace Research* 39(2): 203 –228.
- Stedman, Stephen J. 1997. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes." *International Security* 22(2): 5–53.
- Spears, Ian S. 2002. "Africa: The limits of power-sharing." *Journal of Democracy* 13(3).
- Themnér, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen. 2013. "Armed Conflict, 1946-2012." *Journal of Peace Research* 50(4).
- Tripp, Aili Mari. 2010. *Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Tull, Denis M. and Andreas Mehler. 2005. "The hidden costs of power-sharing: Reproducing insurgent violence in Africa." *African Affairs* 104(416): 375–398.
- "Uganda: Peace process in jeopardy." 1990. London: *IPS-Inter Press Service*, 21 August.
- "Uganda government facing growing rebel activities in Soroti district." 1990. *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 31 July.
- "Ugandan President to meet rebel delegation." 1988. *Xinhua General Overseas News Service*, 11 April.

“UNRFII Rebels Face Government With Huge Demands.” 2002. *New Vision* (23 October).

“UPDA ousts military, political leaders.” 1988. *Xinhua General Overseas News Service*, 10 May.

Walter, Barbara F. 2002. *Committing to peace : the successful settlement of civil wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2005. “Resources and the information problem in rebel recruitment.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 598-624.

“West Nile tension building.” 2002. *New Vision*, 6 December.