

# What Drives the Expression of Ideology?

## Evidence from an Experiment in Pakistan

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  - ▶ Difficult to know when private benefits exceed costs (e.g., poor, Republican voters voting against their pocketbooks)
- ▶ Social environment: some aspect of social pressure shapes political actions
  - ▶ Even voting—seemingly a private act—has a social component (DellaVigna et al., 2013)

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- ▶ Ideology (often social action) at the root of massive political and economic change
  - ▶ The rise of nationalism in 19th century Europe (e.g., Duggan, 2007)
  - ▶ The persistence of Communism (e.g., John R. Lott, 1999)
  - ▶ The unification of Europe after World War II (e.g., Judt, 2006)
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  - ▶ The Arab Spring (e.g., Campante and Chor, 2012)
  
- ▶ In the setting we study, Pakistan, anti-American acts are widespread, with major geopolitical and socioeconomic consequences (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004)

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  - ▶ The act of elicitation may distort expressed attitudes, especially for extreme views
- ▶ We analyze these issues using data from an experiment in Pakistan on individuals' anti-American attitudes

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- ▶ In return for completing the survey, study participants could elect to receive a “bonus” payment (above a show-up fee they had received upon arrival)
- ▶ Receiving the bonus payment required checking a box in a form:
  - ▶ **Accept:** “I gratefully thank the [funding agency] for its generosity and I accept the bonus payment offer.”
  - ▶ **Reject:** “I choose not to accept the bonus payment offer.”

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- ▶ **The expectation of privacy**
  - ▶ Public expectation or private expectation (details to come)

# Strengths of the Elicitation Mechanism

- ▶ Imposes a meaningful cost on political expression in the absence of non-ideological benefit
  - ▶ Advantage compared to observing a range of political outcomes (e.g., willingness to protest)
- ▶ Subjects are unaware of elicitation of interest
- ▶ By varying expectations of anonymity, we can manipulate social costs
- ▶ By varying the financial cost imposed on expression, we can *price* individuals' willingness to express their view (and estimate the social cost in financial terms)

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  - ▶ Suggests that social cost of public expression of anti-American ideology amounts to roughly 200 Rs
- ▶ Additional findings:
  - ▶ Visibly religious reject payment more often, and are less responsive—but not completely unresponsive—to social pressure
  - ▶ Rejection correlates with stated views of the U.S. government

## Related Literature

Our work contributes to several active areas of work:

- ▶ The economics of political expression and identity
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- ▶ The political economy of areas with conflict, in particular Central Asia and the Islamic World
  - ▶ Berman and Laitin (2008) on terrorism
  - ▶ Beath et al. (2012): impact of aid on Afghans' views on security and on the Afghan government, NGO's and foreign military forces
  - ▶ Campante and Chor (2012): education and economics interact to shape protest activity

## Policy Relevance

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- ▶ Understanding levels and determinants of an important set of relatively extreme ideological views
  - ▶ A significant minority of extremists, even among literate men
- ▶ Social context where *expression* of views occurs is important: even extremists' expressed views can be moderated
  - ▶ Voting (in private) may be different from polling (some social interaction)—in particular when choices include extremist options (referenda)
  - ▶ Bringing expression of extreme attitudes into the light of day might moderate groups (though effect might work in the opposite direction)
  - ▶ Expression is price sensitive

# Outline

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## Timeline and Site Selection

- ▶ Pilot: June 24-25, 2013 (Islamabad and Peshawar), 143 subjects
- ▶ Main study: July 7-16 simultaneously in three cities
- ▶ No foreigners (no Lahori) directly involved in the implementation
- ▶ Areas either directly affected by U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan (Peshawar) or cities with substantial numbers of refugees from these areas (Islamabad and Dera Ghazi Khan)
  - ▶ Working directly in rural Khyber Pakhtunhwa or in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA): too much risk
- ▶ Sample: 1,152 Pakistani men

# Map of Locations




Figure: Map of Locations

# Recruitment, Screening, and Enrollment

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  - ▶ Waiting room with *verbal* informed consent
  - ▶ Enrollment one by one at enrollment desk in random order (second literacy test then)
  - ▶ Subject numbers for lab stations also in random order, given a chit numbered 1-24 from a shuffled deck
  - ▶ 24 subjects per room, 24 versions of the surveys

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- ▶ End of session: subjects exited building immediately, bussed off site, no interaction with subjects waiting to participate

## Picture of Implementation (1)




Figure: Enrollment Desk in Islamabad

## Picture of Implementation (2)



Figure: Experimental Session in Peshawar

# Experiment Overview

Each activity in one envelope that had to be closed and placed below the chair when finished. Subjects not allowed to open envelope from previous activity

1. Envelope 1: demographic questions and Big Five and show-up fee of 300 Rs
2. **Envelope 2:** main intervention—bonus payment decision
3. Envelope 3: incentivized views of others' decisions, # of known subjects, and list experiment
4. Envelope 4: stated views on U.S. and Japan

# Main Intervention – Funding Source and Payment Amount

Envelope 2 contained a piece of paper with the following text printed on it:

“Thank you for completing the survey. In return for completing the survey, we can offer you a bonus payment. Funding for the bonus payment comes from {*Funding Agency*}. We can pay you {*Amount*} for completing the survey, but in order to receive the bonus payment you are required to acknowledge receipt of the funds provided by {*Funding Agency*} and thank the funder. If you choose not to accept the payment, you will forgo the bonus payment of {*Amount*}, but not the payment of 300 Rs. for your participation.”

- ▶ Agency: U.S. government or LUMS
- ▶ Amount: 100 Rs or 500 Rs

## Main Intervention: Public Decision

“If you choose to accept the bonus payment, in order to receive this additional payment, you will be asked to turn the letter in to the survey coordinator in the front of the room, so other participants will see you turn in the letter. Once you have made your decision on the next page, please place the letter into envelope 2, whether or not you chose to accept the bonus payment.”

## Main Intervention: Private Decision

“If you choose to accept the bonus payment, in order to receive this additional payment, your decision will be **completely private**; you will simply replace the letter in envelope 2 and submit it with your other survey materials at the end of the study, so no other participants will know your choice. Once you have made your decision on the next page, please place the letter into envelope 2, whether or not you chose to accept the bonus payment.”

## Letter of acknowledgment and thanks

- I gratefully thank { *Lahore University of Management Sciences / the U.S. government* } for its generosity and I accept the bonus payment offer.
- I choose not to accept the bonus payment offer.
- 

### شکریہ اور تصدیق کا خط

میں تہہ دل سے لاہور یونیورسٹی آف مینجمنٹ سائنسز کا اس کی فراہمی کے لئے شکریہ ادا کرتا ہوں اور اضافی رقم قبول کرتا ہوں۔

میں اضافی رقم قبول نہیں کرتا۔

# Payment

- ▶ Subjects asked to come to front of the room in order of subject number; gave materials to coordinator and returned to seat to await payment
- ▶ With 24 packets, two RAs went to separate room to calculate payment
- ▶ Payments sealed in an envelope; bills wrapped in thick debriefing handout so subjects could not tell others' payment amount
- ▶ Subjects called in front of room, were paid, and sent out into a waiting bus; subsequent session began immediately

# Balance of Covariates

	LUMS				U.S. government				p-value
	Low payment		High payment		Low payment		High payment		
	Pri (1)	Pub (2)	Pri (3)	Pub (4)	Pri (5)	Pub (6)	Pri (7)	Pub (8)	
Ec activity?	0.468 (0.042)	0.489 (0.042)	0.518 (0.043)	0.489 (0.043)	0.500 (0.042)	0.529 (0.042)	0.521 (0.042)	0.518 (0.042)	0.97
Age	23.2 (0.4)	23.6 (0.5)	23.6 (0.4)	24.2 (0.4)	23.3 (0.4)	23.8 (0.5)	24.2 (0.5)	23.6 (0.4)	0.63
Single	0.696 (0.039)	0.691 (0.040)	0.691 (0.039)	0.683 (0.040)	0.748 (0.038)	0.669 (0.040)	0.674 (0.040)	0.684 (0.040)	0.90
Yrs of ed	12.1 (0.2)	11.9 (0.3)	11.8 (0.2)	11.7 (0.2)	12.1 (0.2)	11.5 (0.3)	11.7 (0.3)	12.0 (0.2)	0.55
<i>Ethnicity</i>									
Punjabi	0.090 (0.025)	0.098 (0.026)	0.096 (0.025)	0.104 (0.027)	0.101 (0.027)	0.093 (0.026)	0.119 (0.028)	0.105 (0.027)	1.00
Pashtun	0.634 (0.042)	0.632 (0.042)	0.640 (0.041)	0.634 (0.042)	0.643 (0.042)	0.667 (0.042)	0.622 (0.042)	0.654 (0.041)	1.00
Baluchi	0.082 (0.024)	0.120 (0.028)	0.103 (0.026)	0.067 (0.022)	0.093 (0.026)	0.093 (0.026)	0.096 (0.025)	0.075 (0.023)	0.88
<i>Religion</i>									
Shia	0.037 (0.016)	0.045 (0.018)	0.083 (0.024)	0.060 (0.021)	0.040 (0.017)	0.076 (0.023)	0.045 (0.018)	0.038 (0.017)	0.66
Sunni	0.844 (0.031)	0.841 (0.032)	0.812 (0.034)	0.851 (0.031)	0.849 (0.032)	0.855 (0.031)	0.895 (0.027)	0.880 (0.028)	0.67
Visibly religious	0.208 (0.034)	0.257 (0.037)	0.264 (0.037)	0.229 (0.035)	0.229 (0.035)	0.160 (0.031)	0.306 (0.039)	0.257 (0.037)	0.12

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## Pricing Ideology

- ▶ Rejection rate of U.S. 100 Rs private payment: 25.2%

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
- ▶ Rejection rate of U.S. 100 Rs private payment: 25.2%
- ▶ Rejection rate of LUMS 100 Rs private payment: 8.4%  
(p-value of difference  $< 0.001$ )
- ▶ Results unchanged with individual covariates and session F.E.

# The Role of Social Pressure (1)

- ▶ How do subjects view themselves relative to others in the room?
  - ▶ Those who accepted: 18.6% view themselves as strictly more anti-American than the other participants
  - ▶ Those who rejected: 63.6% view themselves strictly more anti-American
  
- ▶ Incentivized elicitation of views on others' acceptance (for 100 Rs private U.S. offer):
  - ▶ Median guess: 95.6% of others accepted bonus payment offer
  - ▶ Median guess among those who rejected: 82.6% accepted the offer

# The Role of Social Pressure (2)

Figure: Number of other subjects known in the room




## The Role of Social Pressure (3)

- ▶ Rejection rate of U.S. 100 Rs offer goes down from 25.2% to 17% (p-value=0.093)
- ▶ Difference in rejection rates (U.S. vs. LUMS) goes down from 16.8% to 5.9% (p-value=0.069)
- ▶ Higher rejection rate of 100 Rs *LUMS* payment in public suggests embarrassment or other effect working against our moderation findings

# The Demand Curve for Political Expression

- ▶ Random subsample received 500 Rs offer
- ▶ Private rejection rates:
  - ▶ U.S. government: goes down from **from 25.2% to 9.5%**  
(p-value=0.0005)
  - ▶ LUMS: **from 8.4% to 5.6%**

# The Demand Curve for Political Expression



# Correlating with Visible Religiosity

- ▶ Scoring sheet of “visible religiosity” : seven categories of visible dress or appearance commonly associated with religiosity
- ▶ For 100 Rs U.S. payment:
- ▶ Private rejection rates:
  - ▶ Non-religious: 24.2%
  - ▶ Religious: 30.4%
- ▶ Public rejection rates:
  - ▶ Non-religious: 14.8%
  - ▶ Religious: 24.2%

## Correlating with Stated Views

- ▶ Among subjects in the private/100 Rs condition:
  - ▶ Among those who **accept** the U.S. payment, **15.2%** have negative views about the U.S. government
  - ▶ Among those who **reject**: **69.4%**
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- ▶ Among subjects in the private/100 Rs condition:
  - ▶ Among those who **accept** the U.S. payment, **12.5%** have negative views about the *Japanese* government
  - ▶ Among those who **reject**: **16.7%**
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- ▶ Similar results with views on U.S. (Japanese) aid

# Ruling out Confounding Stories

- ▶ Rejection not an expression of general anti-foreign sentiment; results on Japan suggest specific ideology
- ▶ Rejection not simply risk aversion: no signature required; acceptance also required checking a box on the same form
- ▶ Other concerns?

# External Validity

- ▶ Our sample consists of Pakistani, literate, young men:
  - ▶ Broad representation from across Pakistani ethnic groups; selected from several regions
  - ▶ Of course, *not* representative—this is useful, though, to show that moderation of expression can be achieved
- ▶ Our method of eliciting subjects' ideology is not general:
  - ▶ Doesn't capture many aspects of subjects' views
- ▶ The attitude expressed may have different characteristics from other ideologies:
  - ▶ It may be that public expression in some settings leads to *greater* extremism
  - ▶ It may be that attitude toward the U.S. is more/less price elastic

# Outline

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# Summary

- ▶ Novel method for eliciting individuals' ideological positions
- ▶ Significant minority of Pakistani men willing to forgo sizable payment simply to avoid checking a box affirming gratitude toward the U.S. government
- ▶ Expectation that ideological expression will be publicly observed leads to reduction of rejection of the payment
- ▶ Higher financial cost of expressing anti-American views leads to fewer men rejecting the payment

# Discussion

- ▶ Even individuals with extreme views suppress those views in some social contexts
  - ▶ This may have important policy implications
  - ▶ We would like to understand the mechanism: Moderation effect? Conformity?
- ▶ Would moderate individuals have suppressed their *pro-American* views if they had been the minority?
- ▶ Does expression *per se* matter if hearts and minds are not changed?

THANK YOU